2 responses to “Vicious & Virtuous Circularity”

1. 

   fulgentian

   5/26/2025 7:53 PM

   Your critique of Presuppositional Apologetics (PA) and the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) suffers from multiple misrepresentations and philosophical category errors.

   You mischaracterize TAG as a deductive syllogism (e.g. G → M; M; ∴ G), then critique it for affirming the consequent. But TAG is not a standard deductive argument—it’s a transcendental argument, which seeks to identify the necessary preconditions for intelligibility (logic, morality, science, etc.). Its structure is reductio: deny the Christian God and you destroy the possibility of knowledge itself. Treating it as a mere inference fails to grasp its actual philosophical force.

   You claim circularity in PA is “vicious,” yet provide no alternative model of epistemic authority that avoids circularity. Foundationalism requires unjustified basicality, and coherentism never escapes subjectivity. PA, following Van Til and Bahnsen, acknowledges circularity at the ultimate level—just like every worldview must—but grounds it in the ontological primacy of the Triune God, not arbitrary human axioms. That’s what makes it virtuous, not vicious.

   Your attempt to formalize TAG introduces an implicit premise (M → G) and then claims circularity. But this “premise” is not smuggled in—it is the conclusion of transcendental analysis. PA doesn’t assume that only the Christian God can account for intelligibility—it demonstrates that all rival systems (naturalism, Islam, Eastern thought, etc.) fail to account for it without borrowing from Christianity.

   You assert that “alternative explanations” (e.g., secular humanism, other religions) could explain M—but you provide no analysis. TAG doesn’t merely assert the exclusivity of Christianity; it exposes the internal collapse of all non-Christian systems under their own epistemic weight. The challenge isn’t to imagine possible alternatives—it’s to present one that can consistently account for logic, morality, and knowledge without presupposing what only Christianity can provide.

   Lastly, your criticisms are framed entirely by naturalistic epistemic standards—standards that PA explicitly rejects as autonomous and self-refuting. To critique PA on those grounds is to beg the very question PA exposes: that autonomous reason cannot justify itself without appealing to God.

   Reply
2. 

   Phil Stilwell

   5/26/2025 8:02 PM

   Thanks for your thoughtful response, fulgentian. While you raise several points in defense of presuppositional apologetics (PA) and the Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence (TAG), your arguments do not sufficiently address the core issues of logical validity and circularity outlined in the original critique. Below, I, with the assistance of Grok, address your points systematically to clarify why the circularity in PA remains vicious and why your objections do not undermine the critique.

   1. Mischaracterization of TAG as a Deductive Syllogism
      You argue that I misrepresent TAG by framing it as a deductive syllogism (e.g., G → M; M; ∴ G) and critiquing it for affirming the consequent, asserting instead that TAG is a transcendental argument aimed at identifying the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. While TAG is indeed presented as a transcendental argument, this does not exempt it from logical scrutiny. Transcendental arguments, by their nature, must still adhere to principles of logical coherence to be persuasive. The formalization (G → M; M; ∴ G) captures the core claim of TAG: that the Christian God (G) is the necessary precondition for intelligibility (M). The critique demonstrates that this structure either commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent or relies on an implicit premise (M → G), which renders it circular. Even as a transcendental argument, TAG must demonstrate, not merely assert, that G is the only possible precondition for M. Without such a demonstration, it remains logically suspect.
   2. Claim That All Worldviews Involve Circularity
      You assert that I (and my AI buddies) provide no alternative model of epistemic authority that avoids circularity and that all worldviews, including foundationalism and coherentism, are inherently circular. While it is true that ultimate epistemic authorities often face challenges of justification, this does not automatically validate PA’s circularity as virtuous. The critique distinguishes between vicious and virtuous circularity based on whether the circular reasoning provides independent support or resolves contradictions in a well-founded system. PA’s circularity—claiming the Bible is true because it declares itself true—lacks external corroboration and fails to provide a non-arbitrary basis for its claims. In contrast, foundationalism relies on self-evident or incorrigible beliefs (e.g., “I exist”), and coherentism seeks consistency within a system of beliefs. While neither is immune to critique, they attempt to minimize arbitrariness through empirical or rational grounding, whereas PA’s reliance on self-authentication risks being indistinguishable from other religious claims (e.g., the Qur’an’s self-authentication).
   3. Implicit Premise (M → G) as the Conclusion of Transcendental Analysis
      You argue that the implicit premise (M → G) is not smuggled in but is the conclusion of transcendental analysis, which demonstrates that only the Christian God can account for intelligibility. However, this claim is precisely where PA falters. The original critique notes that PA assumes, rather than proves, that only the Christian God can account for M (logic, morality, science). To demonstrate this, PA would need to systematically show that all alternative worldviews (e.g., naturalism, humanism, other theistic systems) are incoherent without borrowing from Christianity. As the critique points out, this is a false dilemma, as other systems may offer plausible accounts for M without invoking the Christian God. Your response asserts that rival systems fail but provides no specific analysis to support this, mirroring the critique’s point that PA’s exclusivity claim is asserted rather than substantiated.
   4. Alternative Explanations for Intelligibility (M)
      You challenge the critique for not analyzing alternative explanations for M, such as secular humanism or other religions, and claim that TAG shows the “internal collapse” of non-Christian systems. However, the burden of proof lies with PA to demonstrate that no alternative can account for M, not with the critic to fully articulate every possible alternative. The critique provides a logical counterexample: a non-Christian worldview (H) could explain M (H → M) without contradiction, undermining the necessity of G. For instance, secular humanism might ground logic in the consistency of human reasoning, morality in evolutionary and social frameworks, and science in empirical observation. While these may be debated, they are not inherently incoherent, and PA’s failure to rigorously refute them weakens its claim to exclusivity. Your assertion that rival systems “borrow” from Christianity is itself an unproven assumption, reinforcing the circularity of PA’s reasoning.
   5. Critique Framed by Naturalistic Epistemic Standards
      You argue that the critique relies on naturalistic epistemic standards, which PA rejects as autonomous and self-refuting, and that this constitutes begging the question against PA. However, this objection misconstrues the critique’s approach. The critique evaluates PA using principles of formal logic—validity, soundness, and avoidance of fallacies—which are not inherently “naturalistic” but are universal standards for rational discourse. PA’s rejection of these standards as “autonomous” does not exempt it from logical scrutiny; rather, it highlights its unfalsifiability, as noted in the original critique. By dismissing external standards, PA immunizes itself against criticism, which, per Karl Popper’s criterion, undermines its rationality. Furthermore, claiming that autonomous reason is self-refuting does not prove the Christian God’s necessity; it merely shifts the burden without resolving the circularity.
   6. Virtuous vs. Vicious Circularity in PA
      You claim that PA’s circularity is virtuous because it is grounded in the “ontological primacy of the Triune God” rather than “arbitrary human axioms.” However, this distinction is unconvincing without independent justification for why the Christian God, specifically, is the necessary foundation. The critique argues that virtuous circularity, as seen in recursive definitions or fixed-point theorems, is acceptable because it operates within a well-defined system that resolves contradictions and provides new insights. PA’s circularity, by contrast, relies on self-authentication without external validation, making it indistinguishable from other self-authenticating claims (e.g., those of other religions). This arbitrariness, combined with its lack of falsifiability, renders the circularity vicious rather than virtuous.

   Conclusion
   Your response does not adequately address the critique’s core points: that PA’s circularity assumes the conclusion (G) in its premises, commits logical fallacies (e.g., begging the question), and fails to demonstrate that only the Christian God can account for intelligibility (M). While you correctly note that all worldviews face challenges in justifying ultimate authorities, PA’s reliance on self-authentication and its dismissal of external standards make its circularity vicious, as it provides no independent basis for persuasion or validation. The critique’s logical analysis remains robust, as it applies universal standards of reasoning rather than naturalistic biases, and your assertion that rival systems collapse under scrutiny requires substantiation that PA does not provide.

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