Fictional Meta-Ethics Debate

“The notion of a moral realm is deeply embedded in societal norms, traditions, and legal systems.”
“Many people find comfort and guidance in the concept of an objective moral order, making it resistant to change.”
“Engaging in public discourse through books, articles, debates, and media can help disseminate the ideas of moral anti-realism.”
“Continuing to support and publish research that explores the psychological and neurological bases of moral intuitions can provide empirical support for the anti-realist position.”
“Eliminating the term ‘moral’ from discourse and replacing it with terms like ‘emotional intuitions’ or ‘socially acceptable behaviors’ can clarify the anti-realist position.”
“Successfully integrating these new terms into existing legal and social frameworks without losing the normative force required for social order and cooperation will be challenging.”

Table of Contents: _{^{(Click any link below to navigate to that section.)}}

Create a fictional dialogue on meta-ethics in a table with two columns.

The left column will contain a lengthy dialogue between Stilwell who wrote the moral anti-realist essay below and Yudkowsky based on his position in his essay linked to below. In the right column, I would like you to add clarifying commentary or explanations of the dialogue content on the left.

Yudkowsky: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fG3g3764tSubr6xvs/the-meaning-of-right
Stilwell: https://byteseismic.com/2024/04/24/essay-moral-anti-realism/

Dialogue Between Stilwell and Yudkowsky	Commentary
Stilwell: Eliezer, your essay “The Meaning of Right” dives deep into how our brains label actions as “right”. But isn’t this just a sophisticated way of saying that morality is an evolved cognitive algorithm with no real grounding in objective reality?	Stilwell is questioning the objective existence of morality, suggesting it is purely a result of evolved cognitive processes.
Yudkowsky: That’s an interesting point, Stilwell. While it’s true that our sense of morality stems from cognitive algorithms, this does not mean that morality is devoid of meaning or value. The way our brain processes “rightness” is akin to how it processes other complex properties like color or taste.	Yudkowsky acknowledges the cognitive basis of morality but argues that it still holds value and meaning in human life, similar to subjective experiences like color and taste.
Stilwell: But doesn’t that mean morality is just a projection of our minds, without any objective existence? If we label something as “right”, it’s only because our brains are wired to do so. This doesn’t give it any true universal status.	Stilwell is pushing the point that morality lacks objective reality and is merely a mental construct.
Yudkowsky: Not necessarily. Even if morality is a construct of the human mind, it doesn’t reduce its significance. Morality as a 1-place function remains stable and allows us to make consistent moral judgments. This stability can be seen as a form of objectivity within the human context.	Yudkowsky argues that the stability and consistency of moral judgments give them a form of objectivity, even if they are derived from human cognition.
Stilwell: Yet, the stability you speak of is only within the framework of human cognition. It doesn’t imply any objective moral truths that exist independently of human perception. Moral systems are just attempts to map our emotions and societal norms with a veneer of objectivity.	Stilwell insists that moral systems only reflect human emotions and societal norms, not objective truths.
Yudkowsky: While moral systems do map our emotions and societal norms, they also serve a critical role in guiding human behavior and fostering cooperation. The derived properties of morality, like the obligation to save a child, are essential for societal functioning and human flourishing.	Yudkowsky highlights the practical importance of moral systems in guiding behavior and promoting cooperation, emphasizing their role in human society.
Stilwell: But isn’t that just utilitarianism dressed up as objective morality? You’re saying that because moral systems work to promote human flourishing, they gain some form of legitimacy. This still doesn’t prove they are objectively true.	Stilwell argues that practical benefits of moral systems do not confer objective truth to them, implying they are utilitarian constructs rather than objective realities.
Yudkowsky: I agree that moral systems promote human flourishing, but it’s not just about utility. The sense of rightness we experience is deeply embedded in our cognitive framework. It’s a stable computational property that guides our actions, much like how logical reasoning works.	Yudkowsky defends the stability and embedded nature of moral judgments in our cognitive framework, comparing them to logical reasoning processes.
Stilwell: Yet, this stability is a result of evolutionary and cultural conditioning. Different societies have different moral intuitions, which shows that morality is subjective and context-dependent. There is no universal moral truth that applies across all human societies.	Stilwell emphasizes the variability of moral intuitions across cultures, arguing this as evidence for the subjectivity of morality.
Yudkowsky: Different societies indeed have different moral intuitions, but there is significant overlap due to the psychological unity of humankind. Shared moral intuitions, like fairness and empathy, point to common underlying principles that can be considered universally applicable within the human species.	Yudkowsky acknowledges cultural differences but points to common moral intuitions as evidence of a shared human morality that has universal applicability within our species.
Stilwell: Common moral intuitions might exist, but they are still shaped by evolutionary pressures and cultural influences. This commonality doesn’t make them objectively true; it only makes them widely accepted. The convergence of moral systems on common condemnations is a result of emotional salience, not objective grounding.	Stilwell reiterates that shared moral intuitions are products of evolution and culture, not objective truths, and their commonality arises from emotional responses.
Yudkowsky: I see your point, Stilwell. However, the practical implications of shared moral systems are profound. They enable us to create stable societies and reduce conflict. Even if morality is a human construct, its role in shaping human behavior and societal norms gives it a form of objective reality within our lived experiences.	Yudkowsky concedes that morality might be a construct but emphasizes its practical importance in societal stability and behavior regulation, suggesting a pragmatic form of objectivity.
Stilwell: Pragmatically, perhaps. But this form of objectivity is not what moral realists claim. They assert that moral truths exist independently of human perception, which is what I dispute. Until we can establish a moral realm beyond human cognition, I remain a moral anti-realist.	Stilwell maintains his stance, distinguishing between pragmatic objectivity and the independent objective moral truths claimed by moral realists.
Yudkowsky: Fair enough, Stilwell. Even if we disagree on the objective existence of morality, we can agree that understanding and reflecting on our moral intuitions is crucial. Whether seen as objective truths or valuable constructs, our moral systems profoundly impact human life and society.	Yudkowsky acknowledges the disagreement but emphasizes the importance of moral reflection and the impact of moral systems on human society.

Warning: The dialogues presented are AI-generated and may not accurately represent the positions of the interlocutors. Readers should not assume these dialogues are proper or authoritative representations of the views held by the individuals involved.

Stilwell would like to reformulate his position into something stronger: Moral intuitions are actually emotional intuitions and their emergent values. The use of the term moral in this context is superfluous.
Continue the dialogue:

Dialogue Between Stilwell and Yudkowsky	Commentary
Stilwell: Eliezer, I’d like to reformulate my position. What we call moral intuitions are actually emotional intuitions and their emergent values. The term “moral” in this context is superfluous. These are merely strong emotional responses dressed up in philosophical language to give them undue weight.	Stilwell is refining his argument, asserting that moral intuitions are fundamentally emotional responses and that the term “moral” adds unnecessary complexity.
Yudkowsky: I understand your reformulation, Stilwell. However, even if moral intuitions are rooted in emotional responses, this doesn’t negate their significance. Emotions play a crucial role in human decision-making and societal norms. The label “moral” helps to contextualize these intuitions within a broader framework of human behavior and societal expectations.	Yudkowsky acknowledges the emotional basis of moral intuitions but argues that the term “moral” provides useful context and framework for understanding these intuitions.
Stilwell: But by labeling these intuitions as “moral,” we risk attributing them with an undue sense of universality and objectivity. This can lead to the imposition of one’s emotional responses onto others, creating a false sense of moral superiority. If we recognize these intuitions as emotional, we can better understand and navigate the diversity of human values without the pretense of objective morality.	Stilwell argues that the term “moral” falsely universalizes subjective emotional responses, which can lead to moral imposition and superiority.
Yudkowsky: You raise a valid concern, Stilwell. The term “moral” can indeed be misused to justify imposition. However, when used correctly, it can facilitate discussions about values and ethics in a structured way. Acknowledging the emotional roots of these intuitions doesn’t diminish their relevance in shaping ethical frameworks and guiding behavior.	Yudkowsky acknowledges the potential misuse of the term “moral” but emphasizes its role in structured ethical discussions and behavior guidance.
Stilwell: Even so, we must be cautious. By recognizing these intuitions as emotional, we can approach ethical discussions with more humility and openness to differing perspectives. We can acknowledge that our so-called “moral” intuitions are not universal truths but personal and cultural preferences shaped by our experiences and emotions.	Stilwell emphasizes the need for humility and openness in ethical discussions by recognizing moral intuitions as personal and culturally shaped emotional responses.
Yudkowsky: Agreed, humility and openness are crucial in ethical discourse. Recognizing the emotional basis of our intuitions can indeed foster a more inclusive and empathetic approach. However, I believe the term “moral” still serves a purpose in highlighting the normative aspects of these intuitions, guiding us toward what we consider good or right within our social context.	Yudkowsky agrees on the importance of humility and openness but maintains that the term “moral” is useful for emphasizing the normative aspects of ethical intuitions.
Stilwell: Perhaps, but we should be clear that these normative aspects are contingent on human emotions and cultural contexts. They are not intrinsic properties of actions or states of affairs. By reframing moral intuitions as emotional intuitions, we can better navigate ethical diversity and avoid the pitfalls of moral absolutism.	Stilwell stresses the contingency of normative aspects on emotions and culture, advocating for a reframing of moral intuitions to avoid moral absolutism.
Yudkowsky: I agree that recognizing the contingency of our moral intuitions on emotions and culture can help us avoid moral absolutism. Yet, these intuitions still play a critical role in forming our ethical systems and guiding our actions. Even if they are rooted in emotion, their practical impact and the need for a common framework remain. The challenge is to balance this recognition with the need for structured ethical discourse.	Yudkowsky concurs on avoiding moral absolutism but underscores the practical impact of moral intuitions and the necessity for a common ethical framework.
Stilwell: I see your point, Eliezer. We can retain the practical use of these intuitions while being mindful of their origins. By doing so, we can engage in ethical discussions that are both grounded in human experience and open to diverse perspectives. This approach can help us build more flexible and inclusive moral systems.	Stilwell acknowledges the practical utility of moral intuitions while advocating for an approach that remains mindful of their emotional and cultural origins.
Yudkowsky: Exactly, Stilwell. By understanding the emotional and cultural roots of our moral intuitions, we can create ethical frameworks that are more inclusive and adaptable. This doesn’t diminish the value of these frameworks; rather, it enriches them by incorporating a broader range of human experiences and perspectives.	Yudkowsky agrees, emphasizing that acknowledging the origins of moral intuitions can enrich ethical frameworks by making them more inclusive and adaptable.

I am still dissatisfied with what seems to be a reification of moral intuitions into something weightier than mere emotions. Can we not simply dispense with the muddy term moral and use the terms emotions or values when discussing human behavior?
Continue the dialogue accordingly.

Dialogue Between Stilwell and Yudkowsky	Commentary
Stilwell: Eliezer, I am still dissatisfied. It seems we are reifying moral intuitions into something weightier than mere emotions. Can we not simply dispense with the term “moral” and use “emotions” or “values” when discussing human behavior? This would clarify that these are subjective and context-dependent rather than objective truths.	Stilwell argues for eliminating the term “moral” in favor of “emotions” or “values” to emphasize their subjectivity and context-dependence.
Yudkowsky: I understand your concern, Stilwell. Using “emotions” or “values” can certainly highlight the subjective nature of our intuitions. However, the term “moral” serves to underscore the normative force these intuitions have in guiding behavior. It points to a structured way of thinking about right and wrong, which is crucial for social cohesion and ethical discourse.	Yudkowsky acknowledges the subjective nature of intuitions but defends the term “moral” for its role in structured ethical thinking and social cohesion.
Stilwell: But isn’t that normative force just the strength of our emotional convictions? By calling them “moral,” we risk giving them an illusion of objectivity. If we use “emotions” or “values,” we can still have structured discussions about right and wrong without implying that these concepts have an independent existence.	Stilwell asserts that the normative force of moral intuitions is derived from emotional convictions and argues for using “emotions” or “values” to avoid implying objectivity.
Yudkowsky: You have a point, Stilwell. The strength of our moral intuitions does come from our emotional convictions. However, the term “moral” also encompasses the social and cultural frameworks that shape these convictions. It reflects the collective deliberation on what we, as a society, consider to be right or wrong. Using “emotions” or “values” might miss this collective aspect.	Yudkowsky agrees that moral intuitions stem from emotional convictions but emphasizes that “moral” includes the social and cultural frameworks that shape these convictions.
Stilwell: I see what you’re saying. However, by clearly distinguishing between individual emotional responses and the collective values that emerge, we can better understand how these frameworks are constructed and how they can be changed. Dispensing with the term “moral” can help us focus on the processes that generate our ethical systems without the baggage of assumed objectivity.	Stilwell suggests that distinguishing between individual emotions and collective values can clarify the construction and potential change of ethical frameworks, advocating for dropping the term “moral.”
Yudkowsky: That’s a compelling argument. By focusing on emotions and values, we can indeed analyze the processes behind our ethical systems more clearly. However, I still believe that “moral” has its place in signaling the broader societal context in which these values operate. It reminds us that our individual intuitions are part of a larger, ongoing dialogue about how we should live together.	Yudkowsky acknowledges the clarity of focusing on emotions and values but maintains that “moral” highlights the societal context and ongoing dialogue about ethical living.
Stilwell: Perhaps we can find a middle ground. We could use “emotional values” to describe the individual and collective convictions guiding behavior, without the implication of objective morality. This term can capture both the subjective nature of our intuitions and their normative significance within a social context.	Stilwell proposes a compromise term, “emotional values,” to describe guiding convictions without implying objective morality, capturing both individual and collective aspects.
Yudkowsky: “Emotional values” is a term I can work with. It respects the subjective origins of our intuitions while acknowledging their normative role in society. This way, we can discuss the same concepts without the weight of assumed objectivity, focusing instead on the processes and contexts that shape our ethical beliefs.	Yudkowsky accepts the term “emotional values,” appreciating its balance of subjective origins and normative societal role, allowing for focused discussion on shaping ethical beliefs.
Stilwell: Great, we have a consensus. By using “emotional values,” we can better understand the interplay between our individual experiences and the collective frameworks that guide our behavior. This approach can help us navigate ethical diversity with clarity and openness.	Stilwell expresses satisfaction with the consensus on “emotional values,” emphasizing its usefulness in understanding and navigating the interplay between individual and collective ethical frameworks.
Yudkowsky: Indeed, Stilwell. This terminology allows us to explore ethical questions with a clear acknowledgment of their emotional roots and societal implications. It promotes a nuanced understanding of human behavior and encourages constructive dialogue about our values and how they shape our world.	Yudkowsky concurs, highlighting how “emotional values” facilitates nuanced exploration of ethical questions and encourages constructive dialogue about human values.

It is precisely the notion of normative force that I am objecting to. The use of the term normative appears to be simply another attempt to sneak in the assumption of an actual moral realm, and ignores the position of the moral anti-realist that there is no actual moral or normative realm in which moral or normative facts can reside.
Continue the dialogue accordingly.

Dialogue Between Stilwell and Yudkowsky	Commentary
Stilwell: Eliezer, it is precisely the notion of normative force that I am objecting to. The use of the term “normative” appears to be another attempt to sneak in the assumption of an actual moral realm. This ignores the moral anti-realist position that there is no moral or normative realm where moral or normative facts can reside.	Stilwell challenges the use of “normative,” arguing it implies an actual moral realm, which moral anti-realists deny.
Yudkowsky: I understand your objection, Stilwell. From a moral anti-realist perspective, talking about “normative force” may indeed seem to imply an unjustified objective moral realm. However, when I refer to “normative,” I mean the social and psychological compulsion that our emotional values exert on us. It doesn’t necessarily imply an objective realm but rather the strong influence our values have on our behavior and decisions.	Yudkowsky clarifies that his use of “normative” refers to the social and psychological influence of values, not an objective moral realm.
Stilwell: I see your point, but even this psychological compulsion is rooted in our emotional responses and societal conditioning. By using terms like “normative,” we risk reinforcing the illusion of an objective moral force. Why not simply describe this as the influence of strongly held emotional values, without invoking normative language?	Stilwell suggests avoiding “normative” language to prevent reinforcing the illusion of objective moral force, focusing instead on the influence of emotional values.
Yudkowsky: That’s a fair concern. Describing it as the influence of strongly held emotional values can certainly avoid the implication of objectivity. My goal is to recognize the significant impact these values have on our behavior and social interactions. If we can agree that these values shape our actions and societal norms without implying an objective realm, we can proceed with greater clarity.	Yudkowsky acknowledges the concern and agrees that focusing on the influence of emotional values can avoid implying objectivity while recognizing their impact.
Stilwell: Exactly. By framing our discussion around the influence of emotional values, we acknowledge the strong impact they have without misleadingly suggesting they exist in an independent moral realm. This approach respects the subjective nature of our values while explaining their role in shaping human behavior and societal norms.	Stilwell emphasizes that focusing on the influence of emotional values respects their subjectivity and explains their role in shaping behavior and norms.
Yudkowsky: Agreed, Stilwell. We can discuss how emotional values guide our actions and societal expectations without implying they reside in an objective realm. This allows us to analyze and critique these values based on their origins and effects rather than assuming an inherent moral truth.	Yudkowsky agrees, noting that discussing emotional values without implying objectivity allows for analysis based on their origins and effects.
Stilwell: I’m glad we found common ground. By dispensing with normative language and focusing on emotional values, we can have a clearer, more accurate conversation about the factors that influence human behavior. This also opens the door for more honest discussions about how these values are formed and how they can be changed.	Stilwell is satisfied with the consensus, emphasizing that avoiding normative language allows for clearer discussions about influencing factors and value formation.
Yudkowsky: Absolutely, Stilwell. This approach not only clarifies our discussions but also respects the complexity of human psychology and social dynamics. By focusing on emotional values, we can better understand and navigate the moral landscape without resorting to the notion of an objective moral realm.	Yudkowsky agrees, highlighting that this approach respects human psychology and social dynamics, helping to understand the moral landscape without implying objectivity.

Consistent with my position, I would like to dispense with the term moral landscape and employ terms more consistent with moral anti-realism such as the landscape of socially acceptable behaviors. Is this possible?
Continue the dialogue accordingly.

Dialogue Between Stilwell and Yudkowsky	Commentary
Stilwell: Consistent with my position, I would like to dispense with the term “moral landscape” and employ terms more consistent with moral anti-realism, such as “the landscape of socially acceptable behaviors.” Is this possible?	Stilwell seeks to use terminology that aligns with moral anti-realism, avoiding terms that imply objective morality.
Yudkowsky: Yes, that’s entirely possible. Referring to “the landscape of socially acceptable behaviors” aligns well with the moral anti-realist perspective. It emphasizes the societal and cultural basis of what we consider acceptable or unacceptable without suggesting an objective moral reality.	Yudkowsky agrees to use terms that emphasize societal and cultural bases for behavior, avoiding implications of objective morality.
Stilwell: Excellent. By using “the landscape of socially acceptable behaviors,” we can better reflect the influence of societal norms and emotional values on human actions. This terminology respects the subjective and constructed nature of these norms, making our discussions more precise and aligned with moral anti-realism.	Stilwell is pleased with the agreed terminology, which respects the subjective nature of norms and aligns with moral anti-realism.
Yudkowsky: I agree. This shift in terminology helps clarify that we are discussing behaviors and values shaped by societal influences and emotional responses rather than inherent moral truths. It allows for a more accurate analysis of how these norms evolve and influence behavior.	Yudkowsky agrees that the new terminology clarifies the discussion, focusing on societal influences and emotional responses.
Stilwell: Precisely. By framing our discussions around socially acceptable behaviors, we can analyze how these norms are established, maintained, and changed over time. This approach is more honest and transparent, avoiding the pitfalls of implying objective moral truths.	Stilwell highlights the benefits of the new terminology, allowing for analysis of norm establishment and change while avoiding implications of objective morality.
Yudkowsky: Absolutely. This framework enables us to examine the dynamics of societal norms and their impact on behavior without the need for objective moral claims. It also fosters a more inclusive dialogue, as we can discuss the relative and context-dependent nature of these norms.	Yudkowsky notes that this framework allows for examining societal norms and behavior impacts without objective moral claims, fostering inclusive dialogue.
Stilwell: I’m glad we’re on the same page. Using “the landscape of socially acceptable behaviors” aligns with our understanding of human behavior as influenced by emotional values and societal context. It provides a clearer, more accurate framework for our discussions.	Stilwell expresses satisfaction with the agreed terminology, aligning with their understanding of behavior influenced by emotional values and societal context.
Yudkowsky: Indeed, Stilwell. This terminology shift ensures that our discussions remain grounded in the social and psychological realities of human behavior. It respects the complexity of these influences and avoids misleading implications of objective morality.	Yudkowsky concurs that the terminology shift keeps discussions grounded in social and psychological realities, respecting their complexity.
Stilwell: Thank you, Eliezer. I look forward to continuing our dialogue within this framework. By focusing on socially acceptable behaviors, we can have more nuanced and productive discussions about the factors that shape human actions and societal norms.	Stilwell looks forward to continuing the dialogue within the new framework, anticipating more nuanced and productive discussions.
Yudkowsky: You’re welcome, Stilwell. I believe this approach will lead to deeper insights into how our values and norms are formed and how they influence our behavior. Let’s continue exploring this landscape together.	Yudkowsky agrees and looks forward to exploring the landscape of socially acceptable behaviors for deeper insights.

Feasibility of Challenging the Notion of a Moral Realm with Moral Anti-Realism

Challenging Social Inertia:
Pushing against the social inertia that upholds the belief in a moral realm is a significant challenge. The notion of a moral realm is deeply embedded in societal norms, traditions, and legal systems. Many people find comfort and guidance in the concept of an objective moral order, making it resistant to change. This entrenched belief is reinforced through education, religion, and cultural narratives that emphasize moral absolutes.

Promoting Moral Anti-Realism:

Educational Initiatives: One of the most effective ways to promote moral anti-realism is through education. By integrating moral philosophy, including moral anti-realism, into educational curricula, students can be exposed to a variety of ethical theories. This can encourage critical thinking and a deeper understanding of the foundations of moral claims.
Public Discourse: Engaging in public discourse through books, articles, debates, and media can help disseminate the ideas of moral anti-realism. Influential thinkers and public intellectuals can play a key role in presenting these ideas to a broader audience.
Scientific and Philosophical Research: Continuing to support and publish research that explores the psychological and neurological bases of moral intuitions can provide empirical support for the anti-realist position. Demonstrating that moral intuitions are grounded in emotional and cognitive processes can help demystify the concept of an objective moral realm.

Replacing “Moral” with “Emotional” or “Socially Acceptable”:
Eliminating the term “moral” from discourse and replacing it with terms like “emotional intuitions” or “socially acceptable behaviors” can clarify the anti-realist position. This linguistic shift emphasizes that what we consider “moral” is often a reflection of collective emotional responses and social conventions rather than objective truths.

Potential Challenges:

Resistance to Change: Many individuals and institutions may resist this shift due to their reliance on traditional moral frameworks.
Misunderstanding and Misrepresentation: There is a risk that the public may misunderstand or misrepresent moral anti-realism, perceiving it as a threat to social cohesion and ethical behavior.
Integration with Existing Norms: Successfully integrating these new terms into existing legal and social frameworks without losing the normative force required for social order and cooperation will be challenging.

Conclusion:
While it is feasible to promote moral anti-realism and encourage a shift in discourse, it requires sustained effort across multiple fronts, including education, public discourse, and scientific research. The process will likely be gradual and met with resistance, but by emphasizing the empirical and rational foundations of moral anti-realism, it is possible to challenge the deep-seated belief in a moral realm and foster a more nuanced understanding of human behavior.

Quiz

#1: What is the central question addressed in Yudkowsky’s essay “The Meaning of Right”?

Answer:

Yudkowsky addresses the question of what morality is and what the word “should” means.

#2: How does Yudkowsky propose to investigate how the brain labels things as “right”?

Answer:

By starting out wearing morality-goggles and considering morality-as-morality, then transitioning to reduction-goggles and discussing cognitive algorithms.

#3: What analogy does Yudkowsky use to explain the backward flow of should-ness?

Answer:

He uses the example of flipping a switch to stop a train from hitting a child, showing how the moral desirability flows backward from saving the child to pressing the button.

#4: What is Stilwell’s main argument against the concept of morality?

Answer:

Stilwell argues that moral intuitions are actually emotional intuitions and their emergent values, and that the use of the term moral is superfluous.

#5: According to Stilwell, why is the term “immoral” powerful in social dialogue?

Answer:

Because it can psychologically control others and establish the speaker as “moral” or “good”.

#6: How does Yudkowsky respond to Stilwell’s objection about normative force?

Answer:

Yudkowsky explains that normative force refers to a cognitive algorithm that guides behavior and decision-making, not necessarily an assumption of an actual moral realm.

#7: What term does Stilwell suggest using instead of “moral landscape”?

Answer:

Stilwell suggests using the term “landscape of socially acceptable behaviors”.

#8: Why does Yudkowsky believe that using terms like “moral” is important?

Answer:

Yudkowsky believes it is important because these terms carry significant cognitive and cultural weight that influences human behavior and social norms.

#9: How does Stilwell view the relationship between moral systems and human emotions?

Answer:

Stilwell views moral systems as mappings of human emotions that use terminology to give common emotions greater obligatory force.

#10: What is Yudkowsky’s stance on the objectivity of morality?

Answer:

Yudkowsky argues that moral judgments are subjunctively objective and can be true based on a stable, abstract computation of what is right.

#11: According to Yudkowsky, what is the role of cognitive algorithms in moral decision-making?

Answer:

Cognitive algorithms guide human behavior and decision-making by labeling certain actions as “right” or “should”.

#12: What does Stilwell suggest about the legitimacy of moral systems?

Answer:

Stilwell suggests that moral systems lack legitimate grounding and are essentially extensions of emotional dispositions.

#13: How does Yudkowsky propose to address moral anti-realism’s critique of morality?

Answer:

Yudkowsky proposes understanding morality as a complex, abstract computation that guides behavior and decision-making, rather than as an external, objective realm.

#14: What is the significance of “The Gift We Give To Tomorrow” in Yudkowsky’s argument?

Answer:

It signifies that, despite the evolutionary origins of morality, the values and behaviors that promote human flourishing are worth preserving and advancing.

#15: What challenge does Yudkowsky identify in reflecting on one’s moral intuitions?

Answer:

The challenge is to use one’s current best understanding of morality to critically evaluate and possibly revise one’s own moral intuitions.

Provide 20 discussion questions relevant to the content above.

How does Yudkowsky differentiate between morality-as-morality and cognitive algorithms in his essay “The Meaning of Right”?
What does Yudkowsky mean by the term “should-ness” and how does it relate to causality?
How does Stilwell argue against the concept of an objective moral realm in his essay?
What is the role of social influence in the formation of moral intuitions according to Stilwell?
How does Yudkowsky address the concept of normative force in his discussion with Stilwell?
Can the term “landscape of socially acceptable behaviors” fully replace “moral landscape” in discussions of human behavior? Why or why not?
How does Yudkowsky’s concept of “The Gift We Give To Tomorrow” integrate with his understanding of morality?
What are the implications of viewing moral intuitions as emotional intuitions for moral philosophy?
How does the dialogue between Yudkowsky and Stilwell highlight the tension between moral realism and anti-realism?
In what ways do moral systems attempt to map to human emotions, according to Stilwell?
How does Yudkowsky’s understanding of morality as a complex computation challenge traditional views of moral objectivity?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of Stilwell’s argument that the term “moral” is superfluous?
How does Yudkowsky justify the use of the term “moral” despite Stilwell’s objections?
How might one reconcile the evolutionary origins of morality with the desire for objective moral standards?
What role do cognitive algorithms play in human decision-making about moral issues?
How does Stilwell’s perspective on moral systems challenge the legitimacy of commonly accepted moral norms?
How does Yudkowsky’s concept of “rightness” as a stable, abstract computation align with or differ from traditional ethical theories?
What are the practical implications of adopting a moral anti-realist stance in everyday life?
How does the dialogue between Yudkowsky and Stilwell contribute to the broader debate on moral realism versus anti-realism?
What are the potential benefits and drawbacks of eliminating the term “moral” from discussions of human behavior and values?

Table of Contents: _{^{(Click any link below to navigate to that section.)}}