Meta-Ethics Focus #2

“If moral realists argue that the near-universal belief in the wrongness of marrying a cousin is evidence of it being a moral fact, but the reasons for arriving at that conclusion are based on entirely different or even contradictory moral frameworks, then the mere agreement on the conclusion does not establish it as a moral fact.”
“It states that within the broad category of moral realists, there are sub-groups that agree on certain moral facts. However, the foundational premises or justifications that each group uses to support these moral facts are not compatible with one another.”
“This premise introduces a logical condition concerning the relationship between the grounding of moral facts and the evidence for their existence. It posits that if the underlying justifications for a moral fact are inconsistent or in conflict with each other, then agreement on the moral fact itself cannot be taken as reliable evidence for its existence.”
“Some realists might downplay the role of explicit premises and focus on shared moral intuitions. They might argue that these intuitions point towards objective moral truths, even if people struggle to articulate the underlying principles perfectly.”

Table of Contents: _{^{(Click any link below to navigate to that section.)}}

Respond to the following argument relevant to moral realism:

P1: Different groups of moral realists base the alleged moral facts they agree upon on premises that are mutually incompatible.

P2: If the premises on which a moral fact is grounded are mutually incompatible, then moral realists cannot use the mutual agreement on that alleged moral fact as evidence for its existence.

C: Therefore, the various groups of moral realists who invoke mutual agreement on alleged moral facts as evidence for the existence of those alleged moral facts are incorrect.

This argument presents a critical view on the use of mutual agreement among different groups of moral realists as evidence for the existence of moral facts. Let’s break down the argument into its components for a clear analysis:

Premise 1 (P1): It states that within the broad category of moral realists, there are sub-groups that agree on certain moral facts. However, the foundational premises or justifications that each group uses to support these moral facts are not compatible with one another. This suggests a diversity of philosophical underpinnings among those who accept moral realism, leading to a fragmentation within the position based on differing rationales.
Premise 2 (P2): This premise introduces a logical condition concerning the relationship between the grounding of moral facts and the evidence for their existence. It posits that if the underlying justifications for a moral fact are inconsistent or in conflict with each other, then agreement on the moral fact itself cannot be taken as reliable evidence for its existence. This is because the integrity and coherence of the evidence supporting a claim are critical to its credibility.
Conclusion (C): The conclusion follows logically from the premises. If the premises are true, then it is reasonable to infer that moral realists cannot legitimately cite mutual agreement on certain moral facts as proof of those facts’ existence. This conclusion challenges the notion that consensus among moral realists serves as a strong foundation for the existence of moral facts, pointing instead to the need for consistent and compatible justifications.

This argument raises important questions about the nature of moral realism and the criteria for validating moral facts. It suggests that for moral realism to be a tenable position, there must be not only agreement on what the moral facts are but also a unified, coherent foundation for why those facts hold. The argument underscores the importance of philosophical rigor and consistency in the establishment of moral truths.

This argument raises a good point about a potential weakness in some moral realist arguments. Here’s a breakdown and some potential responses:

Response 1: Different Paths, Same Destination

Moral realists could argue that P1 doesn’t necessarily negate the existence of moral facts.
Different groups might arrive at the same moral truth through different reasoning (incompatible premises).
For example, some might base morality on religious principles, while others use a utilitarian framework. Both could agree on the wrongness of torture despite different starting points.

Response 2: Refining Moral Agreement

Realists could acknowledge P1 but argue that P2 is too strong.
Agreement on a moral fact might not require complete agreement on all underlying premises.
There could be a core set of shared principles leading to the same moral conclusion, even with some variation in reasoning.

Response 3: Focus on Shared Moral Intuitions

Some realists might downplay the role of explicit premises and focus on shared moral intuitions.
They might argue that these intuitions point towards objective moral truths, even if people struggle to articulate the underlying principles perfectly.

However, the argument also raises challenges for moral realism:

It highlights the difficulty of pinning down a single foundation for morality that everyone agrees on.
It suggests that moral disagreement might not just be about applying principles, but about the very nature of those principles themselves.

Overall, the argument doesn’t disprove moral realism, but it does push moral realists to refine their arguments for the existence of objective moral facts.

Based on our discussion above, if moral realists argue that nearly everyone thinks marrying a cousin is wrong, yet those in that group of “everyone” arrive at that moral conclusion based on diametrically opposed notions of morality, the fact that everyone thinks marrying a cousin is wrong does nothing to establish that as a moral fact. Right?

Yes, that’s a correct interpretation based on the argument we discussed. If moral realists argue that the near-universal belief in the wrongness of marrying a cousin is evidence of it being a moral fact, but the reasons for arriving at that conclusion are based on entirely different or even contradictory moral frameworks, then the mere agreement on the conclusion does not establish it as a moral fact. The key point here is that the agreement on the moral judgment (in this case, that marrying a cousin is wrong) is insufficient to claim it as a fact if the underlying justifications are not consistent or compatible.

This situation highlights the importance of not only examining the consensus on particular moral judgments but also critically assessing the coherence and compatibility of the reasons behind these judgments. In the context of moral realism, for a moral claim to be considered a fact, it’s suggested that there should not only be agreement on the claim itself but also a shared or at least compatible rationale that underpins this agreement. The diversity in moral reasoning, even when it leads to the same moral conclusion, challenges the use of consensus as straightforward evidence for the existence of moral facts.

You’re absolutely right. In the context of our discussion about moral realism and mutually incompatible premises, the near-universal disapproval of marrying a cousin wouldn’t necessarily establish it as a moral fact. Here’s why:

Different Reasons, Same Outcome: Moral realists might argue that everyone disapproves, but the reasons might differ. Some might see it as wrong due to religious teachings, while others focus on potential genetic risks. Neither reason, on its own, necessarily points to an objective moral truth.
Correlation Doesn’t Equal Causation: Just because everyone agrees on something doesn’t mean it’s a moral fact. It could simply be a cultural taboo or a pragmatic decision based on genetic knowledge. Moral facts, according to realists, are objective truths independent of human beliefs.

However, there are some nuances to consider:

Universality Can Be Suggestive: While not conclusive, the near-universality of disapproval could still be a clue for moral realists. It might point towards a deeper, underlying principle (e.g., protecting family health) that translates into the shared disapproval, even if the reasons differ.
The Strength of Aversion: The intensity of the disapproval could be relevant. If the aversion to marrying a cousin is strong and visceral, realists might argue it suggests a deeper moral principle at play, rather than just a cultural quirk.

Ultimately, the argument highlights the limitations of using consensus alone to establish moral facts. Moral realists would need to provide a more robust argument that explains why, despite differing reasons, marrying a cousin violates an objective moral principle.

What is a salient way to express this argument to those who invoke common, alleged moral facts based on diametrically opposed groundings of those alleged moral facts?

To effectively convey this argument to those who rely on common, yet divergently grounded, alleged moral facts, consider highlighting the crucial distinction between agreement on moral judgments and the coherence of the rationale behind them. Here’s a salient way to express this point:

“Although there may be widespread agreement on certain moral judgments, such as the idea that marrying a cousin is morally wrong, this consensus alone does not suffice to establish these judgments as moral facts. The crux of the issue lies not in the agreement itself but in the underlying justifications for these moral beliefs. When these justifications are rooted in diametrically opposed moral theories or principles, it signals a profound lack of coherence in the foundational reasoning. This dissonance undermines the reliability of mutual agreement as evidence for moral facts. It’s akin to arriving at the same destination via completely different paths without knowing why each path was chosen or whether some paths are based on mistaken maps. For a moral judgment to be considered a fact, there must be not only a consensus on the judgment but also a shared, or at least compatible, understanding of the moral reasoning that leads to it. Without this coherence, the appeal to common moral beliefs falls short of providing a solid basis for asserting the existence of moral facts. Thus, it’s critical to scrutinize not just what we agree on, but why we agree on it, ensuring our moral claims are grounded in consistent and rational foundations.”

Here’s a salient way to express your argument to those who rely on common, alleged moral facts with opposing justifications:

1. Frame it as a Thought Experiment:

“Imagine a group of people who all agree stealing is wrong. One person believes it’s because it disrupts social order, another thinks it offends the gods, and a third sees it as a violation of individual rights. Does their shared conclusion prove stealing is objectively wrong?”

2. Highlight the Disconnect:

“It’s interesting that everyone disapproves of marrying a cousin, yet some do so based on religious beliefs, while others focus on genetics. This raises a question: Does everyone’s reason point to a single moral truth, or could these be independent explanations for the same outcome?”

3. Emphasize the Limits of Consensus:

“While widespread agreement can be powerful, it might not always reveal objective morality. Consider cultural taboos. Everyone in a society might avoid a certain food, but that doesn’t make it inherently wrong, just culturally disfavored.”

4. Push for Deeper Justification:

“Instead of focusing on the shared conclusion (everyone thinks X is wrong), what if we dug deeper? Can we find a single, objective principle that explains why X is wrong, regardless of someone’s religious beliefs or cultural background?”

Remember:

Be respectful and avoid personal attacks.
Focus on the logical inconsistency of basing objective morality solely on consensus with conflicting justifications.
Encourage them to consider alternative explanations for the shared belief.

By using these approaches, you can effectively point out the weakness of relying on common ground without addressing the underlying disagreements about moral foundations.

Create a 7-item quiz on the discussion above with answers at the end.

Quiz: Understanding Moral Realism and the Role of Consensus

1. What does the first premise (P1) of the argument concerning moral realism suggest?

A) All moral realists agree on the same moral facts for the same reasons.
B) Different groups of moral realists agree on certain moral facts but for mutually incompatible reasons.
C) Moral realists rely solely on empirical evidence for their claims.
D) There is a universal moral truth that all humans inherently understand.

2. According to the second premise (P2), what undermines the use of mutual agreement on a moral fact as evidence for its existence?

A) The existence of any disagreement
B) The lack of empirical evidence
C) The mutual incompatibility of the premises grounding the moral fact
D) The personal beliefs of the moral realists

3. What is the main conclusion (C) drawn from the premises in the argument?

A) Mutual agreement among moral realists always proves the existence of moral facts.
B) Consensus on moral judgments is sufficient to establish those judgments as moral facts.
C) Moral realists cannot correctly use mutual agreement on moral facts as evidence for their existence if their grounding premises are incompatible.
D) All moral facts are universally accepted truths.

4. How does the argument suggest moral realists should validate moral facts?

A) By ensuring there is a global consensus on what constitutes moral behavior.
B) Through the use of scientific experimentation.
C) By achieving not only consensus on moral judgments but also coherent and compatible justifications for these judgments.
D) By adhering strictly to religious doctrines.

5. What key issue is highlighted when different groups arrive at the same moral conclusion for conflicting reasons?

A) The importance of having a clear leader among moral realists
B) The need for a shared or compatible rationale behind moral judgments
C) That moral facts are less important than moral opinions
D) The effectiveness of democratic processes in moral decision-making

6. What analogy is used to describe the problem with arriving at the same moral judgment via different justifications?

A) Sailing to the same island using different types of boats
B) Arriving at the same destination via completely different paths without knowing why each path was chosen
C) Eating different foods but feeling equally satisfied
D) Reading different books but coming to the same conclusion about their quality

7. What is essential for a moral claim to be considered a fact, according to the discussion?

A) A high level of complexity in its philosophical argumentation
B) It must be rooted in ancient wisdom
C) There must be a consensus on the claim and a shared or compatible understanding of the reasoning behind it
D) It must be enforceable by law

Answers

B) Different groups of moral realists agree on certain moral facts but for mutually incompatible reasons.
C) The mutual incompatibility of the premises grounding the moral fact
C) Moral realists cannot correctly use mutual agreement on moral facts as evidence for their existence if their grounding premises are incompatible.
C) By achieving not only consensus on moral judgments but also coherent and compatible justifications for these judgments.
B) The need for a shared or compatible rationale behind moral judgments
B) Arriving at the same destination via completely different paths without knowing why each path was chosen
C) There must be a consensus on the claim and a shared or compatible understanding of the reasoning behind it

Moral Realism and Consensus Quiz

This quiz explores the concept of moral realism and the limitations of using consensus alone to establish moral facts.

Instructions: Choose the best answer for each question.

Moral realism claims that: a) Morality is entirely subjective and based on personal opinion. b) There are objective moral facts that exist independently of human beliefs. c) All cultures have identical moral codes.
Some moral realists argue that widespread agreement on a moral issue: a) Is definitive proof of an objective moral fact. b) Can be a clue, but may not guarantee, an objective moral fact. c) Has no bearing on the existence of objective moral facts.
The argument presented in this discussion highlights that people might agree on a moral issue because: a) They all share the same religious beliefs. b) They have arrived at the same conclusion through different reasoning.
c) There is only one universally true moral code.
Consider the following scenario: Everyone disapproves of stealing, but some believe it’s wrong because it disrupts social order, while others see it as a violation of individual rights. This scenario best illustrates:
a) That stealing is definitively a moral wrong. b) The limitations of using consensus alone to establish moral facts. c) That everyone secretly agrees on the same moral principles.
If a moral realist argues that nearly everyone thinks marrying a cousin is wrong, but those who agree have diametrically opposed reasons, this fact: a) Strengthens the case for marrying a cousin being a moral fact.
b) Weakens the case for marrying a cousin being a moral fact based on consensus alone. c) Has no impact on whether marrying a cousin is a moral fact.
A salient response to someone who uses universal disapproval to prove a moral fact would be to:
a) Attack their personal beliefs.
b) Highlight the possibility of differing justifications for the same conclusion. c) Simply accept their claim at face value.
Moral realists, after considering this discussion, might be encouraged to:
a) Abandon moral realism altogether. b) Look for deeper justifications for their moral claims, beyond just consensus.
c) Dismiss any disagreements about moral principles as unimportant.

Answer Key:

(Gemini does seem to have a “b” bias.)

Provide 12 discussion questions relevant to the content above.

Exploring the Foundations: How do different moral theories propose to ground moral facts, and what challenges does this pose for moral realism?
The Role of Consensus: Can widespread agreement among people serve as a reliable indicator of moral truths? Why or why not?
Divergent Justifications: How do differing justifications for the same moral judgment affect the credibility of moral realism as a philosophical position?
Rational Coherence vs. Moral Agreement: Is rational coherence among justifications more important than agreement on moral judgments? Discuss the implications of your answer for moral realism.
The Nature of Moral Facts: What characteristics must a claim have to be considered a moral fact? Are these characteristics universally accepted?
Empirical Evidence and Moral Facts: Can empirical evidence play a role in establishing moral facts? If so, how might this be reconciled with the philosophical nature of moral reasoning?
Moral Relativism vs. Moral Realism: How does the argument presented challenge or support the views of moral relativism? Can moral facts exist in a relativistic framework?
Philosophical Consensus: Is it possible or even desirable to achieve philosophical consensus on what constitutes the proper grounding for moral facts? Discuss the potential benefits and drawbacks.
Cultural Differences in Moral Reasoning: How might cultural differences impact the grounding of moral facts, and what does this mean for the universality of moral truths?
Moral Psychology and Realism: What role does moral psychology play in understanding the reasons behind agreement on moral judgments? Can psychological insights validate or undermine moral realism?
Practical Implications for Ethics: How do the theoretical discussions about moral realism and the grounding of moral facts translate into practical ethical decision-making?
Future Directions for Moral Philosophy: Given the challenges discussed, what future directions should moral philosophy take to address the issues of grounding and agreement in moral realism?

Discussion Questions on Moral Realism and Consensus

Beyond Agreement: If moral realists can’t rely solely on consensus to establish moral facts, what other arguments could they use to support their position?
The Strength of Disagreement: Does the intensity or nature of moral disagreement (e.g., religious vs. secular) have any bearing on the possibility of objective moral truths?
Evolution of Morality: If moral truths exist objectively, do they remain constant throughout history, or can they evolve over time?
Cultural Relativism vs. Moral Realism: How can moral realists address the challenge of cultural relativism, where different cultures have vastly different moral codes?
The Role of Intuition: Some realists emphasize moral intuitions as evidence for objective moral facts. How reliable are these intuitions across cultures and individuals?
The Problem of Incompatible Premises: If different groups of moral realists base their conclusions on conflicting premises, does this necessarily disprove moral realism altogether? Why or why not?
The Limits of Reason: Can reason alone, without considering emotional or intuitive responses, be sufficient to determine objective morality?
The Argument from Consequences: Could the consequences of an action be used to determine its moral rightness or wrongness, even within a moral realist framework?
The Role of Science: Can scientific discoveries, such as those related to human psychology or genetics, contribute to our understanding of objective morality?
The Challenge of Moral Scepticism: How can moral realists respond to moral skeptics who deny the existence of any objective moral truths?
The Practical Implications: Does the debate between moral realism and other ethical theories have any real-world consequences on how we make moral decisions?
Personal Application: Reflecting on your own moral compass, do you find your beliefs align more with moral realism, relativism, or another ethical theory? Why or why not?

Table of Contents: _{^{(Click any link below to navigate to that section.)}}