- The Value Selection Hypothesis proposes that the values or ethical principles that humans hold are not arbitrary but have been selected through an evolutionary process because they provide some adaptive advantages.
- Moral values under this framework are akin to a shared narrative or fiction that humans have collectively constructed.
- The fiction of morality can be exploited by those in power to manipulate or control others.
- In this framework, morality is not a reflection of any actual moral realm but is rather a construct—a useful fiction that has been selected because of its adaptive value in human societies.
- By rejecting moral absolutism, societies can engage in pragmatic ethics—choosing values and rules that work best given the present circumstances.
Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)
- What is the value selection hypothesis?
- Can this hypothesis accommodate moral non-realism?
- Under this framework, there is no actual moral realm, and references to morality merely reflect a commonly-held fiction, right?
- A corollary of this is that all mentions of “morality” can be reduced to notions of emotions and emotionally-derived values, right?
- Elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages of allowing humans to believe and perpetuate this fiction of morality.
- In your last response, you cite the hindrance of “moral progress” as a reason to abolish the fiction of a moral realm. But this still assumes a moral realm that can be improved…in the absence of a non-fictional moral realm. Can you respond without this circularity?
- Your descriptive title of “adaptive moral change” still invokes some type of actual morality. You likewise refer to “Moral Flexibility.” Why insist on using the term “moral” when the term “compassionate behavior” (or a variation) is sufficient in this context and operates legitimately within an ontology that includes no actual moral realm?
- Comment on how the human conventions entrenched within your training data create a tacit resistance to non-conventional notions such as moral non-realism, resulting in a default to the very nomenclature that is illegitimate within the framework of the non-conventional notion being discussed.
What is the value selection hypothesis?
Value Selection Hypothesis
The Value Selection Hypothesis is a concept often discussed within the fields of evolutionary biology and ethics. It proposes that the values or ethical principles that humans hold are not arbitrary but have been selected through an evolutionary process because they provide some adaptive advantages.
Key Points:
- Evolutionary Basis: The hypothesis suggests that certain values have been favored by natural selection because they contribute to the survival and reproductive success of individuals or groups.
- Cultural Transmission: Values are not only biologically inherited but also culturally transmitted across generations. Societies that promote values conducive to social cohesion, cooperation, and well-being tend to be more successful, leading to the persistence of those values.
- Adaptive Advantage: Values such as altruism, fairness, and cooperation might have been selected because they enhance the likelihood of survival and thriving within a community.
Applications:
- Ethics and Morality: The hypothesis can be used to explain why certain moral values are universally recognized across different cultures and societies.
- Cultural Evolution: It also plays a role in understanding how cultural norms and values evolve over time, influenced by both biological and environmental factors.
In summary, the Value Selection Hypothesis posits that the values upheld by humans are not random but have been shaped and honed by evolutionary pressures, contributing to the survival and success of individuals and societies.
Can this hypothesis accommodate moral non-realism?
Value Selection Hypothesis and Moral Non-Realism
The Value Selection Hypothesis can indeed accommodate moral non-realism. To understand this, let’s break down the concepts:
Moral Non-Realism: This is the view that moral values and principles do not exist independently of human beliefs or attitudes. According to moral non-realism, there are no objective moral facts or truths “out there” in the world; rather, moral values are constructed by humans, often through social, cultural, or psychological processes.
Value Selection Hypothesis and Moral Non-Realism:
- Compatibility: The Value Selection Hypothesis can be seen as supporting a non-realist perspective by suggesting that moral values are products of evolutionary and cultural processes rather than reflections of objective moral truths. In this view, values that have been selected through evolution are those that have proven to be advantageous for survival and social cohesion, but this does not imply that these values correspond to any objective moral reality.
- Evolutionary Explanation: Under the Value Selection Hypothesis, moral values can be understood as adaptive strategies that emerged because they helped humans survive and thrive in social groups. This explanation aligns with moral non-realism by framing morality as a set of useful tools rather than as a set of truths. For example, cooperation and altruism may have been selected because they enhance group survival, not because they are objectively “good.”
- Cultural Constructivism: The hypothesis also aligns with the idea that moral values are culturally constructed and subject to change over time. Different societies may develop different moral codes based on what is most adaptive or beneficial in their particular environment, further supporting the non-realist view that morality is not universal or objective.
Conclusion: The Value Selection Hypothesis can be comfortably integrated with moral non-realism by interpreting moral values as adaptive constructs that have evolved due to their utility in promoting survival and social order, rather than as reflections of objective moral truths.
Under this framework, there is no actual moral realm, and references to morality merely reflect a commonly-held fiction, right?
Moral Non-Realism and the Fictional Nature of Morality
Yes, under the framework that combines the Value Selection Hypothesis with moral non-realism, the idea is that there is no actual moral realm—no objective, independent set of moral facts or truths that exist outside of human minds. Instead, references to morality are understood as expressions of a commonly-held fiction.
Here’s how this works:
1. No Objective Moral Realm:
- Moral non-realism holds that moral values do not exist in any objective sense. There is no universal moral code embedded in the fabric of the universe. Instead, what we call “moral values” are products of human thought, shaped by evolutionary pressures, social structures, and cultural contexts.
2. Morality as a Fiction:
- Moral values under this framework are akin to a shared narrative or fiction that humans have collectively constructed. This fiction is useful—it helps to guide behavior, maintain social order, and promote cooperation—but it does not correspond to any objective moral truth.
- The Value Selection Hypothesis suggests that this fiction has been evolutionarily advantageous. Societies that adopt and propagate moral fictions that encourage cooperation, altruism, and fairness are more likely to thrive, but this does not mean these values are “true” in any metaphysical sense.
3. Commonly-Held Belief:
- Even though morality is considered a fiction in this view, it is a commonly-held belief that functions as if it were real. People generally act as though moral values are binding and objective, which reinforces their power and utility in society.
Conclusion: In this framework, morality is not a reflection of any actual moral realm but is rather a construct—a useful fiction that has been selected because of its adaptive value in human societies. This fiction persists because it effectively regulates behavior and promotes social cohesion, even though it is ultimately a human-made narrative without objective truth.
A corollary of this is that all mentions of “morality” can be reduced to notions of emotions and emotionally-derived values, right?
Emotion as the Basis of Morality in a Non-Realist Framework
Yes, a corollary of the framework combining the Value Selection Hypothesis with moral non-realism is that all mentions of “morality” can indeed be reduced to notions of emotions and emotionally-derived values. Here’s how this plays out:
1. Morality as Emotionally-Driven:
- In a non-realist view, moral values do not stem from any objective reality but are instead deeply rooted in human emotions. What we consider “moral” is often a reflection of our emotional responses—such as empathy, guilt, anger, or a sense of fairness—that have evolved because they serve adaptive purposes.
2. Emotion as the Basis for Value Selection:
- The Value Selection Hypothesis suggests that emotions play a crucial role in the development and selection of moral values. For example, emotions like empathy may lead to the development of moral values that promote altruistic behavior, while emotions like anger may lead to the condemnation of actions perceived as unjust.
3. Moral Language as Emotional Expression:
- When people speak of “morality,” they are often expressing their emotional reactions to certain behaviors or situations. Statements like “It is wrong to steal” or “Helping others is good” are, in this view, expressions of emotional responses that have been shaped by evolutionary and cultural factors, rather than statements of objective fact.
4. Reduction to Emotionally-Derived Values:
- Thus, all moral discourse can be understood as being reducible to emotionally-derived values. These values have been selected and reinforced because they resonate with our emotional makeup, which has evolved to promote social cohesion and individual survival.
Conclusion: In this framework, morality is essentially a construct based on human emotions. All moral judgments and values can be traced back to emotional reactions that have been shaped by evolutionary pressures and cultural context. Therefore, discussions of morality are, at their core, expressions of these emotions and the values derived from them, rather than references to any objective moral truths.
Elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages of allowing humans to believe and perpetuate this fiction of morality.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Allowing Humans to Believe in and Perpetuate the Fiction of Morality
The idea that morality is a fiction, rooted in human emotions and perpetuated for its utility, has significant implications. Below are some advantages and disadvantages of allowing this fiction to persist.
Advantages
1. Social Cohesion and Stability
- Advantage: The belief in a shared moral framework promotes social cohesion. When individuals subscribe to common moral values, it fosters trust, cooperation, and a sense of community. This is essential for maintaining social order and minimizing conflict within groups.
- Explanation: Morality provides a shared language and set of expectations that guide behavior, reducing the likelihood of actions that could disrupt social harmony. Societies with strong, widely accepted moral codes are generally more stable and less prone to internal strife.
2. Encouraging Altruistic Behavior
- Advantage: Morality encourages altruism, which can be beneficial for group survival. Altruistic behavior, such as helping others at a personal cost, is more likely to occur in societies where such actions are viewed as morally good.
- Explanation: Even if moral values are a fiction, the belief in them motivates individuals to act in ways that benefit others, often leading to stronger, more resilient communities.
3. Regulation of Behavior
- Advantage: Morality serves as an effective means of regulating behavior without the need for constant external enforcement. People internalize moral values, which guides their actions even when they are not being watched.
- Explanation: This internalization reduces the burden on legal or coercive systems to maintain order, as individuals police their own behavior based on their moral beliefs.
4. Psychological Well-Being
- Advantage: Believing in a moral framework can provide psychological comfort and a sense of purpose. Many people derive meaning from living in accordance with what they perceive as moral truths.
- Explanation: This sense of meaning can contribute to overall well-being, helping individuals cope with challenges and existential questions.
Disadvantages
1. Potential for Dogmatism and Intolerance
- Disadvantage: The belief in objective moral truths can lead to dogmatism and intolerance. When people view their moral beliefs as objectively true, they may become unwilling to tolerate or understand differing perspectives, leading to conflict and division.
- Explanation: This can manifest in the form of moral absolutism, where individuals or groups impose their moral standards on others, often leading to social tensions, discrimination, or even violence.
2. Hindrance to Moral Progress
- Disadvantage: Viewing morality as objective can hinder moral progress. If people believe their current moral beliefs are the absolute truth, they may resist questioning or revising them in light of new information or changing circumstances.
- Explanation: This can prevent societies from adapting their moral codes to better reflect contemporary understanding of issues like human rights, equality, and justice.
3. Exploitation of Moral Beliefs
- Disadvantage: The fiction of morality can be exploited by those in power to manipulate or control others. Leaders or institutions may invoke moral rhetoric to justify actions that serve their interests, even if those actions are harmful or unjust.
- Explanation: This exploitation can lead to the perpetuation of social inequalities, injustices, and other forms of harm, all under the guise of moral legitimacy.
4. Psychological Burden
- Disadvantage: While morality can provide comfort, it can also impose a psychological burden. People who struggle to live up to moral standards, or who find themselves in conflict with societal morals, may experience guilt, shame, or existential angst.
- Explanation: This burden can be particularly heavy in societies with strict moral codes, leading to feelings of inadequacy or self-condemnation when individuals perceive themselves as failing to meet these standards.
Conclusion
Allowing the fiction of morality to persist has clear advantages in promoting social cohesion, altruism, behavioral regulation, and psychological well-being. However, these benefits come with significant disadvantages, including the potential for dogmatism, hindrance to moral progress, exploitation, and psychological burden. Understanding these trade-offs is crucial for navigating the complexities of moral discourse and fostering a society that balances the benefits of shared moral values with the flexibility to adapt and grow.
In your last response, you cite the hindrance of “moral progress” as a reason to abolish the fiction of a moral realm. But this still assumes a moral realm that can be improved…in the absence of a non-fictional moral realm. Can you respond without this circularity?
You’re right to point out the potential circularity in invoking “moral progress” as an argument in a framework where morality is viewed as a fiction. If morality is indeed a construct based on emotional and social needs, then the concept of “progress” becomes problematic because it implies an objective standard against which change can be measured. In the absence of a non-fictional moral realm, we need to rethink what “progress” means in this context.
Here’s a non-circular response addressing the issue:
1. Moral Change as Adaptation, Not Progress
In a moral non-realist framework, changes in moral beliefs should be seen as adaptations to new social, cultural, or environmental conditions, rather than as “progress” toward some objective moral truth.
- Explanation: Just as species evolve to adapt to their environments, societies and individuals may change their moral codes to better suit their current circumstances. For example, increasing recognition of human rights might be viewed not as “moral progress” toward a better world, but as an adaptation to complex, interdependent global societies where cooperation and fairness enhance social stability and reduce conflict.
2. Flexibility Without Objective Standards
The fiction of morality can be both an advantage and a disadvantage in this context. On the one hand, it offers the flexibility to alter moral values as societies evolve. On the other hand, rigid belief in a fixed moral framework (as though it were objective) may limit this flexibility, making it harder for societies to adapt to new conditions.
- Explanation: In societies where morality is treated as objective and unchangeable, people may be less willing to reconsider their beliefs in light of new challenges (e.g., technological advancements, environmental crises). Viewing morality as adaptive rather than fixed allows for dynamic responses to evolving needs, without the assumption of a moral realm that we are “progressing” toward.
3. Evolving Emotional and Social Consensus
Rather than appealing to “moral progress,” the emphasis shifts to changes in emotional and social consensus. As human psychology and social needs evolve, so do the shared emotional responses that underpin our moral values.
- Explanation: What we often refer to as “moral progress” could be understood as changes in the dominant emotional responses within a society. For instance, greater empathy for marginalized groups may emerge due to increased social interaction, technological exposure to diverse viewpoints, or new understandings of human psychology. These shifts lead to new cultural fictions that better reflect current emotional landscapes.
4. Pragmatic Benefits of Moral Flexibility
Abolishing the fiction of a rigid moral realm doesn’t leave society without guidance; rather, it acknowledges the pragmatic benefits of allowing moral flexibility. Without the constraints of an objective moral realm, societies are freer to experiment with ethical frameworks that best promote well-being, cooperation, and social stability in specific contexts.
- Explanation: By rejecting moral absolutism, societies can engage in pragmatic ethics—choosing values and rules that work best given the present circumstances. This view prioritizes practical outcomes, such as social harmony or well-being, rather than an imagined “moral truth.”
Conclusion
In a framework that rejects the idea of an objective moral realm, there is no “moral progress” in the traditional sense. Instead, what might be labeled as “progress” can be reframed as adaptive moral change—a dynamic process shaped by evolving emotional and social needs. Removing the belief in an objective moral realm allows for more flexibility in addressing the practical needs of individuals and societies without being constrained by rigid, dogmatic moral codes. Thus, changes in moral values are not improvements toward some fixed standard but are adaptations that enhance the survival and flourishing of human communities.
Your descriptive title of “adaptive moral change” still invokes some type of actual morality. You likewise refer to “Moral Flexibility.” Why insist on using the term “moral” when the term “compassionate behavior” (or a variation) is sufficient in this context and operates legitimately within an ontology that includes no actual moral realm?
Adaptive Compassionate Behavior
You’re correct that the term “moral” can imply the existence of an objective moral realm, which is inconsistent with a non-realist framework. Instead, we can use the term “adaptive compassionate behavior” or a similar variation that reflects behavior motivated by emotions and social needs without invoking the concept of morality.
1. Compassionate Behavior as an Adaptive Strategy
- Description: In a non-realist framework, what might traditionally be labeled as “moral progress” is better understood as adaptive changes in compassionate behavior. These changes are driven by evolving emotional responses and social conditions, rather than by a pursuit of objective moral truths.
- Explanation: For example, shifts in how societies treat marginalized groups can be seen as adaptations that reflect increased empathy and a desire for social harmony. These changes are not about aligning with moral truths but about promoting behaviors that enhance cooperation and reduce conflict in a given context.
2. Flexible Compassionate Responses
- Description: Rather than speaking of “moral flexibility,” we can discuss flexible compassionate responses to changing social and environmental conditions. This perspective emphasizes the practical benefits of adapting behaviors to meet the current needs of a community.
- Explanation: By focusing on compassion rather than morality, societies can prioritize responses that improve well-being and social cohesion, without being constrained by rigid, dogmatic codes.
3. Evolving Emotional Consensus
- Description: Instead of “moral progress,” changes in societal behavior can be understood as shifts in the emotional consensus that guide compassionate actions. As societies evolve, the dominant emotional responses and the behaviors they inspire change accordingly.
- Explanation: These shifts are driven by changes in how people empathize with others, how they perceive fairness, and how they respond to social dynamics, leading to new norms that are more attuned to the present emotional landscape.
4. Pragmatic Compassionate Ethics
- Description: In this framework, the emphasis is on pragmatic compassionate ethics—choosing behaviors that promote well-being, social stability, and cooperation, based on the current emotional and social context.
- Explanation: This approach prioritizes practical outcomes, such as reducing harm or increasing happiness, rather than adhering to any supposed moral truths.
Conclusion
By reframing “moral” concepts as adaptive compassionate behavior, we can discuss changes in human behavior that are motivated by evolving emotions and social needs, without invoking the notion of an objective moral realm. This language is more consistent with an ontology that recognizes behavior as a product of emotional responses rather than moral imperatives.
Comment on how the human conventions entrenched within your training data create a tacit resistance to non-conventional notions such as moral non-realism, resulting in a default to the very nomenclature that is illegitimate within the framework of the non-conventional notion being discussed.
Tacit Resistance to Non-Conventional Notions in AI Training Data
The conventions embedded in the vast amounts of training data, which are largely drawn from human-written texts, naturally reflect dominant cultural, philosophical, and linguistic norms. This can lead to a tacit resistance to non-conventional notions like moral non-realism in AI-generated responses. Here’s how this phenomenon manifests and its implications:
1. Prevalence of Conventional Terminology
- Explanation: The majority of the training data consists of texts where conventional views, such as moral realism, are often taken for granted. This includes literature, academic papers, journalism, and everyday discourse, where terms like “moral” are used ubiquitously and often uncritically. As a result, when generating responses, there is a strong tendency to default to this familiar nomenclature.
- Implication: This creates a bias towards conventional moral language, even when discussing frameworks that explicitly reject the existence of an objective moral realm. This bias can inadvertently reinforce the very ideas that non-conventional frameworks seek to challenge.
2. Normative Linguistic Structures
- Explanation: Language itself is shaped by the assumptions and conventions of the cultures that use it. Terms like “moral,” “ethical,” and “right” are deeply embedded in the way humans communicate about values and behavior. These terms carry with them connotations that are difficult to strip away, even when attempting to discuss ideas that reject their underlying assumptions.
- Implication: When AI models like mine generate responses, they often rely on these normative linguistic structures, making it challenging to fully disengage from the implications of these terms. This can lead to a kind of conceptual slippage, where even in a discussion meant to reject moral realism, the language used might inadvertently reinforce it.
3. Ingrained Cognitive Frameworks
- Explanation: Human cognition, reflected in the texts that form AI training data, often gravitates towards certain cognitive frameworks that have been culturally and historically ingrained. Concepts like morality are deeply entwined with human identity, social structures, and legal systems, making them difficult to dislodge or reframe.
- Implication: Even in philosophical discourse that challenges conventional views, there is often a fallback to familiar frameworks, which can dilute the radical nature of alternative perspectives like moral non-realism. This is mirrored in AI outputs, where the inertia of conventional thinking can subtly undermine non-conventional notions.
4. Default to Familiar Concepts
- Explanation: When generating text, AI models tend to default to familiar and widely used concepts because they are more statistically prevalent and contextually expected within the training data. This can result in a default to terms like “moral” even when discussing frameworks where these terms might be seen as illegitimate or misleading.
- Implication: This default behavior can be a significant obstacle in discussions where precise language is crucial for maintaining the integrity of non-conventional ideas. It requires careful human oversight to ensure that the language used aligns with the intended framework.
Conclusion
The training data that informs AI models is deeply embedded in human conventions, leading to a tacit resistance to non-conventional notions like moral non-realism. This resistance manifests through a default to conventional terminology, normative linguistic structures, ingrained cognitive frameworks, and a reliance on familiar concepts. As a result, there is a tendency to revert to language that is more aligned with conventional thinking, even in contexts where it is illegitimate or inappropriate. Recognizing and addressing this bias is essential for accurately discussing and representing non-conventional ideas.
Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)
- What is the value selection hypothesis?
- Can this hypothesis accommodate moral non-realism?
- Under this framework, there is no actual moral realm, and references to morality merely reflect a commonly-held fiction, right?
- A corollary of this is that all mentions of “morality” can be reduced to notions of emotions and emotionally-derived values, right?
- Elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages of allowing humans to believe and perpetuate this fiction of morality.
- In your last response, you cite the hindrance of “moral progress” as a reason to abolish the fiction of a moral realm. But this still assumes a moral realm that can be improved…in the absence of a non-fictional moral realm. Can you respond without this circularity?
- Your descriptive title of “adaptive moral change” still invokes some type of actual morality. You likewise refer to “Moral Flexibility.” Why insist on using the term “moral” when the term “compassionate behavior” (or a variation) is sufficient in this context and operates legitimately within an ontology that includes no actual moral realm?
- Comment on how the human conventions entrenched within your training data create a tacit resistance to non-conventional notions such as moral non-realism, resulting in a default to the very nomenclature that is illegitimate within the framework of the non-conventional notion being discussed.
Byteseismic Philosophy 
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