MacIntyre: Jurgen, I’ve long admired the scope and ambition of your theories on communicative action and the public sphere, but I have some concerns. I’m not convinced your approach fully captures the moral depth necessary for true consensus and community.

Habermas: I appreciate your honesty, Alasdair. Where do you see these weaknesses? I believe communicative action offers a robust framework for moral discourse, particularly through reasoned argument and shared understanding.

MacIntyre: That’s precisely where I see the gap. You seem to believe that rational consensus can be achieved universally. But without a shared tradition or narrative framework, how do you expect people to come to a genuine moral understanding? Reason alone, in my view, is insufficient.

Habermas: It’s true that I emphasize rationality as a universal medium for reaching consensus. But I don’t see this as empty or devoid of moral depth. I argue that by engaging in discourse, we can arrive at moral truths that transcend individual backgrounds or traditions.

MacIntyre: I’m skeptical. Morality is deeply embedded in traditions and historical contexts, which shape how we interpret concepts like “justice,” “honesty,” and “responsibility.” A universal framework of reason, as you propose, might strip away these meanings rather than reveal them.

Habermas: But doesn’t a purely tradition-bound morality risk being exclusionary? My aim is to create a framework where diverse perspectives can interact on an equal footing, regardless of cultural or historical background. This kind of universalism is essential for building a fair and democratic society.

MacIntyre: I understand the intent, but a tradition-bound morality isn’t necessarily exclusionary. Traditions provide context and coherence to our moral lives. Without them, I fear individuals lose a sense of belonging and purpose. Your universalism might encourage a sort of ethical emptiness—a procedural approach devoid of moral substance.

Habermas: I would argue the opposite: a universal approach that focuses on discourse enables us to uncover moral substance by transcending the constraints of individual traditions. Reason and dialogue can provide new forms of meaning, allowing people to find common ground even amidst different backgrounds.

MacIntyre: Yet, the type of “common ground” you’re describing assumes everyone can set aside their values and adopt a neutral stance. I question whether this is possible. Moral beliefs are not merely rational conclusions but deeply embedded practices. For many, abandoning these roots would mean sacrificing authenticity.

Habermas: I’m not asking individuals to abandon their roots, merely to participate in a process where they can engage with others outside those roots. This exchange can even enrich their own traditions. Furthermore, I believe that reason itself has a unifying power that can guide us through these differences.

MacIntyre: But reason, when divorced from tradition, becomes an abstraction. Take the Enlightenment project, for example—its universal claims often disregarded the context-specific needs and values of various communities, leading to cultural impositions and a loss of moral richness. Doesn’t your theory risk falling into the same trap?

Habermas: That’s a legitimate concern. However, I’d argue that my theory is distinct from the Enlightenment’s more rigid universalism. My notion of rationality is dialogical, meaning it evolves through interaction and adapts to include diverse perspectives. It’s not about imposing a set of values but about discovering shared norms through dialogue.

MacIntyre: Even so, there’s an assumption that everyone can—or should—engage in this form of “rational dialogue.” Some traditions value other forms of knowledge: narrative, experience, or even faith. By centering everything on rational discourse, are we not marginalizing those who engage differently?

Habermas: Perhaps, but I believe that rational discourse does not exclude other forms of expression; it can incorporate them. My emphasis is on a shared commitment to truth and mutual understanding, which I see as foundational across all traditions, even if expressed in different ways.

MacIntyre: That may be your intent, but in practice, such a commitment often privileges secular, Western modes of reasoning. By assuming that everyone can engage in a form of universal rationality, you risk marginalizing people whose beliefs do not fit neatly within that framework.

Habermas: That’s an important critique, Alasdair. Yet I see communicative action as adaptable. It’s not about enforcing a Western or secular viewpoint; it’s about creating a space where all voices, including those from non-Western or religious traditions, can participate and shape the discourse. My theory is meant to be as inclusive as possible.

MacIntyre: But inclusivity, in this case, still depends on the assumption that “reasoned discourse” is the only path to legitimacy. My point is that for many, moral knowledge is inseparable from tradition, from community practices that don’t always align with rational argument. To value these ways of life, we need a framework that appreciates the role of tradition in shaping moral identity.

Habermas: And I agree that tradition has a role, but if we lean too heavily on tradition, we risk justifying practices that might be unethical or outdated. By emphasizing rational discourse, I hope to create a platform where traditions can be evaluated and revised collectively, allowing us to retain what is valuable and challenge what may be harmful.

MacIntyre: That’s true, but traditions often have their own mechanisms for self-critique and change. I would argue that your framework might disrupt these mechanisms rather than support them. Communities find meaning and moral guidance through shared histories and stories—not through abstract rationality.

Habermas: You raise an important point, Alasdair. I don’t deny that communities find value through traditions, but I believe these traditions must also engage with broader discourses to prevent insularity. Without exposure to alternative perspectives, traditions risk becoming rigid or oppressive.

MacIntyre: Yet, when a tradition engages in self-critique, it does so through its own language and narratives. Imposing a universal, rational framework can sever a tradition from these roots, weakening its internal coherence. I worry that your emphasis on universality lacks respect for the complexity and integrity of distinct cultural narratives.

Habermas: Perhaps, but universality doesn’t have to negate complexity. My approach is based on the assumption that all individuals can engage in a process of mutual understanding. I believe that through dialogue, we can arrive at shared norms without erasing cultural uniqueness.

MacIntyre: But again, shared norms presuppose a level playing field. And here, I think we encounter a final issue: power dynamics. Your framework assumes that rational discourse alone can neutralize power imbalances, but in practice, those with more social or economic power often dominate discourse. How can we ensure that communicative action truly respects all voices?

Habermas: Power is indeed a challenge, and I acknowledge that it distorts communication. But I see communicative action as a way to counterbalance power—by creating spaces where the best argument, not the most powerful person, wins. Rationality can act as a safeguard against domination.

MacIntyre: A noble aim, Jurgen, but I would argue that power is not so easily neutralized. Tradition provides community members with their own forms of legitimacy, their own means of resistance. By relying on abstract rationality, your framework risks undermining these forms of legitimacy in favor of a homogenized discourse.

Habermas: I see your point. My goal is not to erase these forms of legitimacy but to create a system where they can coexist and interact meaningfully. I believe that by refining our approach to communicative action, we can address power imbalances without dismissing the cultural and moral insights that traditions provide.

MacIntyre: I appreciate that, Jurgen. But I’ll remain cautious. I see your philosophy as aiming for a noble goal, yet I believe a greater respect for the depth of tradition might strengthen your approach. In my view, true morality arises not from abstraction but from concrete practices within a community.

Habermas: And perhaps we need both—a recognition of tradition’s role in shaping moral identities, combined with a framework that allows traditions to engage with one another openly. Thank you, Alasdair, for this challenging and thought-provoking exchange.

MacIntyre: Thank you as well, Jurgen. It’s through conversations like these that we refine our ideas, even if we never fully agree. And perhaps that, too, is a form of consensus.