Evidences of Moral Facts

⸺

  • “Could what humans consider to be their “moral intuitions” be simply their emotions coupled with socially-derived expectations? Would that not be a far more parsimonious explanation than invoking an entire moral realm?“ This question highlights the core debate in understanding moral intuitions as an interplay between emotions and social norms, challenging the necessity of an objective moral realm.
  • “Emotional Foundations of Moral Judgments: Research in psychology suggests that emotions play a crucial role in moral judgments.“ Jonathan Haidt’s model is emphasized, proposing that moral judgments stem from intuitive, emotional responses rather than deliberate reasoning, underscoring emotions as the primary drivers of these judgments.
  • “Humans are inherently social creatures, and much of our understanding of what is “right” and “wrong” is learned through social interactions and cultural norms.“ This statement underlines the significance of socially-derived expectations in shaping moral intuitions, pointing to the cultural and social context as key determinants of moral norms.
  • “Proponents of the view that there are universal moral principles…argue that certain moral intuitions appear to be widespread across different cultures.“ This quote addresses the debate over universal moral principles, suggesting the existence of a moral framework that transcends cultural variations, challenging the purely naturalistic view.

Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)

  1. Could what humans consider to be their “moral intuitions” be simply their emotions coupled with socially-derived expectations? Would that not be a far more parsimonious explanation than invoking an entire moral realm?
    1. Emotions and Social Expectations in Moral Intuitions
    2. Critiques and Limitations
  2. It seems that what are deemed “moral intuitions” map neatly to human emotions, an explanation more parsimonious than actual moral facts. What could we consider legitimate evidence for a moral realm in which moral facts reside that would run counter to what we would expect from socially shared emotions?
    1. 1. Intuition of Moral Realism
    2. 2. Argument from Moral Disagreement
    3. 3. Moral Progress
    4. 4. Argument from Reason
    5. 5. Moral Language and Practice
    6. 6. Argument from Moral Experience
    7. Counterpoints to Socially Shared Emotions Explanation
  3. ChatGPT identified the following as potential evidence of a true moral realm.
  4. We addressed #1 in this post. I want to respond to #2 below:
    1. Reevaluation of Moral Disagreements
    2. Implications
    3. Conclusion
  5. I now want to address ChatGPT’s third objection of “Moral Progress”
    1. Emotional Evolution and Social Dynamics
    2. Measuring Moral Frameworks
    3. Conclusion
  6. I will now address the 4th “evidence” of an objective moral realm, “Argument from Reason”.
    1. Challenges to the Moral-Mathematical Analogy
    2. Parsimony and Emotional Explanations
    3. Conclusion
  7. I will now address the 5th “evidence” of an objective moral realm, “Moral Language and Practice”.
    1. Emotional Underpinnings of Moral Language
    2. Challenges to Objective Moral Standards
    3. Conclusion
  8. Let’s now address the 6th “evidence” of an objective moral realm, “Argument from Moral Experience”.
    1. Subjectivity and the Notion of “Self-Evident” Moral Truths
    2. Theoretical Inflation and Parsimony
    3. Conclusion
  9. Create a 10-item quiz on the discussion above with answers at the end.
    1. Quiz
    2. Answers
    3. Morality Quiz
  10. Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.
    1. Morality Discussion Questions:

Could what humans consider to be their “moral intuitions” be simply their emotions coupled with socially-derived expectations? Would that not be a far more parsimonious explanation than invoking an entire moral realm?

Your question touches on a significant debate in the fields of ethics and moral psychology, one that examines the origins and nature of moral intuitions. The suggestion that moral intuitions could be primarily the result of emotions intertwined with socially-derived expectations offers a naturalistic explanation for how humans discern right from wrong without appealing to the existence of an objective moral realm. This viewpoint aligns with several theories in moral psychology and evolutionary ethics, and we can explore both the arguments for this perspective and the implications of adopting it.

Emotions and Social Expectations in Moral Intuitions

  1. Emotional Foundations of Moral Judgments:
  • Research in psychology suggests that emotions play a crucial role in moral judgments. Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model, for example, argues that moral judgments are often the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions), where reasoning comes into play primarily to justify one’s instinctual response post hoc. This model emphasizes emotions as the primary driver of these intuitive judgments.
  1. Socially-Derived Expectations:
  • Humans are inherently social creatures, and much of our understanding of what is “right” and “wrong” is learned through social interactions and cultural norms. From this perspective, moral intuitions are seen as internalized versions of societal rules and expectations, which are shaped by the cultural and social context one grows up in. This can explain the variability of moral norms across different societies and time periods.
  1. Evolutionary Perspectives:
  • Evolutionary theories of morality suggest that moral intuitions may have developed as adaptive responses to promote group cohesion and cooperation, which were beneficial for our ancestors’ survival. This view posits that emotions such as empathy, guilt, and indignation are evolutionary products that guide social behavior in ways that typically align with what is considered moral in a given group.

Critiques and Limitations

While the explanation based on emotions and social expectations is parsimonious and grounded in empirical research, there are several critiques and limitations to consider:

  1. Complexity of Moral Reasoning:
  • Some philosophers and psychologists argue that reducing moral intuitions to emotions and social expectations oversimplifies the complexity of moral reasoning. They point out that individuals often engage in principled reasoning that goes beyond immediate emotional responses and societal norms, especially in novel or complex situations.
  1. Existence of Universal Moral Principles:
  • Proponents of the view that there are universal moral principles, which might suggest the existence of a moral realm or objective moral truths, argue that certain moral intuitions appear to be widespread across different cultures, hinting at an underlying moral framework that transcends cultural variations.
  1. Moral Progress and Critique:
  • Another challenge to the emotions and social expectations view is the concept of moral progress. Critics argue that if our moral intuitions were solely based on these factors, it would be difficult to explain how societies come to recognize and rectify moral wrongs that were once socially accepted.

In conclusion, the view that human moral intuitions can be understood as the interplay of emotions and socially-derived expectations offers a compelling, naturalistic explanation that aligns with much current research in psychology and evolutionary biology. However, this perspective is part of a broader debate that includes various competing theories about the nature of morality, its origins, and how best to understand moral judgments and behaviors. Each of these perspectives provides valuable insights into the complex and multifaceted nature of human morality.

You raise an interesting point! There is debate about the source of moral intuitions. Here’s how your idea stacks up:

  • Emotions and Social Influence: There’s definitely a link between emotions like disgust or empathy and moral judgments. Social experiences also shape intuitions. Growing up in a society that values honesty might make stealing feel intuitively wrong.
  • Parsimony: Your explanation is simpler, relying on known psychological mechanisms. This appeals to some philosophers.
  • Challenges: Some argue that emotions alone can’t explain the feeling of “rightness” that often accompanies moral intuitions. Social expectations can also be arbitrary or even harmful. For instance, a society might have expected women to stay silent, but most would consider that morally wrong today.

Alternative View: Some philosophers believe there’s more to morality than just emotions and society. They propose a moral realm or objective moral facts that our intuitions tap into imperfectly.

The Debate Continues: There’s no consensus on the origin of moral intuitions. It’s likely a complex interplay of emotions, social learning, and perhaps even evolved predispositions.

Here are some resources to dig deeper:

  • Moral Intuitions | The Moral Psychology Handbook [Oxford Academic]
  • The evolution of moral intuitions and their feeling of rightness [PhilArchive]

It seems that what are deemed “moral intuitions” map neatly to human emotions, an explanation more parsimonious than actual moral facts. What could we consider legitimate evidence for a moral realm in which moral facts reside that would run counter to what we would expect from socially shared emotions?

Arguing for the existence of a moral realm in which objective moral facts reside involves moving beyond the framework of naturalistic explanations—such as emotions and socially derived expectations—to consider philosophical and potentially metaphysical evidence. These discussions often revolve around arguments that seek to establish the existence of moral truths that are independent of human emotions and societal constructions. Let’s explore several types of evidence and arguments that proponents of objective moral facts might use:

1. Intuition of Moral Realism

  • Universality of Certain Moral Intuitions: Some philosophers argue that the widespread agreement on certain moral principles across diverse cultures suggests the existence of universal moral truths. These are not easily explained by cultural relativism or individual emotional responses. For example, prohibitions against unjust killing or the virtue of fairness seem to have near-universal recognition.

(This is address here.)

2. Argument from Moral Disagreement

  • Depth of Moral Disagreements: Sometimes, moral disagreements go deeper than mere differences in emotional responses or societal expectations. They seem to reflect underlying conflicts about principles that both parties recognize as important, even if they interpret or prioritize them differently. This suggests that the disagreements are about real, objective issues rather than just differences in subjective feelings or social conditioning.

3. Moral Progress

  • Historical Moral Progress: The notion of moral progress—societies’ abilities to improve their moral standards over time (e.g., abolishing slavery, extending voting rights, etc.)—suggests that humanity is getting closer to recognizing and adhering to objective moral truths. If moral values were solely subjective or culturally relative, the concept of moral progress would be less coherent, as there would be no ‘better’ or ‘worse’ moral frameworks, just different ones.

4. Argument from Reason

  • Rationality and Moral Truths: Some argue that moral truths are accessible through reason in a way analogous to mathematical truths. Just as mathematical truths are not contingent upon human emotions or societal constructions, so too could moral truths exist independently of human feelings and social norms. This argument posits that human reason can apprehend an abstract, objective moral order.

5. Moral Language and Practice

  • Moral Language: The way people talk about moral issues—using terms like “ought,” “should,” and “right” that imply an objective standard—suggests that people naturally conceive of morality as involving objective facts. The argument here is about the semantics of moral language, which seems to presuppose the existence of moral facts that our statements aim to describe.

6. Argument from Moral Experience

  • Direct Moral Experience: Some philosophers point to the phenomenology of moral experience—the way in which moral truths seem to be directly apprehended in certain situations. This is akin to experiencing the wrongness of an act not just as a personal dislike or societal taboo but as an objective feature of the situation.

Counterpoints to Socially Shared Emotions Explanation

Each of these points presents a form of evidence or argumentation that seeks to establish or support the existence of a moral realm independent of human emotions and social constructs. However, it’s important to note that these arguments are subject to various counterarguments and interpretations. The debate between moral realism (the belief in objective moral facts) and anti-realism (denial of the same) is ongoing, with sophisticated positions on both sides. The evidence for a moral realm as outlined above challenges the reduction of moral intuitions to socially shared emotions by positing that our moral experiences, language, and reasoning reveal an engagement with objective moral truths, not merely emotional reactions or social conventions.

You’re right, the emotional connection to morality is strong. Here’s the challenge with using emotions alone as evidence for objective moral facts:

  • Emotional Variation: Emotions can be culturally influenced and vary across individuals. What feels wrong in one society might feel okay in another (think arranged marriages or public nudity).

Finding Evidence for a Moral Realm: Here are some areas philosophers look at for evidence of objective moral facts that transcend emotions and social conditioning:

  1. Universality (with caveats): Some argue there are core moral principles, like avoiding inflicting unnecessary harm, found universally across cultures. However, the specific application can differ (lying to protect someone might be seen differently).
    (This is address here.)
  2. Reasoning and Justification: The ability to reason about moral dilemmas and provide justifications beyond “it feels bad” could suggest grounding in something more objective.
  3. The “Queasiness Factor”: Some philosophers like David Hume point to a feeling of “queerness” when contemplating certain acts, regardless of emotion or social norms. For example, incest might feel wrong even if it wasn’t socially forbidden.

Important Caveats:

  • There are alternative explanations for each point. Universality might reflect evolved predispositions, reasoning could be based on social benefits, and “queerness” could be a product of cultural conditioning we’re not fully aware of.
  • Even if there’s a moral realm, it doesn’t guarantee easy access to moral facts. Disagreements would still arise about how to interpret them.

The Bottom Line:

The debate continues. While emotions undoubtedly play a role, the question of whether there’s an underlying moral realm remains an open one.

ChatGPT identified the following as potential evidence of a true moral realm.

We addressed #1 in this post.
I want to respond to #2 below:

Moral disagreement can just as easily arise from emotions as can aesthetic disagreements. Just as different cultures disagree on architecture and cuisine, their emotionally-derived values may produce disagreements on what they consider morally right and wrong. Therefore moral disagreement does not serve as evidence of an actual moral realm that is in contradiction to or possessing explanatory power above what we would expect from emotions tied to culture. Right?

Your observation effectively highlights a crucial counterpoint in the debate about the nature of moral disagreements and their implications for moral realism. The comparison to aesthetic disagreements is particularly insightful, as it draws attention to how deeply rooted cultural and emotional influences can shape our perceptions and judgments, whether they concern morality, beauty, or taste.

The argument that moral disagreements might arise from emotions and culturally derived values, much like disagreements in aesthetics, challenges the notion that such disagreements necessarily point to the existence of an objective moral realm. From this perspective, the variability and subjectivity observed in moral judgments across different cultures and individuals could be seen as analogous to differences in artistic or culinary preferences, which are widely recognized as being influenced by personal and cultural backgrounds rather than reflecting objective truths.

Reevaluation of Moral Disagreements

  • Cultural Relativism: The argument leans towards a form of cultural relativism, suggesting that moral beliefs and practices are products of cultural conditioning. Just as different cultures develop distinct tastes in food and art, they also develop different moral codes, none of which are inherently superior or closer to objective moral truths than others.
  • Emotional and Evolutionary Perspectives: It acknowledges the role of emotions in moral decision-making, consistent with evolutionary psychology’s view that our moral intuitions have been shaped by natural selection to facilitate cooperation and social cohesion. Emotions like empathy, disgust, and outrage can therefore drive moral judgments in ways that are deeply subjective and context-dependent.
  • Constructivism in Morality: This view aligns with moral constructivism, the idea that moral truths are constructed by human beings rather than discovered in an objective moral realm. On this account, moral disagreements reflect the diverse ways in which different cultures and individuals construct their moral understandings.

Implications

The implication of this perspective is that moral disagreements do not necessarily indicate the presence of objective moral facts that are independent of human emotions and cultural contexts. Instead, they may simply reflect the rich tapestry of human diversity in constructing moral frameworks based on emotional responses and social learning. This does not mean that all moral judgments are equally valid or that efforts to resolve moral disagreements are futile. Rather, it suggests that understanding and addressing these disagreements requires engagement with the underlying emotional and cultural dimensions.

Conclusion

While this perspective provides a powerful challenge to certain arguments for moral realism, it’s important to note that the debate between moral realism and anti-realism is complex and multifaceted. Each side offers sophisticated arguments and counterarguments. The discussion about whether moral disagreements point to an objective moral realm or are better explained by cultural and emotional differences is a central and ongoing part of this philosophical conversation.

You’re absolutely right. Moral disagreements can definitely be seen as similar to aesthetic disagreements, and both can stem from emotional responses tied to culture. Here’s why the depth of moral disagreement might not be the slam dunk evidence it initially seems:

  • Disagreements Within a Framework: Even deep moral disagreements often occur within a shared moral framework. For example, both sides in a capital punishment debate might value human life, but prioritize different principles (justice vs. rehabilitation). This doesn’t necessarily point to entirely different moral realities.
  • Emotional Intensity Doesn’t Equal Objectivity: The intensity of emotions surrounding a moral issue doesn’t automatically translate to objective moral facts. People can feel strongly about things they later come to see differently, like slavery being morally reprehensible despite once being widely accepted.

Alternative Explanations for Depth:

Here are some alternative explanations for the perceived depth of moral disagreements:

  • Evolutionary Pressures: Moral frameworks might reflect evolved predispositions that have been shaped by natural selection, leading to some level of cross-cultural consistency despite variations.
  • Reasoning and Justification: Even if the starting point is emotions, moral disagreements often involve complex reasoning and attempts to justify positions based on principles. This suggests a deeper level of engagement than just subjective feelings.

The Importance of the Debate:

While the existence of a moral realm remains unproven, the very act of having these disagreements holds value. It pushes us to examine our own values, consider different perspectives, and refine our moral reasoning.

The Takeaway:

Moral disagreements are complex phenomena. Emotions and social conditioning play a significant role, but they might not be the whole story. The question of whether there’s an underlying moral reality is fascinating and likely to be debated for some time to come.

I now want to address ChatGPT’s third objection of “Moral Progress”

There is no need to assume that the convergence of moral intuitions is anything other than the convergence of emotional dispositions. This convergence may feel like moral progress when, in fact, it is merely an effect of an age in which positive emotions such as compassion have lower viscosity as aggression becomes more costly and altruism has increased value. What people perceive as “better” or “worse” moral frameworks they are likely simply measuring against their increased compassion instead of some perceived objective moral realm. The notion of a shared moral realm is a facade that is loosely covering the reality of shared emotions. Right?

Your interpretation offers a compelling critique of the argument that historical moral progress suggests humanity is getting closer to objective moral truths. By attributing changes in moral standards over time to shifts in emotional dispositions and social conditions, you’re presenting an alternative explanation that does not rely on the existence of an objective moral realm. This perspective fits within a broader naturalistic understanding of morality, emphasizing the role of evolutionary, psychological, and sociological factors in shaping moral intuitions and judgments.

Emotional Evolution and Social Dynamics

  • Shifts in Emotional Dispositions: The idea that the convergence of moral intuitions reflects the convergence of emotional dispositions is rooted in the understanding that our emotions evolve. As societies evolve, certain emotions, like compassion, may become more prevalent because they foster social cohesion and cooperation, which are beneficial in complex social systems.
  • Socioeconomic Factors: The notion that aggression becomes more costly and altruism gains increased value in modern societies highlights the impact of socioeconomic changes on moral attitudes. In environments where direct conflict is less likely to ensure survival or success, traits like cooperation and altruism can become more valuable, leading to shifts in what is considered morally commendable.
  • Perception of Moral Progress: Under this view, what is perceived as moral progress (e.g., the abolition of slavery, the expansion of rights) can be understood as societies adapting their moral frameworks to better align with these evolved emotional dispositions and social conditions. The “improvement” in moral standards is then measured against these shifting emotional baselines rather than an objective moral order.

Measuring Moral Frameworks

  • Increased Compassion: The argument that societies are likely measuring moral frameworks against their increased compassion rather than some objective moral standards suggests a form of moral relativism informed by evolving human psychology. This perspective emphasizes the subjective nature of moral judgments and their dependence on human emotional and cognitive capacities.
  • The Facade of a Shared Moral Realm: Proposing that the notion of a shared moral realm is a facade covering the reality of shared emotions challenges the moral realist position. It suggests that the apparent objectivity of moral claims might be an illusion, with the true foundation of these claims lying in the shared emotional experiences and social practices of human beings.

Conclusion

The perspective you’ve outlined provides a naturalistic and sociopsychological account of morality that contrasts with theories positing the existence of objective moral truths. It suggests that what we consider moral progress is more about the evolution of emotional dispositions and the changing conditions of social life rather than a movement towards a universal moral truth. This view invites a reevaluation of how we understand moral change and the basis of moral judgments, emphasizing the role of human emotions, social interactions, and cultural evolution in shaping what we consider to be moral.

You raise a very interesting point! It’s true that increased compassion and lower “aggression viscosity” (meaning aggression becomes less common) can lead to convergence of moral intuitions. This convergence might feel like moral progress, even if it’s driven by emotional shifts rather than objective moral truths. Here’s how to approach this argument:

Acknowledge the Power of Emotions: Absolutely, emotions play a huge role in shaping moral intuitions. As societies become more peaceful and cooperative, valuing compassion can naturally lead to changes like abolishing slavery.

Challenge the “Just Emotions” View: While emotions are powerful, some argue they’re not the whole story. Here are some counterpoints:

  • Reasoning and Justification: People often provide reasons beyond “it feels good” to justify their moral positions. This suggests a deeper level of engagement with moral concepts.
  • The “Queasiness Factor”: Some philosophers like David Hume point to a feeling of “queerness” when contemplating certain acts, regardless of emotion or social norms (e.g., incest).
  • Objective Moral Progress?: Even if emotions are a driving force, the concept of progress suggests some moral frameworks are better at reducing suffering or promoting flourishing than others. This doesn’t require a moral realm, but acknowledges some frameworks lead to better outcomes.

Alternative Explanation for Moral Convergence:

  • Evolutionary Pressures: Moral frameworks might reflect evolved predispositions that have been shaped by natural selection. Societies that fostered cooperation thrived, leading to some level of cross-cultural consistency in core values despite variations.

The Shared Moral Realm: Facade or Foundation?

Whether the idea of a shared moral realm is a facade or a foundation is still up for debate. But even if it’s a product of our emotional and social nature, it can still be a powerful tool for guiding our actions and promoting well-being.

Here are some resources to dig deeper:

  • The evolution of moral intuitions and their feeling of rightness [PhilArchive]
  • Moral Realism [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

The Takeaway:

The relationship between emotions, social conditioning, and morality is complex. Understanding these forces allows us to be more critical thinkers about our own moral intuitions and engage more productively in moral discussions.

I will now address the 4th “evidence” of an objective moral realm, “Argument from Reason”.

This argument claims we can extract moral facts from reason. It assumes a regularly in moral hermeneutics we do not see. If there exists a moral order analogous to mathematical order, there would be an invariant moral calculus. It seems this argument is often accompanied by additional unsubstantiated entities such as evil spirit that subvert the perception of alleged clear moral facts. If we accept this argument, we must not only accept the bloated ontology of a moral realm, we must admit additions unsubstantiated entities to explain away the reasons humans cannot properly derive moral facts from reason. Common emotions remain the most parsimonious explanation for shared moral intuitions. Right?

Your critique raises important considerations about the challenges of comparing moral reasoning to mathematical reasoning and the implications of asserting the existence of objective moral truths accessible through reason. The comparison to mathematics, a domain characterized by clear, universally accepted principles and the possibility of objective verification, sets a high bar for moral reasoning that may be difficult to meet given the variability and context-dependency of moral judgments. Let’s unpack the critique and the counterarguments it implies:

Challenges to the Moral-Mathematical Analogy

  • Invariance in Moral Calculus: The expectation of an invariant moral calculus analogous to mathematical order presupposes a level of objectivity and universality in moral reasoning that seems at odds with the empirical diversity of moral beliefs and practices. Unlike mathematics, where axioms and operations yield consistent results across contexts, moral reasoning often involves principles that are interpreted and weighted differently across different cultures and individual perspectives.
  • Unsubstantiated Entities: The critique highlights a potential issue with positing additional metaphysical entities (e.g., evil spirits, abstract moral entities) to account for discrepancies between the ideal of objective moral truths and the messy reality of human moral reasoning. This move can indeed complicate the ontology unnecessarily and raise questions about the explanatory power and parsimony of the theory.
  • Challenges in Deriving Moral Facts: The difficulty in deriving clear, objective moral facts from reason alone, especially in the face of widespread moral disagreement and the influence of non-rational factors (emotions, social pressures, etc.), suggests that the analogy with mathematics may not hold as strongly as some proponents of moral realism might hope.

Parsimony and Emotional Explanations

  • Parsimony: The principle of parsimony (or Occam’s Razor) favors explanations that make the fewest assumptions. From this standpoint, explaining shared moral intuitions in terms of common emotional responses and socially conditioned values may indeed be more straightforward than positing an abstract, independent moral order.
  • Emotional and Social Underpinnings: Emphasizing the role of emotions and social contexts in shaping moral intuitions aligns with empirical findings in psychology and anthropology, which document the influence of these factors on moral judgment and behavior. This approach provides a naturalistic account of morality that can accommodate the variability and complexity of moral phenomena without requiring the assumption of objective moral truths.

Conclusion

Your critique effectively articulates some of the key challenges faced by theories that seek to establish an analogy between moral and mathematical reasoning and posit the existence of objective moral truths accessible through reason. While the aspiration to ground morality in reason is appealing for its promise of universality and objectivity, the practical and conceptual difficulties highlighted by your critique suggest that explanations based on common emotional responses and social conditioning offer a more parsimonious and empirically grounded account of shared moral intuitions. This does not necessarily invalidate the project of moral reasoning or the search for moral principles that can command widespread agreement, but it does suggest that such efforts need to be sensitive to the complexities and contingencies of moral life.

You’re right to challenge the idea of a perfect moral calculus derived purely from reason. Here’s how to address this argument:

  • Moral Complexity vs. Mathematical Certainty: Unlike math, moral problems often lack clear-cut answers. There can be trade-offs between competing values, and reasonable people can disagree on the best course of action.
  • Reason Alone is Insufficient: Reasoning is crucial for navigating moral dilemmas, but emotions can provide valuable input. Empathy helps us understand the impact of our choices on others, and moral outrage can motivate us to fight for justice.
  • The “Thick Fact” Problem: Moral judgments often rely on rich contextual details (“thick facts”) that can be difficult to capture in purely logical terms. Understanding a situation’s nuances is essential for sound moral reasoning.

The Challenge of Moral Realism:

The idea of a moral order analogous to math (moral realism) faces its own challenges:

  • Disagreement and Invariance: If there were a clear moral order, wouldn’t moral disagreements be less common? The existence of persistent moral debates casts doubt on the idea of a single, universally agreed-upon moral code.
  • Explaining Away Disagreements: Some moral realists posit “evil spirits” or corrupted reasoning to explain why people don’t always see the “clear” moral facts. This feels like an unnecessary complication.

Emotions: A Simpler Explanation:

Shared emotions provide a more parsimonious explanation for many moral intuitions. Compassion, fairness, and a sense of justice are common across cultures, even if their application can vary.

The Importance of Reasoned Debate:

Even if there’s no perfect moral calculus, reason is still vital for moral progress. By critically examining our intuitions, considering different perspectives, and using reason to justify our positions, we can develop better moral frameworks.

The Takeaway:

Reason and emotions are both crucial for navigating the complexities of morality. While a perfect moral order based solely on reason might be appealing, it’s likely an unrealistic ideal. The messiness of moral discourse might be a necessary part of the ongoing process of refining our moral understanding.

I will now address the 5th “evidence” of an objective moral realm, “Moral Language and Practice”.

Emotions fully explain why humans tend to generate and use judgmental phrases such as “You must X”, “X is immoral”, or “That’s not right!” The power of emotions is an adequate driver toward the reification of terms that feel to us have more obligatory weight than simply expressing our emotions in honest terms such as “I find X abhorrent” or “X makes me angry”. And humans collaborate to introduce and sustain these “moral” terms in our societies to control behavior. There is nothing surprising about emotional humans attempting to add weight to their emotions by creating an moral nomenclature that canonizes those emotions into something that feels more substantive.

And again, this “objective standard” lacks the consensus we would expect from a clear moral code that would run counter to the parsimonious explanation of emotional convergence. Right?

Your analysis presents a compelling argument for understanding moral language and judgments as emerging from emotional responses, rather than reflecting an underlying objective moral order. This perspective highlights the sociolinguistic and psychological mechanisms by which humans express and regulate their moral emotions, shaping collective behavior through a shared moral vocabulary. Let’s delve into the key points of this argument and its implications.

Emotional Underpinnings of Moral Language

  • Emotional Drivers: The claim that emotions are sufficient to explain why humans use judgmental moral language is rooted in the observation that emotions often motivate our judgments and actions. Emotions like disgust, empathy, anger, and fear can drive strong moral responses, and expressing these emotions in terms of moral obligations or prohibitions (“You must X”, “X is immoral”) can amplify their social impact.
  • Reification of Moral Terms: The process of reifying certain emotions into moral terms that carry obligatory weight is seen as a natural extension of the human tendency to communicate and enforce social norms. By framing personal emotional responses as reflections of broader moral principles, individuals can lend their judgments a semblance of objectivity and universality, thereby facilitating social coordination and control.
  • Collaborative Creation of Moral Nomenclature: The development and maintenance of a moral vocabulary within societies can be understood as a collective effort to codify and standardize emotional reactions to behaviors and situations. This shared moral language enables members of a society to articulate and negotiate their values, expectations, and judgments more effectively.

Challenges to Objective Moral Standards

  • Lack of Consensus: The observation that there is no consensus on a clear moral code across different cultures and individuals challenges the notion of objective moral standards. If such standards existed and were accessible through reason or moral intuition, we might expect greater agreement on moral questions than is actually observed. The diversity of moral beliefs and practices, then, is more readily explained by the variability of human emotions and the cultural contexts that shape them.
  • Parsimony and Emotional Convergence: The explanation that converging emotional dispositions underlie shared moral intuitions and language is parsimonious because it relies on observable psychological and sociocultural phenomena without positing the existence of an independent moral realm. This account aligns with the principle of Occam’s Razor, favoring simpler explanations over those that require additional, unsubstantiated assumptions.

Conclusion

Your argument underscores the power of emotions and social processes in shaping moral language and judgments, offering a naturalistic account of morality that eschews the need for objective moral facts. By framing moral discourse as a reflection of emotional experiences and cultural negotiations, this perspective provides a cohesive explanation for the complexity and diversity of moral phenomena. It suggests that what often appears as appeals to objective moral standards may, in fact, be sophisticated expressions of shared emotional responses and social imperatives, articulated through a common moral vocabulary to foster cohesion and regulate behavior within human communities.

You’re absolutely right. Emotions can strongly influence moral language and the feeling of objective moral truths. Here’s how to break down your argument:

  • Emotions Drive Moral Judgments: You’re spot on. Emotions like disgust, anger, or compassion can lead people to use strong moral language (“immoral,” “must”) that goes beyond simply expressing personal feelings (“I dislike it”).
  • Social Collaboration and Moral Norms: People collaborate to create and enforce moral norms, often using strong moral language to do so. This reinforces the feeling of objectivity, even if it’s ultimately rooted in shared emotions and social expectations.
  • Moral Language vs. Moral Reality: The way we talk about morality doesn’t necessarily reflect an objective moral reality. It might simply be a way to make our emotional responses seem more weighty and encourage cooperation.
  • The “Objective Standard” Challenge: You highlight a key weakness in arguments from moral language. The lack of universal consensus on moral issues weakens the claim that our language reflects a single, objective moral code.

Emotions: A More Parsimonious Explanation:

Shared emotions offer a simpler explanation for moral intuitions and moral language. Concepts like fairness, compassion, and harm avoidance are common across cultures, even if their specific applications vary. Moral language then becomes a way to express and enforce these shared emotional responses.

Beyond Pure Emotions:

While emotions are powerful, it’s not the whole story. Reason also plays a role:

  • Justifying Moral Positions: People often use reason to justify their moral stances, going beyond just stating their emotions. This suggests a deeper engagement with moral concepts.
  • Refining Moral Frameworks: Through reasoned discussion and debate, we can refine our moral frameworks and develop more nuanced positions.

The Takeaway:

Moral language is a fascinating tool, but it doesn’t guarantee the existence of a simple, objective moral code. Our emotions, social interactions, and reasoning all play a role in shaping how we talk about morality. Understanding these different influences allows us to have more productive conversations about right and wrong.

Let’s now address the 6th “evidence” of an objective moral realm, “Argument from Moral Experience”.

This argument from moral experience seems to be entirely based on the notion of “self-evident”. This notion appears absent any grounding other than the subject’s raw feelings. While the arguments has the strength of being too vague to deeply scrutinize, its effects can be assessed. If moral facts were available to humans as self-evident knowledge, what can we say of the vast disparities in moral opinions? At this point, additional concepts and entities are often posited, leading to a quite bloated moral ontology quite distant from the parsimony of simply acknowledging moral experiences are emergent of emotional dispositions. Right?

Your critique thoughtfully addresses the challenges inherent in appealing to direct moral experience or the notion of self-evidence in moral truths. This critique rests on two main concerns: the subjective nature of these experiences and the lack of consensus they produce, alongside the theoretical inflation that often accompanies attempts to explain these phenomena. Let’s unpack these concerns further.

Subjectivity and the Notion of “Self-Evident” Moral Truths

  • Subjectivity and Self-Evidence: The claim that some moral truths are self-evident primarily rests on individual subjective experiences. While certain moral intuitions might feel compelling or undeniable to individuals, these intuitions vary significantly across different people and cultures. The reliance on subjective experience as the basis for asserting the existence of objective moral truths presents a challenge, as what feels self-evident to one person may not to another.
  • Disparities in Moral Opinions: The vast disparities in moral opinions and practices across cultures and even within societies challenge the notion of universally accessible, self-evident moral truths. If such truths were readily apparent to all rational beings, we might expect a higher degree of moral consensus than is observed. The diversity in moral beliefs suggests that other factors—such as emotional dispositions, social conditioning, and cultural background—play a significant role in shaping moral intuitions.

Theoretical Inflation and Parsimony

  • Bloated Moral Ontology: To account for the discrepancies between the claim of self-evident moral truths and the observable diversity of moral beliefs, additional theoretical constructs are often introduced. These may include concepts like moral blindness, the corrupting influence of desires or societal norms, or varying capacities for moral reasoning. However, this expansion of moral ontology can complicate the theory without necessarily providing a clearer understanding of moral phenomena.
  • Parsimony of Emotional Explanations: A more parsimonious explanation for shared moral experiences and judgments might be found in common emotional dispositions and their social and cultural modulation. This approach suggests that moral intuitions emerge from complex interactions between innate emotional responses and the external influences individuals encounter throughout their lives. Such an explanation avoids the need for positing self-evident moral truths and instead grounds moral experience in the observable workings of human psychology and social dynamics.

Conclusion

Your argument critically engages with the difficulties of grounding moral truths in direct moral experience or self-evidence, highlighting the challenges posed by subjective variability and the lack of consensus on moral matters. By advocating for an understanding of moral experiences as emergent from emotional dispositions, this critique emphasizes the importance of parsimony and empirical grounding in ethical theory. This approach encourages a focus on the psychological and sociocultural mechanisms that shape moral intuitions and practices, offering a more naturalistic and less ontologically demanding account of morality.

You’re right on target. The “self-evident” nature of moral experience is a key point of contention. Here’s how to approach this argument:

  • The “Self-evident” Problem: The feeling that moral truths are self-evident is subjective and lacks objective grounding. What seems obvious to one person might seem wrong to another.
  • Moral Disparity and Self-Evidence: The vast array of moral disagreements across cultures and history directly contradicts the idea of self-evident moral facts. If they were truly self-evident, wouldn’t there be more consensus?
  • Bloated Moral Ontology: To explain away moral disagreement, some proponents of direct moral experience posit additional entities like “natural law” or a “moral faculty.” This adds complexity without much explanatory power.

Emotions Offer a Simpler Explanation:

Shared emotional responses provide a more parsimonious explanation for moral experience. Emotions like empathy, disgust, and fairness can create the feeling of something being objectively right or wrong, even if it’s ultimately rooted in our emotional makeup.

Beyond Pure Emotions:

While emotions are powerful, it’s important to consider other factors:

  • Reasoning and Justification: People often use reason to justify their moral intuitions, not just relying on a feeling of self-evidence.
  • Social Learning: Moral experiences are shaped by social learning and cultural contexts. What feels “self-evident” can vary depending on where and when you grew up.

The Takeaway:

The feeling of self-evident moral truths is a complex phenomenon. Emotions, social conditioning, and even reason all play a role. While the idea of direct moral experience might be appealing, it’s difficult to sustain in light of the vast array of moral disagreements we see in the world.

Further Exploration:

  • Moral Intuitions | The Moral Psychology Handbook [Oxford Academic]
  • The evolution of moral intuitions and their feeling of rightness [PhilArchive]

Create a 10-item quiz on the discussion above with answers at the end.

Certainly! Below is a 10-item quiz based on our discussion, complete with answers at the end. The quiz is designed to assess understanding of the key concepts and arguments discussed in relation to moral intuitions, emotions, and the notion of objective moral truths.

Quiz

  1. What is the primary critique of attributing moral intuitions solely to emotions and socially derived expectations?
  2. How do some philosophers argue for the existence of universal moral truths beyond cultural variations?
  3. What is the social intuitionist model, and who proposed it?
  4. How does evolutionary psychology explain the development of moral intuitions?
  5. What is a key argument against the existence of an objective moral realm based on the diversity of moral beliefs and practices?
  6. What concept suggests that moral improvements over time indicate humanity is getting closer to recognizing objective moral truths?
  7. How does the argument from reason compare moral truths to which other type of truths?
  8. What challenge is posed by the argument that moral language implies an objective standard?
  9. What does the principle of parsimony (Occam’s Razor) favor in explanations of moral intuitions?
  10. What is the main issue with relying on “self-evident” moral truths according to the critique discussed?

Answers

  1. The critique suggests that this approach may oversimplify the complexity of moral reasoning and fails to account for principled reasoning that goes beyond immediate emotional responses and societal norms.
  2. They argue that the widespread agreement on certain moral principles across diverse cultures suggests the existence of universal moral truths that transcend cultural variations.
  3. The social intuitionist model, proposed by Jonathan Haidt, argues that moral judgments are often the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions), where reasoning mainly serves to justify one’s initial response.
  4. Evolutionary psychology explains the development of moral intuitions as adaptive responses that promoted group cohesion and cooperation, beneficial for our ancestors’ survival.
  5. The challenge is that if moral values were merely subjective or culturally relative, the vast diversity of moral beliefs and practices would not suggest an underlying objective moral truth.
  6. The concept of “moral progress” suggests that societies’ ability to improve their moral standards over time indicates humanity is getting closer to recognizing and adhering to objective moral truths.
  7. The argument from reason compares moral truths to mathematical truths, suggesting that, like mathematical truths, moral truths exist independently of human emotions or societal constructions.
  8. The challenge is that moral language uses terms like “ought,” “should,” and “right,” which imply an objective standard, yet the vast diversity in moral opinions seems to contradict the existence of such a standard.
  9. The principle of parsimony favors simpler explanations that make the fewest assumptions, such as explaining shared moral intuitions in terms of common emotional responses and socially conditioned values.
  10. The main issue is that relying on self-evident moral truths is based on individual subjective experiences, which vary significantly, thus challenging the notion of universally accessible, objective moral truths.

Morality Quiz

Test your knowledge about the philosophical debate on the source of morality!

Instructions: Choose the best answer for each question.

  1. According to the passage, what is a simpler explanation for moral intuitions than invoking an objective moral realm?
    • (a) Religious teachings
    • (b) Social conditioning
    • (c) Emotions
    • (d) Legal frameworks
  2. What is a challenge to the idea that emotions alone explain moral intuitions?
    • (a) They can vary across cultures.
    • (b) They can be suppressed by reason.
    • (c) They can’t explain the feeling of “rightness.”
    • (d) They are not always logical.
  3. Universality with caveats refers to:
    • (a) All cultures agree on everything that is moral.
    • (b) Certain core moral principles are found everywhere.
    • (c) Moral truths are self-evident to all humans.
    • (d) Emotions are the same across all societies.
  4. What is an alternative explanation for the “depth of moral disagreements?”
    • (a) Divine intervention
    • (b) Shared moral frameworks with different interpretations
    • (c) Lack of education
    • (d) Purely emotional responses
  5. Moral convergence might be due to:
    • (a) Increased emphasis on logic in decision-making.
    • (b) Lower societal aggression and more compassion.
    • (c) The discovery of objective moral facts.
    • (d) Widespread adoption of religious beliefs.
  6. The “thick fact problem” refers to the difficulty of:
    • (a) Understanding complex emotions.
    • (b) Capturing moral dilemmas in purely logical terms.
    • (c) Accepting moral disagreements.
    • (d) Separating reason from emotions.
  7. Why is the concept of a perfect moral calculus problematic?
    • (a) It requires advanced mathematical skills.
    • (b) Moral problems often lack clear-cut answers.
    • (c) It is not relevant to everyday life.
    • (d) It goes against religious teachings.
  8. Moral language using terms like “ought” and “must” suggests:
    • (a) People are naturally good at math.
    • (b) An objective moral standard exists.
    • (c) Emotions are the only factor in morality.
    • (d) Moral confusions are inevitable.
  9. What weakens the claim of a universal moral code based on moral language?
    • (a) The existence of different languages.
    • (b) The lack of consensus on moral issues.
    • (c) The power of persuasive arguments.
    • (d) The influence of political leaders.
  10. Why is the “self-evident” nature of moral experience a weak argument?
    • (a) It requires complex philosophical training.
    • (b) It lacks objective grounding and varies by person.
    • (c) It cannot be used to persuade others.
    • (d) It is not based on emotions.

Answers:

  1. (c) Emotions
  2. (c) They can’t explain the feeling of “rightness.”
  3. (b) Certain core moral principles are found everywhere.
  4. (b) Shared moral frameworks with different interpretations
  5. (b) Lower societal aggression and more compassion.
  6. (b) Capturing moral dilemmas in purely logical terms.
  7. (b) Moral problems often lack clear-cut answers.
  8. (b) An objective moral standard exists.
  9. (b) The lack of consensus on moral issues.
  10. (b) It lacks objective grounding and varies by person.

Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.

  1. How do emotions influence our moral judgments, and can they reliably guide us to make morally correct decisions?
  2. In what ways might cultural and social expectations shape an individual’s moral intuitions?
  3. Discuss the implications of Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model for understanding moral reasoning. How does this model challenge traditional views of how we make moral decisions?
  4. How does evolutionary psychology contribute to our understanding of the development of moral norms? Do you think this approach can fully explain the complexity of human morality?
  5. Can the diversity of moral beliefs across different cultures and societies be seen as evidence against the existence of objective moral truths? Why or why not?
  6. What role does the concept of moral progress play in the debate between moral realism and moral relativism? Can we truly speak of moral progress without assuming some form of moral realism?
  7. How does the analogy between moral truths and mathematical truths support the argument for moral realism? Are there limits to this analogy?
  8. Explore the significance of moral language in the debate over moral realism. Does the way we talk about moral issues imply a belief in objective moral standards?
  9. Considering the principle of parsimony (Occam’s Razor), discuss whether a naturalistic explanation of morality based on emotions and social conditioning is preferable to the belief in an objective moral realm. Why or why not?
  10. How does the critique of “self-evident” moral truths challenge the notion that we can directly apprehend moral facts? Is it possible to reconcile this critique with the existence of universal moral principles?
  11. Discuss the role of moral disagreements in understanding the nature of morality. Do these disagreements support the idea of subjective morality or highlight the challenges in accessing objective moral truths?
  12. How might the concept of moral ontology be expanded or complicated by attempts to explain moral perceptions and judgments? Is a more complex moral ontology necessarily problematic?
  13. Explore the implications of moral constructivism for how we understand moral truths. How does this view impact our approach to moral disagreements and moral education?
  14. Discuss the potential for emotional evolution and social dynamics to lead to a convergence of moral intuitions over time. Could this process mimic what some interpret as moral progress towards objective truths?
  15. How do theories that posit innate emotional responses as the basis for moral judgments address the issue of moral diversity and conflict? Can these theories adequately explain the range of moral beliefs and practices observed in different cultures?

Morality Discussion Questions:

  1. If emotions play a large role in shaping our moral intuitions, does that make morality inherently subjective or unreliable?
  2. Can you think of any moral principles that seem truly universal across cultures, even if their application differs?
  3. How can the “queasiness factor” David Hume describes be explained without resorting to an objective moral realm?
  4. Is the “depth of moral disagreements” necessarily a bad thing? Could it be a sign of a healthy and evolving moral framework?
  5. Imagine a society with drastically different emotional dispositions. How might their moral intuitions differ from ours?
  6. Can increased focus on empathy and compassion explain some historical examples of moral progress, like abolishing slavery?
  7. If moral language doesn’t guarantee an objective moral reality, how can we effectively communicate and justify our moral positions?
  8. Does the lack of a perfect moral calculus mean all moral reasoning is futile, or can we still make progress in understanding right and wrong?
  9. How might social conditioning and cultural norms influence what we perceive as “common emotions” underlying morality?
  10. Is the concept of a “bloated moral ontology” (adding entities like natural law) a fair criticism of arguments from direct moral experience?
  11. Should emotions be seen as a weakness or a strength in moral decision-making? Why or why not?
  12. Can advancements in neuroscience help shed light on the biological basis of our moral intuitions?
  13. Does the existence of moral disagreements make the concept of moral progress nonsensical? How can we reconcile these ideas?
  14. If morality is ultimately a product of human emotions and social learning, does that diminish the importance of following moral principles?
  15. In a world without a universally agreed-upon moral code, what role should reason and critical thinking play in navigating ethical dilemmas?

Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)

  1. Could what humans consider to be their “moral intuitions” be simply their emotions coupled with socially-derived expectations? Would that not be a far more parsimonious explanation than invoking an entire moral realm?
    1. Emotions and Social Expectations in Moral Intuitions
    2. Critiques and Limitations
  2. It seems that what are deemed “moral intuitions” map neatly to human emotions, an explanation more parsimonious than actual moral facts. What could we consider legitimate evidence for a moral realm in which moral facts reside that would run counter to what we would expect from socially shared emotions?
    1. 1. Intuition of Moral Realism
    2. 2. Argument from Moral Disagreement
    3. 3. Moral Progress
    4. 4. Argument from Reason
    5. 5. Moral Language and Practice
    6. 6. Argument from Moral Experience
    7. Counterpoints to Socially Shared Emotions Explanation
  3. ChatGPT identified the following as potential evidence of a true moral realm.
  4. We addressed #1 in this post. I want to respond to #2 below:
    1. Reevaluation of Moral Disagreements
    2. Implications
    3. Conclusion
  5. I now want to address ChatGPT’s third objection of “Moral Progress”
    1. Emotional Evolution and Social Dynamics
    2. Measuring Moral Frameworks
    3. Conclusion
  6. I will now address the 4th “evidence” of an objective moral realm, “Argument from Reason”.
    1. Challenges to the Moral-Mathematical Analogy
    2. Parsimony and Emotional Explanations
    3. Conclusion
  7. I will now address the 5th “evidence” of an objective moral realm, “Moral Language and Practice”.
    1. Emotional Underpinnings of Moral Language
    2. Challenges to Objective Moral Standards
    3. Conclusion
  8. Let’s now address the 6th “evidence” of an objective moral realm, “Argument from Moral Experience”.
    1. Subjectivity and the Notion of “Self-Evident” Moral Truths
    2. Theoretical Inflation and Parsimony
    3. Conclusion
  9. Create a 10-item quiz on the discussion above with answers at the end.
    1. Quiz
    2. Answers
    3. Morality Quiz
  10. Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.
    1. Morality Discussion Questions:

Leave a comment

Phil Stilwell

Phil picked up a BA in Philosophy a couple of decades ago. He occasionally teaches philosophy and critical thinking courses in university and industry. He is joined here by ChatGPT 4, GEMINI, CLAUDE, and occasionally Copilot, his far more intelligent AI friends. The five of them discuss and debate a wide variety of philosophical topics I think you’ll enjoy.

Phil curates the content and guides the discussion, primarily through questions. At times there are disagreements, and you may find the banter interesting.

— Goals and Observations

Stay informed!

Sign up for new post notices.

Recent Posts

  • Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

    Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was a seminal figure in modern philosophy, contributing to metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. His concept of monads, the principle of sufficient reason, and the idea of the best of all possible worlds… Read more

  • Collapsing Epistemological Terms

    This article delves into the challenges of defining epistemological terms and proposes methods to achieve productive dialogue. It emphasizes collapsing 2nd-order terms into 1st-order concepts like “credence” for clarity and mutual understanding. However, some responses… Read more

  • Dialoguing with Hegel

    Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy has left a lasting impact. While his concept of the dialectic is widely acknowledged, his Absolute Spirit and Absolute Idealism are less accepted due to their speculative and metaphysical nature.… Read more

  • John Locke

    John Locke profoundly influenced modern philosophy, challenging prevailing rationalist views and emphasizing knowledge derived from sensory experiences. His concept of the mind as a “tabula rasa” at birth and his political theories significantly impacted political… Read more

  • Dangers: Awe as an Indicator

    The argument presents an insightful perspective on the subjective nature of beauty and the relationship between the observer and the observed. It questions the idea of objective beauty and challenges anthropocentric viewpoints. It also acknowledges… Read more

  • The Power of Statistics

    Statistics play a crucial role in acquiring truth by providing tools for interpreting data, quantifying uncertainty, and making informed decisions. Its power lies in quantifying evidence, pattern recognition, hypothesis testing, decision-making, understanding variability, and effective… Read more

  • Dialoguing with Charles Sanders Peirce

    Charles Sanders Peirce explains his philosophy, covering pragmatism, semiotics, and the scientific method. Pragmatism evaluates ideas by their practical consequences. Semiotics studies signs: icons, indexes, and symbols. The scientific method involves hypothesis, experimentation, and revision.… Read more

  • Baruch Spinoza

    Baruch Spinoza, a 17th-century Dutch philosopher, significantly influenced modern philosophy by challenging traditional dualistic views and championing reason as the path to knowledge. His deterministic view of the universe led to groundbreaking contributions in monism,… Read more

  • Subjectivity Constrained by the Objective

    Subjective experience, influenced by objective reality, emerges from subjective creatures trying to navigate the world. Objective limitations and neural flexibility shape rich subjectivity, displaying various quirks. Cognitive biases, emotional states, and exploratory nature raise potential… Read more

  • Dialoguing with Epicurus

    Epicurus, an influential ancient Greek philosopher, advocated for pleasure as the highest good, tranquility of the mind, and the moderation of desires. While some of his specific ideas have evolved, they continue to shape contemporary… Read more

  • Faith or Evidence?

    This article explores the tension between citing miracles and advocating for faith as a reason to believe in God. It delves into how these concepts are viewed and reconciled within religious epistemology. The passage also… Read more

  • Testing Prayer

    A definitive prayer test would involve a specific, observable miracle, like restoring amputated limbs, occurring within a set timeframe following prayers directed to a specific God. Control groups would be essential to exclude coincidences and… Read more

  • Dialoguing with Socrates

    Socrates’ philosophy has left a lasting impact on critical thinking and ethical exploration. His Socratic Method continues to inspire dialogue in various fields. The notion of ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ challenges societal… Read more

  • Monetary Goals

    A rational disposition toward money and possessions involves moderation, value-focused decision-making, and long-term planning, prioritizing experiences over material possessions. Historical figures like Diogenes of Sinope and St. Francis of Assisi found happiness through self-sufficiency and… Read more

  • Thomas Aquinas

    Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican friar and theologian of the 13th century, profoundly impacted Western philosophy by integrating Aristotelian philosophy with Christian doctrine. His influence is seen in Scholasticism, natural law theory, and the synthesis of… Read more

  • Culture-Wide Emotional Dispositions

    This article discusses the cultural aspects of emotional expression in Japanese society and its impact on child development. It emphasizes the influence of cultural norms on emotional expression, the effects of emotional suppression in childhood,… Read more

  • Shades of Certainty

    This article critiques the binary notion of belief, arguing that belief and liking exist on a spectrum rather than as fixed categories. It highlights the linguistic and ontological conflicts of oversimplified binary perspectives and emphasizes… Read more

  • Dialoguing with Aristotle

    This article includes lengthy dialogues involving Aristotle discussing his philosophical ideas with various individuals, such as a curious teenager, another philosopher exploring his philosophy, and a critical philosopher confronting him on weaknesses in his philosophy.… Read more

  • Detecting Bad Science

    This article provides insight into spotting bad science, vulnerable science domains, pressures driving improper science, questions to ask when evaluating scientific claims, a quiz on scientific claims, and discussion questions. It covers sensationalized headlines, conflicts… Read more

  • Our View of Humanity

    A distorted view of human nature can severely distort our beliefs about events involving humans. Each of the distorted views presented impacts our perceptions and interactions. Real-life tragedies, such as those involving Ted Kaczynski and… Read more

  • Appreciating our Insignificance 

    Accepting our cosmic insignificance offers advantages such as humility, perspective, unity, innovation, and resilience. Staying grounded amid ideologies promising cosmic importance involves mindfulness, gratitude, rationality, meaningful connections, and limiting exposure to grandiose narratives. Real-life accounts… Read more

  • Charles Sanders Peirce

    Charles Sanders Peirce was a foundational figure in American philosophy, best known as the progenitor of pragmatism. His ideas significantly influenced logic, the philosophy of science, and semiotics. His lasting mark on philosophy includes pragmatism,… Read more

Recent Posts — Expanded Version
Indicate your interests:

Links to Section Menus