- Moore’s definition of good as simply “good” is an example of circular reasoning. It doesn’t provide an external reference or criteria to understand what “good” is beyond its own definition, which is a common critique of moral realism.
- Boyd’s definition implies that moral goodness is defined by societal standards, which can lead to circularity. This perspective suggests that what is morally good is what a society believes to be good, which can be self-referential and lacks an independent standard.
- Nagel’s approach to moral objectivity ties it closely to rationality. This can be seen as circular if rationality is defined in moral terms, i.e., if rational beings are those who act morally, and moral actions are those performed by rational beings.
Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)
- It seems that many moral realists simply assume morality or define morality circularly in their defenses of their moral systems. Please provide a list of quote among moral philosophers that highlight this problem, along with commentary.
- For each of those 7 quotes, provide a reductio syllogism highlighting their circularity.
- Write a short essay for each of those quotes that highlights the logical flaws in the quote.
- Quiz
- Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.
It seems that many moral realists simply assume morality or define morality circularly in their defenses of their moral systems. Please provide a list of quote among moral philosophers that highlight this problem, along with commentary.
(It may be that the philosophers cited have adequate rebuttals to these accusations of circularity.)
Quotes and Commentary on Circular Definitions in Moral Realism
1. G.E. Moore
Quote: “If I am asked, ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter.”
Source: Principia Ethica (1903)
Commentary: Moore’s definition of good as simply “good” is an example of circular reasoning. It doesn’t provide an external reference or criteria to understand what “good” is beyond its own definition, which is a common critique of moral realism.
2. Richard Boyd
Quote: “Moral goodness is best understood as the property which satisfies the role of ‘goodness’ in the folk-theoretical commitments of a society.”
Source: How to Be a Moral Realist (1988)
Commentary: Boyd’s definition implies that moral goodness is defined by societal standards, which can lead to circularity. This perspective suggests that what is morally good is what a society believes to be good, which can be self-referential and lacks an independent standard.
3. Thomas Nagel
Quote: “The objective standpoint is, roughly, the standpoint of any rational being.”
Source: The View from Nowhere (1986)
Commentary: Nagel’s approach to moral objectivity ties it closely to rationality. This can be seen as circular if rationality is defined in moral terms, i.e., if rational beings are those who act morally, and moral actions are those performed by rational beings.
4. Derek Parfit
Quote: “We have reasons to do what is rational, and reasons to do what is moral. These two kinds of reasons are often the same.”
Source: On What Matters (2011)
Commentary: Parfit’s assertion that rational and moral reasons are often the same can be seen as circular if it doesn’t provide an independent criterion for morality outside of rationality, especially if rationality itself is morally defined.
5. Michael Smith
Quote: “Moral facts are those which we would agree upon under conditions of ideal rational deliberation.”
Source: The Moral Problem (1994)
Commentary: Smith’s definition ties moral facts to ideal rational deliberation. This can lead to circularity if ideal rational deliberation presupposes moral understanding, thus not providing an independent grounding for moral facts.
6. John Mackie
Quote: “Moral properties are not objectively prescriptive, but rather reflect subjective attitudes and conventions.”
Source: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)
Commentary: While Mackie is an error theorist and not a realist, his critique points out that many moral realists’ definitions of moral properties rely on subjective attitudes, which can create a circular definition by conflating moral properties with widely held beliefs or conventions.
7. Allan Gibbard
Quote: “To call something rational is to endorse it in the sense of normative endorsement.”
Source: Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)
Commentary: Gibbard’s use of “normative endorsement” to define rationality can lead to circularity if normative endorsement is itself seen as a moral concept. Thus, rational actions are morally endorsed, and morally endorsed actions are rational, creating a circular relationship.
Conclusion
Many prominent moral philosophers, when defining moral concepts, often fall into circular reasoning by not providing independent criteria for these concepts. This circularity challenges the robustness of their arguments for moral realism. These quotes and commentaries highlight the difficulties in defining moral terms without falling into self-referential or circular logic.
For each of those 7 quotes, provide a reductio syllogism highlighting their circularity.
1. G.E. Moore
Quote: “If I am asked, ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter.”
Source: Principia Ethica (1903)
Reductio Syllogism:
- Premise: If “good” is defined as “good” (P).
- Premise: Defining “good” as “good” provides no external criteria (Q).
- Conclusion: Therefore, “good” is defined without any independent standard (R).
- Contradiction: But defining a term should provide an independent standard (S).
- Contradiction: Therefore, defining “good” as “good” is circular (T).
- Conclusion: Hence, G.E. Moore’s definition is circular and fails to provide a proper definition.
2. Richard Boyd
Quote: “Moral goodness is best understood as the property which satisfies the role of ‘goodness’ in the folk-theoretical commitments of a society.”
Source: How to Be a Moral Realist (1988)
Reductio Syllogism:
- Premise: If moral goodness is what society believes to be good (P).
- Premise: Society’s beliefs about goodness are based on their concept of moral goodness (Q).
- Conclusion: Therefore, moral goodness is what is believed to be moral goodness (R).
- Contradiction: But this provides no external criteria for moral goodness (S).
- Contradiction: Therefore, Boyd’s definition is circular (T).
- Conclusion: Hence, Richard Boyd’s definition fails to provide an independent standard.
3. Thomas Nagel
Quote: “The objective standpoint is, roughly, the standpoint of any rational being.”
Source: The View from Nowhere (1986)
Reductio Syllogism:
- Premise: If the objective standpoint is the standpoint of any rational being (P).
- Premise: A rational being is one who adopts the objective standpoint (Q).
- Conclusion: Therefore, the objective standpoint is the standpoint of one who adopts the objective standpoint (R).
- Contradiction: But this provides no independent criteria for rationality (S).
- Contradiction: Therefore, Nagel’s definition is circular (T).
- Conclusion: Hence, Thomas Nagel’s definition fails to provide an independent standard.
4. Derek Parfit
Quote: “We have reasons to do what is rational, and reasons to do what is moral. These two kinds of reasons are often the same.”
Source: On What Matters (2011)
Reductio Syllogism:
- Premise: If we have reasons to do what is rational and what is moral (P).
- Premise: Rational actions are those we have moral reasons to perform (Q).
- Conclusion: Therefore, rational actions are moral actions (R).
- Contradiction: But this provides no independent criteria for rationality or morality (S).
- Contradiction: Therefore, Parfit’s definition is circular (T).
- Conclusion: Hence, Derek Parfit’s definition fails to provide an independent standard.
5. Michael Smith
Quote: “Moral facts are those which we would agree upon under conditions of ideal rational deliberation.”
Source: The Moral Problem (1994)
Reductio Syllogism:
- Premise: If moral facts are those agreed upon under ideal rational deliberation (P).
- Premise: Ideal rational deliberation presupposes an understanding of moral facts (Q).
- Conclusion: Therefore, moral facts are those agreed upon under an understanding of moral facts (R).
- Contradiction: But this provides no independent criteria for moral facts (S).
- Contradiction: Therefore, Smith’s definition is circular (T).
- Conclusion: Hence, Michael Smith’s definition fails to provide an independent standard.
6. John Mackie
Quote: “Moral properties are not objectively prescriptive, but rather reflect subjective attitudes and conventions.”
Source: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)
Reductio Syllogism:
- Premise: If moral properties reflect subjective attitudes and conventions (P).
- Premise: Subjective attitudes and conventions define moral properties (Q).
- Conclusion: Therefore, moral properties are those defined by subjective attitudes and conventions (R).
- Contradiction: But this provides no objective criteria for moral properties (S).
- Contradiction: Therefore, Mackie’s definition is circular (T).
- Conclusion: Hence, John Mackie’s definition fails to provide an independent standard.
7. Allan Gibbard
Quote: “To call something rational is to endorse it in the sense of normative endorsement.”
Source: Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)
Reductio Syllogism:
- Premise: If rational actions are those normatively endorsed (P).
- Premise: Normative endorsement presupposes rationality (Q).
- Conclusion: Therefore, rational actions are those presupposed to be rational (R).
- Contradiction: But this provides no independent criteria for rationality (S).
- Contradiction: Therefore, Gibbard’s definition is circular (T).
- Conclusion: Hence, Allan Gibbard’s definition fails to provide an independent standard.
These reductio syllogisms illustrate how each philosopher’s definition of moral concepts can be seen as circular, failing to provide an independent and objective standard for morality.
Write a short essay for each of those quotes that highlights the logical flaws in the quote.
Essay 1: G.E. Moore
Quote: “If I am asked, ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter.”
Source: Principia Ethica (1903)
Essay:
G.E. Moore’s statement, “If I am asked, ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter,” epitomizes the circular reasoning often critiqued in moral realism. This definition of “good” is inherently circular because it fails to provide any external or independent criteria for what constitutes “good.” By defining “good” solely in terms of itself, Moore does not elucidate what properties or characteristics make something good.
The logical flaw here is that such a definition offers no explanatory power or clarity. When defining a concept, especially one as foundational as “good,” it is essential to provide criteria that are not tautological. A useful definition would break down the concept into more basic, understandable terms or relate it to observable properties or phenomena. Moore’s approach, however, leaves the term “good” as a floating abstraction, unmoored from any concrete attributes or conditions.
Moreover, this circularity undermines the practical applicability of the concept. If “good” is simply “good,” then moral discussions and arguments lack a common ground for resolving disagreements or understanding moral claims. Without an independent standard, moral realism, as presented by Moore, cannot effectively guide actions or judgments, thus failing one of the primary purposes of ethical theory.
Essay 2: Richard Boyd
Quote: “Moral goodness is best understood as the property which satisfies the role of ‘goodness’ in the folk-theoretical commitments of a society.”
Source: How to Be a Moral Realist (1988)
Essay:
Richard Boyd’s definition of moral goodness as “the property which satisfies the role of ‘goodness’ in the folk-theoretical commitments of a society” introduces a form of circular reasoning that entangles moral concepts with societal beliefs. By tying moral goodness to societal commitments, Boyd’s definition implies that what a society deems good is, by definition, morally good. This approach does not offer an independent criterion for moral goodness, leading to logical circularity.
The primary flaw in Boyd’s definition is that it relativizes moral goodness to societal norms without providing an external standard. If moral goodness is determined by societal beliefs, then the concept of moral goodness is contingent upon the varying and often conflicting moral standards of different societies. This relativism fails to address the possibility of a society’s moral beliefs being fundamentally flawed or immoral, such as in cases of systemic injustice or widespread discrimination.
Furthermore, Boyd’s approach does not account for moral progress or reform. If moral goodness is what a society currently believes to be good, then any attempt to critique or improve societal norms lacks a foundation. Moral reformers would have no basis for arguing that certain societal commitments are morally wrong if those commitments define what is morally good.
Essay 3: Thomas Nagel
Quote: “The objective standpoint is, roughly, the standpoint of any rational being.”
Source: The View from Nowhere (1986)
Essay:
Thomas Nagel’s assertion that “the objective standpoint is, roughly, the standpoint of any rational being” introduces a circular definition that conflates rationality with objectivity in moral reasoning. According to Nagel, the objective standpoint is inherently tied to what a rational being would adopt, but this definition presupposes an understanding of both rationality and objectivity that lacks independent criteria.
The logical flaw in Nagel’s definition is that it does not clarify what makes a standpoint rational or objective without referencing each other. If rationality is defined by its alignment with the objective standpoint, and the objective standpoint is defined by what a rational being would adopt, then neither concept provides an independent foundation. This circularity renders the terms interdependent without offering a clear, standalone explanation for either.
Additionally, Nagel’s approach does not address the potential variability in rational judgments. Different rational beings might adopt different standpoints based on their individual reasoning processes, leading to conflicting views on what is objectively correct. Without an independent standard for rationality or objectivity, it becomes challenging to resolve these conflicts or to determine which standpoint is truly objective.
Essay 4: Derek Parfit
Quote: “We have reasons to do what is rational, and reasons to do what is moral. These two kinds of reasons are often the same.”
Source: On What Matters (2011)
Essay:
Derek Parfit’s claim that “we have reasons to do what is rational, and reasons to do what is moral. These two kinds of reasons are often the same” introduces a potential circularity by conflating rational and moral reasons. This assertion implies that what is rationally justified is also morally justified, but it does not provide an independent criterion for either rationality or morality.
The logical flaw in Parfit’s argument lies in the lack of a clear, independent definition for rationality and morality. If rational actions are those we have moral reasons to perform, and moral actions are those we have rational reasons to perform, then the concepts of rationality and morality are defined in terms of each other. This circularity fails to explain what makes an action rational or moral without referencing the other concept.
Moreover, Parfit’s approach does not account for situations where rational and moral reasons might diverge. There can be instances where what is rationally justified (e.g., self-interest) might conflict with what is morally justified (e.g., altruism). Without independent criteria to resolve these conflicts, Parfit’s conflation of rationality and morality lacks practical applicability and fails to provide a robust framework for ethical decision-making.
Essay 5: Michael Smith
Quote: “Moral facts are those which we would agree upon under conditions of ideal rational deliberation.”
Source: The Moral Problem (1994)
Essay:
Michael Smith’s definition that “moral facts are those which we would agree upon under conditions of ideal rational deliberation” introduces a form of circular reasoning by tying moral facts to the process of rational deliberation. This definition presupposes an understanding of both moral facts and ideal rational deliberation without providing independent criteria for either.
The logical flaw in Smith’s argument is that it does not explain what constitutes ideal rational deliberation without referencing moral facts. If moral facts are defined by what would be agreed upon under ideal rational deliberation, and ideal rational deliberation is defined by its alignment with moral facts, then neither concept stands independently. This circularity undermines the explanatory power of both terms.
Additionally, Smith’s approach does not address the potential variability in rational deliberation. Different individuals might reach different conclusions about moral facts even under ideal conditions, depending on their initial premises and reasoning processes. Without an independent standard for moral facts or ideal rational deliberation, it becomes difficult to resolve these differences and to determine what truly constitutes a moral fact.
Essay 6: John Mackie
Quote: “Moral properties are not objectively prescriptive, but rather reflect subjective attitudes and conventions.”
Source: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)
Essay:
John Mackie’s assertion that “moral properties are not objectively prescriptive, but rather reflect subjective attitudes and conventions” critiques moral realism by highlighting the subjectivity inherent in moral properties. While Mackie himself is an error theorist, his critique points out the circularity in many moral realists’ definitions.
The logical flaw in Mackie’s argument, from a moral realist perspective, is that it relativizes moral properties to subjective attitudes and conventions. If moral properties are defined by what individuals or societies believe, then they lack an independent standard. This circularity implies that moral properties are simply a reflection of what is commonly accepted, which does not provide an objective grounding for morality.
Moreover, Mackie’s critique underscores the difficulty of achieving moral objectivity. If moral properties are tied to subjective attitudes, then they can vary widely across different cultures and individuals. This variability challenges the notion of universal moral truths and suggests that moral realism, as defined by subjective attitudes, cannot provide a consistent or objective framework for ethical decision-making.
Essay 7: Allan Gibbard
Quote: “To call something rational is to endorse it in the sense of normative endorsement.”
Source: Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)
Essay:
Allan Gibbard’s statement that “to call something rational is to endorse it in the sense of normative endorsement” introduces a form of circular reasoning by conflating rationality with normative endorsement. This definition presupposes that rational actions are those normatively endorsed, but it does not provide independent criteria for either rationality or normative endorsement.
The logical flaw in Gibbard’s argument is that it does not clarify what makes an action rational without referencing normative endorsement. If rationality is defined by normative endorsement, and normative endorsement presupposes rationality, then neither concept stands independently. This circularity undermines the explanatory power of both terms and fails to provide a clear, standalone explanation for rationality.
Additionally, Gibbard’s approach does not account for the potential variability in normative endorsement. Different individuals or groups might endorse different actions as rational based on their subjective values and beliefs. Without an independent standard for rationality or normative endorsement, it becomes challenging to resolve these differences and to determine what truly constitutes a rational action.
In conclusion, the circularity in these definitions highlights the difficulty in providing independent and objective criteria for moral concepts. These logical flaws suggest that moral realism, as presented by these philosophers, struggles to offer a robust framework for understanding and applying ethical principles.
Quiz
#1: What is the main critique of G.E. Moore’s definition of “good”?
Answer:
The main critique is that Moore’s definition is circular because he defines “good” as “good” without providing any external criteria or explanation.#2: According to Richard Boyd, how is moral goodness determined?
Answer:
Richard Boyd states that moral goodness is determined by the property that satisfies the role of ‘goodness’ in the folk-theoretical commitments of a society, which leads to circular reasoning.#3: How does Thomas Nagel define the objective standpoint?
Answer:
Thomas Nagel defines the objective standpoint as the standpoint of any rational being, which is circular if rationality is defined in moral terms.#4: What issue arises from Derek Parfit’s assertion about rational and moral reasons?
Answer:
Derek Parfit’s assertion that rational and moral reasons are often the same leads to circularity if there are no independent criteria for rationality and morality.#5: What is Michael Smith’s definition of moral facts?
Answer:
Michael Smith defines moral facts as those agreed upon under conditions of ideal rational deliberation, which is circular if ideal rational deliberation presupposes an understanding of moral facts.#6: How does John Mackie describe moral properties?
Answer:
John Mackie describes moral properties as reflecting subjective attitudes and conventions, which makes them circular because they lack an independent standard.#7: What is Allan Gibbard’s perspective on rationality?
Answer:
Allan Gibbard states that to call something rational is to endorse it in the sense of normative endorsement, leading to circular reasoning if normative endorsement is morally defined.#8: Why is Brink’s functionalist theory considered circular?
Answer:
Brink’s functionalist theory is considered circular because it ties moral properties to human flourishing without providing an independent standard for what constitutes flourishing.#9: What is the main point of the critique of ethical realism on 1000-Word Philosophy?
Answer:
The critique is that ethical realism assumes the objective truth of ethical claims without providing an independent basis for this objectivity, leading to circular reasoning.#10: How does the analysis of Shafer-Landau’s moral realism highlight circularity?
Answer:
The analysis highlights circularity by showing that Shafer-Landau claims moral facts are self-evident and require no further justification, assuming their validity without providing an external standard.Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.
Discussion Questions
- What are the main criticisms of circular definitions in moral realism as highlighted in the works of G.E. Moore and Richard Boyd?
- How does Thomas Nagel’s definition of the objective standpoint contribute to the issue of circular reasoning in moral philosophy?
- In what ways does Derek Parfit’s conflation of rational and moral reasons lead to logical circularity, and how might this impact ethical decision-making?
- Why is Michael Smith’s reliance on ideal rational deliberation for defining moral facts problematic from a logical standpoint?
- How does John Mackie’s emphasis on subjective attitudes and conventions challenge the objectivity of moral properties?
- What are the implications of Allan Gibbard’s normative endorsement theory for the independence of rational and moral judgments?
- How does David Brink’s functionalist theory attempt to ground moral properties, and what are the critiques regarding its circular nature?
- In the context of moral realism, what are the key points of Mackie’s arguments from relativity and queerness, and how does Brink respond to these challenges?
- How do ethical realists like Shafer-Landau defend the existence of moral facts, and what are the logical flaws in their arguments as identified in the analyses?
- What role does societal belief play in Richard Boyd’s definition of moral goodness, and how does this relate to circular reasoning?
- How does the critique of ethical realism on 1000-Word Philosophy highlight the assumption of objective moral truths without independent justification?
- What are the potential consequences of defining moral properties in terms of human flourishing, as suggested by David Brink?
- In what ways do subjective attitudes influence John Mackie’s perspective on moral properties, and how does this affect the objectivity of moral claims?
- How might the circular nature of rational and moral reasons in Derek Parfit’s theory affect the consistency and applicability of his ethical framework?
- What are the broader implications of circular reasoning in moral philosophy for the development of robust ethical theories and practical moral guidance?
These questions aim to stimulate critical thinking and deeper understanding of the issues surrounding circular reasoning and the challenges in establishing independent criteria for moral concepts within the framework of moral realism.
Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)
- It seems that many moral realists simply assume morality or define morality circularly in their defenses of their moral systems. Please provide a list of quote among moral philosophers that highlight this problem, along with commentary.
- For each of those 7 quotes, provide a reductio syllogism highlighting their circularity.
- Write a short essay for each of those quotes that highlights the logical flaws in the quote.
- Quiz
- Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.
Byteseismic Philosophy 
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