- “I define consciousness as the brain’s ability to generate a narrative or a story about what is happening both inside and outside of us. It’s not a single thing but rather a collection of processes and abilities that give rise to our experiences and awareness.”
- “Consciousness is a real phenomenon created by our brain, but it’s not as magical or mysterious as some might think. It’s a product of complex neural processes.”
- “The intentional stance is a way of predicting and explaining behavior by treating entities as if they have beliefs, desires, and intentions. This stance helps us make sense of their behavior.”
- “We can apply the intentional stance to animals, machines, and even simple objects like thermostats. By attributing intentions to these entities, we can predict how they’ll behave.”
- “I argue that we do have free will, but it’s not the kind of absolute, unconstrained freedom some people imagine. Instead, it’s a type of freedom that emerges from our complex neural processes.”
Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)
- Create a lengthy dialogue between Daniel Dennett and a bright teenager curious about his philosophy.
- Create a lengthy dialogue between Dennett and another philosopher who wishes to explore the minutia in his philosophy.
- Create a lengthy dialogue between Dennett and another philosopher who wishes to confront him on weaknesses in his philosophy.
- List Dennett’s 5 most influential philosophical notions, and indicate the degree to which they are accepted by philosophers today.
- Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.
Create a lengthy dialogue between Daniel Dennett and a bright teenager curious about his philosophy.
Daniel Dennett and the Curious Teenager
Introduction
Teenager: Hi, Mr. Dennett! It’s such an honor to meet you. I’ve been reading about your work and have so many questions. Can we talk about your philosophy?
Daniel Dennett: Absolutely! I’m glad to hear you’re interested in philosophy. Ask away, and I’ll do my best to answer.
Consciousness and the Mind
Teenager: Let’s start with consciousness. It’s a topic that really fascinates me. How do you define consciousness?
Dennett: Consciousness is indeed a fascinating topic. I define consciousness as the brain’s ability to generate a narrative or a story about what is happening both inside and outside of us. It’s not a single thing but rather a collection of processes and abilities that give rise to our experiences and awareness.
Teenager: So, is consciousness just an illusion?
Dennett: Not quite. I wouldn’t call it an illusion but rather a user interface that helps us navigate the world. It’s a real phenomenon created by our brain, but it’s not as magical or mysterious as some might think. It’s a product of complex neural processes.
The Intentional Stance
Teenager: I’ve read about your concept of the intentional stance. Can you explain what that is?
Dennett: Sure! The intentional stance is a way of predicting and explaining behavior by treating entities as if they have beliefs, desires, and intentions. For example, when we interact with other people, we assume they have goals and thoughts that guide their actions. This stance helps us make sense of their behavior.
Teenager: Does this apply to non-human entities as well?
Dennett: Yes, it does. We can apply the intentional stance to animals, machines, and even simple objects like thermostats. By attributing intentions to these entities, we can predict how they’ll behave. It’s a useful tool for understanding complex systems.
Free Will and Determinism
Teenager: What about free will? Do we have it, or are our actions determined by prior causes?
Dennett: That’s a great question and a central topic in philosophy. I argue that we do have free will, but it’s not the kind of absolute, unconstrained freedom some people imagine. Instead, it’s a type of freedom that emerges from our complex neural processes. Our decisions are influenced by many factors, but we still have the capacity to make choices and be held responsible for them.
Teenager: So, you’re saying free will and determinism can coexist?
Dennett: Exactly. This view is known as compatibilism. It suggests that free will is compatible with determinism because our ability to make choices and act on them is part of the deterministic processes of our brains. We can be free in the sense that we can reflect, deliberate, and act according to our reasons and desires.
Evolution and the Mind
Teenager: How does evolution play into your philosophy of mind?
Dennett: Evolution is fundamental to understanding the mind. I believe that our cognitive abilities and consciousness evolved through natural selection. Our brains are the result of millions of years of evolutionary pressures that favored traits enhancing survival and reproduction. This perspective helps explain why our minds work the way they do.
Teenager: Does that mean our minds are just adaptations?
Dennett: In a way, yes. Our cognitive abilities are adaptations that helped our ancestors solve problems and thrive in their environments. However, these adaptations have also given rise to complex behaviors and abilities that go beyond mere survival, like art, science, and philosophy.
The Role of Philosophy
Teenager: What do you think is the role of philosophy in today’s world?
Dennett: Philosophy plays a crucial role in helping us understand the fundamental questions about reality, knowledge, and values. It encourages critical thinking, questioning assumptions, and exploring the implications of our ideas. In today’s world, with rapid technological and social changes, philosophy can help us navigate ethical dilemmas, understand the nature of consciousness, and address the challenges posed by artificial intelligence and other advances.
Teenager: How can young people like me get involved in philosophy?
Dennett: Start by reading widely and engaging with different viewpoints. Don’t be afraid to ask questions and challenge established ideas. Join discussions, whether in school, online, or in local philosophy groups. And most importantly, think critically and reflect on your own beliefs and assumptions.
Conclusion
Teenager: Thank you so much, Mr. Dennett. This conversation has been incredibly enlightening. I feel more inspired than ever to dive deeper into philosophy.
Dennett: You’re very welcome! I’m glad to hear that. Keep questioning and exploring, and you’ll find philosophy to be a rewarding and enriching journey.
Sure, here’s a lengthy dialogue between Daniel Dennett and a bright teenager curious about his philosophy:
Setting: A sunny afternoon at a university book fair. Daniel Dennett is signing copies of his latest book, “From Bacteria to Bach and Back.” A young teenager, Maya, approaches him with a well-worn copy and a mix of nervousness and excitement.
Maya: Hi Dr. Dennett, I’m Maya. I’m a huge fan of your work! I read your book on consciousness, and it blew my mind.
Dennett: (chuckles) That’s wonderful, Maya. Thank you for reading! It can be a tricky topic for even grown-up minds, so I’m happy it resonated with you.
Maya: It did! But there’s so much I still don’t understand. Like, if our brains are just machines, how can they create something as subjective as consciousness?
Dennett: That’s a great question, and it’s one that philosophers have been grappling with for centuries. Here’s the thing: we don’t need some special, non-physical ingredient to explain consciousness. Think of an orchestra. Each instrument is a physical thing, following the laws of physics. But when they all play together, something new emerges – a beautiful symphony.
Maya: So, our brains are like the instruments, and consciousness is the symphony?
Dennett: Exactly! Our brains are incredibly complex systems, with billions of neurons firing in intricate patterns. These patterns give rise to our thoughts, feelings, and sense of self. It’s an emergent property, just like the melody is an emergent property of the orchestra.
Maya: But doesn’t that make everything seem… meaningless? If we’re just machines, what’s the point of it all?
Dennett: Not at all! Even though we’re physical systems, we can still have rich and meaningful lives. Think about it this way: a well-designed machine can be incredibly beautiful and awe-inspiring. Consider a butterfly’s wing, the Grand Canyon, or a masterpiece of music. These are all physical things, yet they can evoke deep emotions and wonder in us.
Maya: But those are things we can see and touch. Consciousness feels different. It feels…internal.
Dennett: True, but that internality is an illusion created by the complexity of our brains. Imagine a really good thermostat. It can sense the temperature and adjust itself without any kind of “internal” experience. Our brains are far more sophisticated thermostats, constantly processing information and generating responses, but the basic principle is the same.
Maya: Hmm, I see what you’re saying. But how can something physical create a feeling like ” qualia,” the raw experience of redness or the taste of chocolate?
Dennett: That’s a tough one, even for philosophers! But here’s an analogy: a digital camera doesn’t “see” the world in the same way we do. It takes in light and converts it into electrical signals. But the resulting image on the screen allows us to experience the world visually. Our brains might be doing something similar, taking in physical information and creating a subjective experience of the world.
Maya: Wow, that’s a lot to think about. So, what does this mean for free will? If our brains are just physical systems, aren’t our choices predetermined?
Dennett: That’s a complex question too. But here’s the thing: even if our brains are determined by prior states, that doesn’t mean we’re simply puppets. We can still be held responsible for our actions, just like we hold a thermostat responsible for maintaining a certain temperature.
Maya: But it feels like I have a choice! Like, right now, I could choose to walk away from this conversation or keep talking to you.
Dennett: Exactly! That feeling of choice is an important part of what it means to be human. Even if the decision to keep talking was ultimately influenced by your past experiences and brain states, you still have the capacity to evaluate options and make decisions.
Maya: This is all so fascinating, Dr. Dennett. Thank you for taking the time to talk to me!
Dennett: It’s my pleasure, Maya. Keep questioning, keep exploring. That’s how we make progress in understanding ourselves and the universe around us.
Teen: Professor Dennett, I’ve read a few of your books and find your ideas on consciousness and free will really fascinating, but also quite confusing at times. Could you try to explain in simple terms what you mean by saying consciousness and free will are “illusions”?
Dennett: That’s a great question, and you’re absolutely right that some of these concepts can be confusing and counterintuitive. Let me start by clarifying what I mean by calling consciousness and free will “illusions.” I’m not saying they don’t exist at all – rather, I’m claiming that our common-sense understandings of them are mistaken in important ways.
Our intuitive feeling is that consciousness is like a radiant spotlight, illuminating one thing after another for our subjective awareness. But after studying the science of how our brains work, I’ve come to believe that consciousness is more of a “fame in the brain” – it arises from a massively parallel process with multiple drafts of narrative streams happening simultaneously. There’s no central headquarters or Cartesian Theater where “it all comes together” for the audience of the conscious mind.
Teen: But it sure feels like there is a unified subjective experience happening in my mind. How can that be an illusion?
Dennett: You’re absolutely right, the illusion of the unitary subjective consciousness is incredibly powerful and gripping. But illusions don’t have to be utterly disconnected from reality to be illusions. My claim is that the reality behind the scenes is just a hugely distributed process of content discrimination, with no real centerpoint. The unity of subjective consciousness arises from a sort of brilliant brain fiction.
Teen: Okay, I think I can kind of grasp that idea about consciousness, even though it’s highly counterintuitive. But what about free will – how is that an illusion according to your view? It certainly feels like I have the ability to make free choices.
Dennett: Another great question! Once again, I’m not denying that we have some kind of ability to make decisions and control our behaviors to some extent. But the traditional idea of free will based on immaterial souls or a tiny miraculous exception to physical laws is what I’m calling an illusion.
My perspective is that human choice and reasoning works sort of like a huge corporate network, with different processes and procedures handling different aspects of decision-making. There are competing considerations that get traded off, and the outcome of this massively distributed process is what we experience as a “free choice.” But there’s no little man inside, no Cartesian demon pulling the levers. It’s more like a pandemonium of competing forces resolving into a decision.
Teen: But how can we be truly morally responsible for our actions if everything is just the product of physical processes outside of our control? That seems to let people off the hook too easily for bad decisions.
Dennett: I can certainly understand that concern. If we don’t have this kind of miraculous non-physical free will, it might seem that we’re just victims of circumstance with no real accountability. However, I actually think my view preserves moral responsibility quite well, perhaps even better than the traditional free will view.
You see, once we give up on the idea of an immaterial soul deciding from beyond the laws of physics, we can focus on the decision-making systems that actually exist in our brains and look at how well they are functioning. Some brain systems will be better at weighing considerations rationally, learning from mistakes, and guiding behavior than others. The more thoughtful and well-calibrated these systems are, the more praiseworthy the decisions that emerge from them will be. Conversely, when the systems are faulty or impaired, it makes sense to assign more blame.
So while it’s not the knee-jerk blame or praise we tend to assign based on the intuitive notion of free will, I would argue it is a more grounded and accurate way to think about moral responsibility. We are the products of nature and nurture, but some of those products are clearly better than others when it comes to rational decision making. That’s where the buck stops for moral accountability on my view.
Teen: Hmm, I think I’m starting to see your point, even though it’s highly unintuitive. It reminds me of how we might praise or blame a computer program based on how well it is designed and coded to accomplish certain goals, even though it isn’t a conscious free agent. I’ll have to mull over these ideas some more. Do you have any books you’d particularly recommend for a young person starting to explore these topics?
Dennett: That’s an insightful analogy about the computer program – nicely put! As for book recommendations, I’d suggest starting with some of my more accessible volumes like “Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking” or “Breaking the Spell.” Those lay out a lot of the key ideas about consciousness, free will, and ethics in a relatively gentle way. After that, “Consciousness Explained” and “Freedom Evolves” go deeper into the arguments.
But I’d also encourage you to explore other thinkers in this space, even those I disagree with substantially. It’s a complex issue and
Create a lengthy dialogue between Dennett and another philosopher who wishes to explore the minutia in his philosophy.
Daniel Dennett and the Fellow Philosopher
Introduction
Philosopher: Good afternoon, Daniel. It’s a pleasure to sit down with you today. I’d like to delve deeper into some of the more intricate aspects of your philosophy.
Dennett: Good afternoon. I’m looking forward to our discussion. What specific aspects would you like to explore?
Consciousness and the Brain
Philosopher: Let’s start with your view on consciousness. You’ve described it as the brain’s ability to generate a narrative. How do you address the hard problem of consciousness—the question of why and how subjective experiences arise from physical processes?
Dennett: The so-called hard problem is a fascinating challenge. My approach, which some call the “multiple drafts model,” suggests that consciousness doesn’t arise from a single, central process but from multiple, parallel processes that occur in the brain. These processes create different narratives that compete for dominance. The subjective experience is simply the result of whichever narrative wins out in this ongoing competition.
Philosopher: So, you’re suggesting that the hard problem might be a kind of illusion created by our cognitive architecture?
Dennett: In a way, yes. The mystery of subjective experience might diminish as we better understand these underlying processes. The sense of a single, unified experience is a product of how our brains interpret and integrate these competing narratives.
The Intentional Stance and Realism
Philosopher: Moving on to the intentional stance, you’ve argued that it helps us predict behavior by attributing beliefs, desires, and intentions. But does this imply a form of instrumentalism rather than realism about mental states?
Dennett: That’s a nuanced question. The intentional stance is indeed a practical tool for understanding behavior, but I don’t think it necessarily commits us to instrumentalism. While it’s a useful heuristic, it also aligns with a form of realism. The patterns we identify when using the intentional stance correspond to real, albeit complex, patterns in the brain. These patterns are what we refer to as beliefs, desires, and intentions.
Philosopher: So, you see the intentional stance as both a useful heuristic and as pointing to real phenomena?
Dennett: Exactly. The stance simplifies the complexity of mental states into a more understandable form without denying their reality. It’s a pragmatic way of engaging with the true nature of these states.
Free Will and Determinism
Philosopher: Your compatibilist view on free will is well-known. How do you address criticisms that compatibilism merely redefines free will rather than solving the core issue?
Dennett: I understand that criticism. Compatibilism does involve a redefinition, but it’s a redefinition that better fits our actual practices and intuitions about responsibility and agency. By focusing on the kinds of control and decision-making processes that matter for moral responsibility, we retain what is valuable about the concept of free will without requiring it to be entirely independent of determinism.
Philosopher: What about the concern that determinism undermines our sense of autonomy?
Dennett: I argue that our sense of autonomy is preserved because our actions are the result of complex, self-reflective processes within us. These processes include our ability to reflect on reasons, plan for the future, and learn from our experiences. Even if these processes are ultimately deterministic, they still constitute genuine autonomy.
Evolution and Cultural Evolution
Philosopher: You’ve emphasized the role of biological evolution in shaping the mind. How do you view the relationship between biological evolution and cultural evolution?
Dennett: Biological evolution and cultural evolution are deeply intertwined. Biological evolution has given us the cognitive capacities that make culture possible, and cultural evolution, in turn, influences our biological evolution through niche construction and other mechanisms. Cultural evolution operates at a much faster pace, allowing for the rapid development and transmission of knowledge, skills, and behaviors.
Philosopher: Can cultural evolution lead to changes in our cognitive architecture?
Dennett: Absolutely. Cultural practices can create new cognitive niches that, over time, can lead to changes in our cognitive abilities. For example, the development of writing systems has profoundly influenced our cognitive processes, enhancing our ability to store and manipulate information.
The Future of Philosophy
Philosopher: In light of your views on evolution and consciousness, what do you see as the future direction of philosophy?
Dennett: I believe the future of philosophy lies in increasingly interdisciplinary approaches. As we learn more from cognitive science, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology, these insights will inform and refine philosophical questions and methods. Philosophy will continue to play a crucial role in interpreting these findings and addressing the conceptual and ethical issues they raise.
Philosopher: How do you see the role of AI and machine learning in this interdisciplinary future?
Dennett: AI and machine learning will be significant contributors. They offer new tools for understanding intelligence and cognition, both artificial and biological. Philosophers will need to engage with these technologies, examining their implications for concepts like consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility.
Conclusion
Philosopher: Thank you, Daniel. This has been an illuminating discussion. Your perspectives offer much to think about and explore further.
Dennett: Thank you as well. These conversations are essential for advancing our understanding. I look forward to seeing where these explorations will lead us.
The Mechanics of Meaning: A Dennett and Chalmers Debate
Setting: A quiet corner at a bustling philosophy conference. Daniel Dennett sits across from David Chalmers, a prominent philosopher of mind, both sipping coffee.
Dennett: David, fascinating talk on panpsychism. But I have to admit, I find the idea of even fundamental particles having some degree of proto-consciousness a bit…unnecessary.
Chalmers: (chuckles) Perhaps, Daniel. But where else do you draw the line? Your view of consciousness as an emergent property, while elegant, seems to leave a gap in explaining the subjective experience itself.
Dennett: Ah, the ever-elusive qualia! Look, imagine a computer program playing a complex game like chess. It can analyze the board, make strategic decisions, even “win” the game. Would you say the program experiences the game in some subjective way?
Chalmers: Not necessarily. But it lacks the internal qualia – the feeling of seeing the board, the satisfaction of a good move. Your view, brilliant as it is, seems to fall short of explaining that intrinsic aspect of consciousness.
Dennett: But David, can’t we explain that feeling as a product of the program’s internal processes? The way it manipulates information, the feedback loops it utilizes – perhaps these create a functional equivalent of subjective experience, even if not an identical one.
Chalmers: Functional equivalence is an interesting concept, but it doesn’t address the “hard problem” of consciousness. Two systems could be functionally identical, yet one experiences the world subjectively and the other doesn’t. How do we bridge that explanatory gap?
Dennett: Maybe the gap isn’t as wide as we think. We tend to anthropomorphize consciousness, assuming it needs a “homunculus” inside our heads experiencing the world. But what if consciousness is a spectrum, with different levels of complexity arising from different levels of information processing?
Chalmers: A spectrum is interesting, but where on that spectrum do we find the “explanatory jump” to subjective experience? Is it a gradual increase in complexity, or is there a more fundamental difference at play?
Dennett: Perhaps it’s gradual. Imagine a thermostat. It doesn’t “experience” temperature, yet it responds to it. Our brains, with their immense complexity, might be “experiencing” the world in a way that’s functionally similar, but qualitatively different due to the sheer volume of information processed.
Chalmers: I see the appeal of that analogy, but it still feels like a dodge. The thermostat doesn’t “feel” anything at all. There’s still a qualitative difference to bridge.
Dennett: Agreed, and that’s the beauty of the problem! Maybe the “feeling” aspect is an illusion, an emergent property of complex information processing. Just because it feels subjective doesn’t mean it actually is, in some fundamental sense.
Chalmers: Intriguing, but it leaves me with a nagging doubt. If consciousness is purely an illusion arising from physical processes, then wouldn’t everything else be an illusion as well? What about the solidity of the table, the redness of the coffee?
Dennett: Not necessarily. Our brains are survival machines, after all. The illusion of a solid world, of red coffee, has survival value. It allows us to interact with the environment effectively. Consciousness might be a similar kind of “useful illusion.”
Chalmers: (nods thoughtfully) A useful illusion… perhaps. But don’t we then lose a sense of grounding in reality? If even our subjective experience is an illusion, what can we truly know about the world?
Dennett: We can still know a great deal! Science allows us to understand the physical world with remarkable accuracy. And even if our subjective experience is an illusion, it’s still a powerful and real phenomenon.
Chalmers: I appreciate your perspective, Daniel. While I might not be fully convinced, you’ve certainly given me some food for thought.
Dennett: And you, David, with your insistence on the “hard problem,” keep us all on our toes. That’s what philosophy is all about, isn’t it? The ongoing exploration of these fundamental mysteries. (raises his coffee cup) To the mysteries of consciousness!
Chalmers: (clinks his cup) To the mysteries, indeed!
Philosopher: Greetings Daniel, thank you for taking the time to explore these deep issues with me today. I must admit, I find your views on consciousness and free will to be quite radical departures from traditional notions. Let’s start with your perspective on consciousness as a “brilliant brain fiction” as you put it. How does this compte with the basic fact of subjective experience itself? Surely there must be a unity to conscious awareness, a subjectivity that experiences the world in a unified way?
Dennett: An excellent jumping-off point, my friend. You’re absolutely right that we cannot deny the reality of subjective experience itself. My view is simply that this unified subjective awareness arises from a multitude of distributed processes in the brain, rather than some mystical Cartesian theater. The appearance of unity is an emergent product, not a privileged foundational element.
Philosopher: But how can mere information processing give rise to the felt sense of inner experience? There seems to be an explanatory gap between the objective neurobiology and the subjective felt experience of consciousness itself. Isn’t this the classic “hard problem” of consciousness as posed by David Chalmers?
Dennett: Ah yes, the notorious “hard problem” laid out by Chalmers and others. I have deep respect for Chalmers but I believe his framing of the issue relies too heavily on intuitions and folk concepts that may not map cleanly onto reality. My contention is that once we clear away those assumptions and hunker down to the actual evidence from neuroscience, chemistry and psychology, we can see how the brain’s prodigious complexity gives rise to conscious experience without requiring any spooky extra ingredients.
Philosopher: So you’re saying there is no real “hard problem” at all, just failure of our intuitions to fully grasp the materialist processes that produce consciousness? That’s quite a claim! What about the knowledge argument posed by Frank Jackson – that mere physical facts cannot capture the felt essence of phenomenal experiences like seeing red for the first time?
Dennett: The knowledge argument is indeed a clever one, but I remain unconvinced. My view is that the intuition pump Jackson constructs trades on conceptual incoherencies surrounding color qualia. Once we recognize that raw feels are not in fact raw at all, but highly processed and interpreted constructions deeply shaped by our cognitive faculties, the knowledge argument loses its bite. There are no objectively-existing pure qualia that can be conceptually isolated from our categorical representational systems.
Philosopher: Fair enough, those are complex issues we could debate for some time. Let me pivot then to your perspective on free will as another “brilliant fiction.” It seems you are denying the notion of sovereign free will completely and arguing instead for some kind of naturalistic decision-making process that is not truly “free” in any robust sense. But how can we make sense of reasoned deliberation or moral responsibility if all our choices are simply products of antecedent causes outside our control? Is there any remnant of free will worth preserving?
Dennett: You’ve cut right to the heart of the issue! I’ll be the first to acknowledge that my view on free will is immensely unsettling and counterintuitive. The ideology of free will as traditionally understood is so culturally ingrained and intuitive that relinquishing it feels like a kind of miniature intellectual death.
And yet, I’ve become convinced that this very notion is incompatible with the massively attributable determination of decision-making processes we are uncovering in the brain. There simply is no room for a miraculous non-physical uncaused causa sui – our choices inevitably arise from the rich interplay of neural networks, cognitive faculties and environmental inputs all shaped by the long history of evolutionary, cultural and personal developmental processes.
Philosopher: But surely you don’t mean to say we are simply dominoes falling in a deterministic universe with no responsibility whatsoever? That seems to make reasoned deliberation and ascriptions of praise and blame incoherent.
Dennett: Not at all! This is where I part ways with the hard determinists. My view is that even in a universe of pervasive naturalistic causation, there can still be decision-making systems of remarkable competence and rationality for which ascriptions of moral accountability apply.
The degree to which a human decision-procedure approaches ideal Bayesian reasoning, integrates relevant information, learns from experience, and deploys effective cognitive strategies is the degree to which it is praiseworthy or blameworthy. We don’t need a pesky immaterial soul for moral responsibility to be sensible – we just need to appreciate the stupendous achievements of some natural decision systems over others.
Philosopher: A fascinating view to be sure. It almost seems you are translating traditional free will into a naturalistic framework of cognitive systems ethics. There is much to explore here in terms of how such an accountability system would cash out and what its implications are for our practices of praise, blame, punishment and just societal organization. Clearly we have opened up an avenue of inquiry that could occupy thinkers for centuries to come!
Create a lengthy dialogue between Dennett and another philosopher who wishes to confront him on weaknesses in his philosophy.
Daniel Dennett and the Critical Philosopher
Introduction
Philosopher: Good afternoon, Daniel. It’s a pleasure to engage with you. I’d like to discuss some points in your philosophy that I find contentious.
Dennett: Good afternoon. I’m always open to constructive criticism. Please, let’s delve into it.
Consciousness and Subjective Experience
Philosopher: Let’s begin with your approach to consciousness. Your multiple drafts model suggests that consciousness arises from various parallel processes in the brain. Critics argue that this model fails to adequately address the qualia, the subjective experience of consciousness. How do you respond to that?
Dennett: The criticism of not addressing qualia is a common one. My contention is that qualia, as traditionally conceived, are an artifact of our cognitive architecture. The multiple drafts model suggests that what we call qualia are simply the results of various competing narratives in the brain. These narratives are integrated and interpreted by our cognitive systems, creating the illusion of a unified, subjective experience.
Philosopher: But doesn’t this approach risk eliminativism, denying the existence of subjective experiences that seem self-evident to us?
Dennett: I wouldn’t call it eliminativism but rather a reconstruction. I’m not denying subjective experiences exist; I’m suggesting they aren’t what we traditionally think they are. They are real phenomena, but their nature is different from the intuitive, introspective understanding we have.
The Intentional Stance and Its Limits
Philosopher: Moving on to the intentional stance, you’ve argued that it’s a useful heuristic for predicting behavior. However, some critics claim this stance oversimplifies the complexity of mental states and behaviors. How do you reconcile this with the need for a deeper understanding of cognition?
Dennett: The intentional stance is indeed a simplification, but it’s a powerful and practical one. It allows us to navigate and predict behavior effectively. For a deeper understanding, we need to complement it with the design stance and the physical stance. These stances provide additional layers of explanation that account for the underlying mechanisms.
Philosopher: Still, doesn’t relying on the intentional stance risk anthropomorphizing entities and obscuring their true nature?
Dennett: While there’s a risk of anthropomorphism, the intentional stance is a methodological tool, not an ontological claim. It’s a way to make sense of complex systems by attributing intentionality where it’s useful. It’s crucial to remember that this is a pragmatic approach, and we must remain aware of its limitations.
Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Philosopher: Your compatibilist view on free will argues that determinism and free will can coexist. Critics argue that this view waters down the concept of free will, making it seem like mere illusion of choice. How do you address this concern?
Dennett: Compatibilism redefines free will in a way that aligns with our practices and intuitions about moral responsibility. Free will, in this sense, is about having the capacity to reflect, deliberate, and act according to reasons. This kind of autonomy is compatible with determinism because it focuses on the mechanisms that enable decision-making and self-control.
Philosopher: But doesn’t this redefinition avoid addressing the deeper issue of whether our choices are truly free or merely the result of prior causes?
Dennett: The deeper issue you’re referring to stems from a misunderstanding of freedom. Absolute freedom, unconstrained by prior causes, is an incoherent notion. What matters for moral responsibility is that our actions are the result of our internal deliberative processes. These processes are part of the deterministic fabric of our brains, yet they allow for meaningful choice and control.
Evolution and the Mind
Philosopher: You’ve emphasized the role of evolution in shaping the mind. Some critics argue that this perspective underplays the role of individual development and social environment. How do you balance these influences?
Dennett: Evolution provides the foundational framework for understanding the mind, but it doesn’t exclude the importance of individual development and social environment. These factors are crucial for shaping our cognitive abilities and behaviors. Cultural evolution, for example, operates alongside biological evolution, influencing and being influenced by our genetic makeup.
Philosopher: However, by emphasizing evolution, isn’t there a risk of biological determinism, where human behavior is seen as strictly determined by genetics?
Dennett: It’s important to distinguish between genetic determinism and the broader view of evolution. Evolutionary processes include genetic, developmental, and cultural factors. Human behavior is a product of the complex interplay between these elements. Recognizing the role of evolution doesn’t imply that we’re solely determined by our genes.
The Role of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Approaches
Philosopher: In your work, you advocate for an interdisciplinary approach. Some philosophers worry that this dilutes the philosophical inquiry with too much scientific reductionism. How do you respond to that?
Dennett: Interdisciplinary approaches enhance philosophical inquiry rather than dilute it. By integrating insights from cognitive science, neuroscience, and other fields, we can address philosophical questions with greater depth and precision. Philosophical rigor isn’t compromised; instead, it’s enriched by empirical findings and theoretical developments from other disciplines.
Philosopher: But isn’t there a risk of losing the distinctiveness of philosophical methods and questions in this process?
Dennett: Philosophy’s distinctiveness lies in its critical, reflective approach to fundamental questions. Engaging with other disciplines doesn’t erode this distinctiveness; it broadens the scope of our inquiry and equips us with more tools to tackle complex problems. Philosophy remains a unique endeavor, even as it collaborates with other fields.
Cracks in the Machine: A Dennett and Harman Debate
Setting: A dimly lit pub after a philosophy conference. Daniel Dennett and Graham Harman, a philosopher known for his object-oriented ontology, are nursing pints of beer.
Harman: (leans forward) So, Dan, your “From Bacteria to Bach” spiel was entertaining, but frankly, it feels reductive. You paint consciousness as a mere byproduct of complex systems, neglecting the fundamental strangeness of existence.
Dennett: (chuckles) Come on, Graham, don’t get all mystical on me. We’re talking about brains, neurons firing, not some ineffable spirit world.
Harman: But that’s exactly the problem, Dan. You flatten everything into the realm of the material, ignoring the independent “aliveness” of objects, both physical and mental.
Dennett: Aliveness? Objects are just configurations of matter, not sentient beings. We project our own experiences onto them, that’s all.
Harman: But what about intentionality? Take that chair. It doesn’t “intend” to be sat upon, but it has a certain “withdrawnness” from us, a resistance to our will. It’s not just a lump of matter, it’s an object with its own “allure.”
Dennett: Allure? That’s just how our brains interpret its shape and function. The chair doesn’t “allure” us, it simply has certain properties that trigger our desires.
Harman: Perhaps. But doesn’t that speak to a deeper reality? The chair exists independently of our interpretations, holding its own mysteries. It’s not just a cog in the machine of consciousness.
Dennett: Look, objects are part of the environment our brains interact with. They influence our consciousness, sure, but they don’t have their own subjective experience. It’s all about the complex web of interactions.
Harman: But what about qualia? That red you see, the pain I feel – are those just emergent properties of the brain-environment interaction, or is there something more intrinsic to the experience?
Dennett: Again, the brain processes information in a way that creates the illusion of qualia. We can explain it all in terms of complex physical systems.
Harman: An illusion? But the illusion feels so real! And what about the “hard problem” you so readily dismiss? How do physical processes generate subjective experience?
Dennett: The “hard problem” is a dead end. We can explain consciousness functionally, even if we can’t fully grasp the subjective aspect. It’s enough to understand the underlying mechanisms.
Harman: But function without essence is hollow, Dan. Consciousness, the aliveness of objects – these are fundamental aspects of reality, not mere epiphenomena. We need to move beyond your mechanistic materialism.
Dennett: Mechanistic? Maybe. But it’s a mechanism that works! Science has made incredible progress by explaining the universe in material terms.
Harman: Science has its limitations, Dan. Your philosophy ignores the strangeness of being, the “slant” of objects towards us. We need a more nuanced approach, one that acknowledges the “otherness” of things.
Dennett: Nuanced? Sure, but grounded in reality. We can’t just invent mystical properties for objects to explain consciousness. We need a rigorous, scientific approach.
Harman: (sighs) Science is great, Dan, but it’s not the only way to understand the world. Maybe a bit of “mysticism” is needed to grasp the full spectrum of existence.
Dennett: (raises his glass) Well, then here’s to the mysteries, Graham, both the scientific and the…shall we say, “poetic.”
Harman: (clinks his glass) To mysteries, indeed. But maybe next time, let’s not reduce them all to the whirring gears of a machine.
Critic: Professor Dennett, I must say I find your views on consciousness and free will to be deeply unsatisfying and fraught with unaddressed difficulties. Let’s begin with your claim that consciousness is an “illusion” or “brilliant fiction” produced by the brain. Does this not simply raise more questions than it answers?
Dennett: Not at all, I believe my view provides a simpler and more empirically grounded account that avoids the philosophical pitfalls of traditional conceptions. But I’m listening – what difficulties do you have in mind?
Critic: For one, your view seems to completely ignore and fail to account for the rich, unified field of subjective experience we all inescapably inhabit as conscious beings. You want to reduce consciousness to “fame in the brain” but that metaphor simply avoids the core issue of subjective qualitative experience. How does your view explain the inner essence of consciousness itself?
Dennett: Ah, but you see, that’s just the assumption I’m questioning – the idea that there is an inner essense of qualitative consciousness that needs further explaining beyond the brain’s processing of information. I’m suggesting that this inner light is itself the illusion, a powerful predictive fantasy spun by the brain’s cognitive machinery. The appearance of a seamless subjective experience arises from a”Cartesian vapor” as I’ve put it.
Critic: That simply won’t do, Dennett. You’re papering over the hard problem of consciousness, not solving it. Even if we grant that consciousness arises from information processing in the brain, how do those mere physical processes give rise to inner subjective experience at all? You’re waving it away, not explaining it.
Dennett: Not at all, I’m simply questioning the coherence of the very concept of “inner subjective experience” as conventionally understood. I believe the assumed separateness and interiority of consciousness is itself an artifact of folk psychology we need to transcend. Once we ditch those intuitive pictures, the production of consciousness by physical systems is no more baffling than the production of any other higher cognitive phenomenon like memory or visual processing.
Critic: So in the end you simply deny the reality of subjective experience as a brute fact we can’t escape? That’s grossly implausible on its face. And what’s more, it undermines our conventional notions of personhood, agency, and moral responsibility in ethics – issues you also grossly mangle with your denial of free will.
Dennett: I don’t deny the reality of subjective experience at all. I’m simply claiming its inner seeming is mistaken, that what we call subjective experience is already an interpreted, represented model produced by the brain’s cognitive systems. There’s no separate “hard problem” beyond explaining how information processing of sufficient complexity and abstraction can produce such models. As for free will and ethics, once again I’m rehabilitating these concepts in a naturalistic framework, not undermining them altogether.
Critic: But that’s just bad philosophy through and through! You’re completely reconstruing and changing the meaning of basic concepts to suit your reductive materialist philosophy, not honestly reckoning with them on their own terms. Subjective experience, free will, moral responsibility – these are all coherent common notions that can’t simply be redefined away whenever they cause problems for your worldview.
Dennett: On the contrary, I’m doing what any good revisionary philosopher should – seeing how far our conventional concepts and assumptions can be pushed and updated in light of our best scientific self-understanding. Why should pre-scientific intuitions born of cognitive illusions be sacred and immune to theoretical revision? Philosophy’s greatest achievements have come from thinkers willing to break with common sense when investigation demands it.
Critic: There’s a line between productive conceptual revision and outright incoherent denial of the data, Dennett. You’ve clearly crossed it in my view. Your view of consciousness as a mere “fame in the brain” ignores and hand-waves away the reality of inner subjective experience we all know to be true. And your account of reasoning as some kind of corporate network undermines any viable account of ultimate origination required for free will and real moral responsibility.
At the end of the day, your view leads to an externalist philosophy of mind that simply cannot accommodate or make sense of what we all know to be true about the reality of consciousness, the manifest truth of subjective experience, and the undeniable fact that we are the deep free sources of at least some of our thoughts and decisions. It’s simply a non-starter.
Dennett: And there you go again, treating intuitions about subjective experience or free will as indubitable data that cannot be questioned! Why should we privilege these deep-seated illusions of the human mind, especially in light of the overwhelming scientific evidence suggesting they are computational models and interpretations constructed by our brain’s staggering complexities? You accuse me of dismissing the data, when in fact I’m taking the scientific data about how our minds actually work deadly seriously.
Critic: But you’re simply assuming a reductive materialist metaphysics from the outset which bars any non-physical accounting of mind and conscious experience! That’s certainly one philosophical perspective, but by no means an unassailable truth. There are other robust traditions like property dualism or cosmopsychism that can make sense of consciousness and subjective experience in a far more satisfying way.
Dennett: Those traditions strike me as desperate attempts to cherish ancient intuitions and hang on to a mystical conception of mind in the face of the scientific revolution’s mounting insights about the material underpinnings of cognitive processes. Why should we go through theological-type contortions just to preserve common sense notions that were inevitably born of our cognitive limitations and lack of self-understanding?
Critic: Because those “common sense notions” track core phenomenological realities at the heart of the human experience! You’re adopting an external third-person perspective that wholly fails to make sense of the first-person facts about consciousness and agency that are undeniable starting points for any sound philosophy of mind. Materialist or not, you have to be able to accommodate those basic truths about subjective inner experience.
Dennett: But that’s just the point – the so-called first-person “truth” about a unitary subjective inner experience is precisely what I’m calling into question as a kind of representational idolization by the brain. There’s no need to accommodate it as a fundamental fact because it arises from the very cognitive virtuosity and self-modeling we’re trying to explain in the first place! You’re treating the output as input.
Critic: shakes head I fear we’ve reached an impasse. Your view simply flies in the face of common sense, intuition, and phenomenological certainties about consciousness that cannot simply be redefined away by scientific posturing. A philosophical system that cannot account for the reality of first-person subjective experience is no system worth having in my eyes.
Dennett: And there you have my critic’s lament – a stubbornly un-revisable commitment to intuition and common sense over the obligatory revisions demanded by our evolving scientific self-understanding. But make no mistake, such reactionary temperaments have always stood in the way of philosophical and scientific progress throughout history. The future inevitably belongs to those courageous revisers willing to face up to the deepest empirical realities, however unsettling.
List Dennett’s 5 most influential philosophical notions, and indicate the degree to which they are accepted by philosophers today.
Daniel Dennett’s Five Most Influential Philosophical Notions
1. Intentional Stance
Description: The intentional stance is a method of predicting and explaining behavior by treating entities as if they have beliefs, desires, and intentions. This stance is particularly useful for understanding complex systems, from humans to animals to artificial intelligence.
Acceptance: The intentional stance is widely accepted as a useful heuristic in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. While some criticize it for potentially oversimplifying mental states, it remains a foundational concept for understanding and predicting behavior across various domains.
2. Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness
Description: The multiple drafts model posits that consciousness consists of parallel processes in the brain that generate different narratives or “drafts.” These drafts compete for dominance, and the winning narrative becomes our conscious experience.
Acceptance: This model has sparked significant debate. While some philosophers and cognitive scientists appreciate its innovative approach to understanding consciousness, others argue that it fails to address the subjective nature of qualia. Overall, it has influenced ongoing discussions about the nature of consciousness, even among its critics.
3. Compatibilism in Free Will
Description: Dennett’s compatibilism argues that free will and determinism are compatible. He redefines free will to focus on the capacity for self-reflection, deliberation, and action based on reasons, which fits within a deterministic framework.
Acceptance: Compatibilism is a major position in contemporary debates about free will, and Dennett’s version is highly influential. While some philosophers advocate for incompatibilism (the view that free will and determinism are incompatible), Dennett’s arguments have significantly shaped the compatibilist discourse.
4. Evolutionary Approach to the Mind
Description: Dennett emphasizes the role of natural selection in shaping cognitive abilities and consciousness. He argues that our minds are products of evolutionary processes that favored traits enhancing survival and reproduction.
Acceptance: Dennett’s evolutionary perspective is widely accepted in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, particularly among those who favor naturalistic explanations. While some may argue that it underplays the role of culture and individual development, it is generally seen as a robust framework for understanding the mind.
5. Philosophy as a Bridge Between Sciences and Humanities
Description: Dennett advocates for an interdisciplinary approach, integrating insights from sciences, particularly cognitive science and evolutionary biology, with traditional philosophical inquiry. He believes this approach enriches both fields and provides a more comprehensive understanding of complex phenomena.
Acceptance: This interdisciplinary approach is gaining traction, especially as philosophy increasingly interacts with empirical sciences. While some traditionalists may resist this integration, the trend towards interdisciplinary research is growing, and Dennett’s advocacy has been influential in this shift.
Overall Acceptance
Daniel Dennett’s contributions are highly respected and influential within the philosophical community, particularly in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and discussions on free will. While some of his ideas remain contentious and subject to ongoing debate, his work has significantly shaped contemporary philosophical discourse and continues to inspire new lines of inquiry.
Here are 5 of Daniel Dennett’s most influential philosophical notions, along with the level of acceptance they hold among philosophers today:
- Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness: This theory proposes that consciousness isn’t a single, unified stream of thought, but rather arises from multiple, competing drafts processed by different brain areas. This idea has been influential in cognitive science, but hasn’t been universally accepted. Acceptance: Moderate
- Intentional Stance: This approach suggests that the best way to understand complex systems, including humans and animals, is to treat them “as if” they have beliefs, desires, and goals. This perspective is widely used in the study of animal behavior and artificial intelligence. Acceptance: High
- Darwinian Explanations of the Mind: Dennett argues that the mind is a product of evolution, and its features can be understood through the lens of natural selection. This view aligns with the broader acceptance of evolutionary psychology. Acceptance: High
- Consciousness as an Emergent Property: Dennett proposes that consciousness arises from the complex interactions within the brain, not from a separate, non-physical entity. This aligns with some neuroscientific theories, but the “hard problem” of qualia (subjective experience) remains a challenge. Acceptance: Moderate
- Free Will as an Illusion: Dennett argues that free will, as traditionally conceived, is an illusion arising from the complexity of our decision-making processes. While some philosophers agree, the debate on free will continues. Acceptance: Low
It’s important to note that these are just some of Dennett’s many contributions, and the level of acceptance can vary depending on the specific philosophical school of thought. His work, however, has been highly influential in bridging the gap between philosophy and cognitive science.
Here are 5 of Daniel Dennett’s most influential philosophical notions and the degree to which they are accepted by philosophers today:
- Intentional Stance and Instrumentalism about the Mind
Dennett argues that we can usefully predict and explain the behavior of minds (human or artificial) by adopting the “intentional stance” – treating them as rational agents with beliefs, desires, and intentions, without needing to know the underlying mechanisms. This instrumentalist view of folk psychology is fairly widely accepted among philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists.
Acceptance: Moderate to High - Heterophenomenology and Dismissal of Qualia
Dennett rejects the notion of ineffable, intrinsic qualities of subjective experience (qualia) in favor of treating reports of consciousness as texts to be interpreted from an external, scientific third-person perspective (heterophenomenology). This dismissal of qualia remains quite controversial and is rejected by many philosophers.
Acceptance: Low to Moderate - Consciousness as “Fame in the Brain”
Dennett denies the reality of a subjective Cartesian Theater or central experience of consciousness, arguing instead that it arises from parallel processes competing for “fame” or attention in a virtual machine in the brain. This view of consciousness as an illusion remains contentious.
Acceptance: Low to Moderate - Compatibilist Account of Free Will
Rather than deny free will altogether, Dennett aims to naturalize it as the operation of cognitive processes that can be meaningfully praised, blamed, or held accountable. While compatibilist, his specific reconceptualization of free will remains philosophically controversial.
Acceptance: Moderate - Memetics and Evolutionary Account of Minds
Drawing on evolutionary theory, Dennett develops memetics – the study of how cultural information propagates and evolves analogously to genes. He advocates for seeing minds and selves as products of evolutionary cultural processes. Reception of his memetic ideas has been mixed.
Acceptance: Low to Moderate
In summary, while some of Dennett’s key ideas like the intentional stance have gained significant traction, many of his most provocative reconceptualizations of consciousness, qualia, free will, and memetics remain quite philosophically contentious and have not achieved widespread acceptance, despite his influential advocacy.
Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.
Discussion Questions
- Intentional Stance
- How does the intentional stance help us predict and explain behavior in humans and other entities?
- What are the main criticisms of the intentional stance, and how might they be addressed?
- Can the intentional stance be applied effectively to artificial intelligence, and if so, how?
- Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness
- What are the key features of Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness?
- How does the multiple drafts model account for subjective experience or qualia?
- In what ways does the multiple drafts model challenge traditional views of a unified conscious experience?
- Compatibilism in Free Will
- What is the core argument behind Dennett’s compatibilism?
- How does Dennett’s view of free will differ from traditional libertarian and deterministic views?
- What are the implications of Dennett’s compatibilism for moral responsibility and legal accountability?
- Evolutionary Approach to the Mind
- How does Dennett argue that evolutionary processes have shaped human cognition and consciousness?
- What role do culture and individual development play in Dennett’s evolutionary framework?
- How might Dennett’s evolutionary perspective inform our understanding of mental disorders?
- Philosophy as a Bridge Between Sciences and Humanities
- What are the benefits and potential drawbacks of an interdisciplinary approach to philosophical questions?
- How can philosophy contribute to empirical sciences, and vice versa?
- What are some examples of successful interdisciplinary research that integrates philosophy with cognitive science or evolutionary biology?
- General Influence and Criticism
- Which of Dennett’s ideas do you find most compelling, and why?
- What are the primary challenges faced by Dennett’s philosophical views in contemporary debates?
- How has Dennett’s work influenced the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science?
These questions aim to facilitate a deep and comprehensive discussion of Daniel Dennett’s philosophical contributions, encouraging critical analysis and exploration of their implications and challenges.
Discussion Questions on Dennett’s Philosophy:
- Do you think the “Multiple Drafts” model offers a convincing explanation for consciousness? How does it compare to other models?
- Is the “intentional stance” a useful tool for understanding both humans and animals? Are there any limitations to this approach?
- How well does evolutionary psychology explain the complexities of the human mind? Are there other factors at play?
- If consciousness is an emergent property, what are the implications for understanding the nature of reality?
- Does the idea of consciousness as an illusion diminish the importance of subjective experience?
- Do you find Dennett’s arguments about free will persuasive? What are the potential consequences of believing free will is an illusion?
- How can we bridge the gap between the objective study of the brain and the subjective experience of consciousness?
- Does Dennett’s philosophy leave any room for spirituality or religious beliefs?
- Can artificial intelligence ever achieve true consciousness if it’s based on the principles Dennett outlines?
- Is Dennett’s approach too focused on the physical brain, neglecting the role of the environment in shaping consciousness?
- How might Graham Harman’s ideas about “object-oriented ontology” challenge Dennett’s materialism?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of both scientific and philosophical approaches to understanding consciousness?
- Is the search for the “hard problem” of qualia a worthwhile pursuit, or is there a better way to approach subjective experience?
- Do you think future advancements in neuroscience will eventually provide a definitive explanation for consciousness?
- How do Dennett’s ideas influence our understanding of ethics and morality, if at all?
Here are 15 discussion questions relevant to Daniel Dennett’s philosophical ideas and their reception:
- Do you find Dennett’s instrumentalist “intentional stance” toward minds convincing? What are the potential limitations of this view?
- How well does Dennett’s notion of “heterophenomenology” address or dismiss the problems raised by qualitative subjective experience (qualia)?
- Dennett likens consciousness to “fame in the brain” – do you think this metaphor accurately captures the nature of conscious experience? Why or why not?
- What are the strongest objections or counterarguments to Dennett’s claim that the unified subjective experience of consciousness is an “illusion”?
- How satisfying or plausible do you find Dennett’s compatibilist attempt to naturalize free will within a deterministic universe?
- Does rejecting non-physical accounts of free will necessarily undermine moral responsibility, as some critics charge? Why or why not?
- Should we be willing to revise or reject deep folk intuitions about subjective experience or agency if empirical evidence demands it, as Dennett argues?
- What role (if any) should common sense, intuition, and first-person phenomenological data play in developing a theory of consciousness?
- How promising or satisfactory is Dennett’s memetic, evolutionary account of cultural information and mind as an explanatory framework?
- Do Dennett’s views on consciousness and free will pose a fundamental threat to conventional notions of personhood and agency? If so, is that a reductio of his view?
- What are the most promising aspects or insights from Dennett’s overall philosophical framework? What are its biggest potential blindspots?
- How well can Dennett’s philosophy accommodate or explain the seemingly unified narrated experience of being a coherent self over time?
- Are Dennett’s views a form of overcorrecting reductive physicalism/scientism, or a proper embrace of our best scientific understanding?
- In what ways do Dennett’s views enhance, clarify, or provide a useful reconceptualization of notions like consciousness and free will?
- How might Dennett’s approach need to be modified or revised to better accommodate or explain various data about the mind?
Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)
- Create a lengthy dialogue between Daniel Dennett and a bright teenager curious about his philosophy.
- Create a lengthy dialogue between Dennett and another philosopher who wishes to explore the minutia in his philosophy.
- Create a lengthy dialogue between Dennett and another philosopher who wishes to confront him on weaknesses in his philosophy.
- List Dennett’s 5 most influential philosophical notions, and indicate the degree to which they are accepted by philosophers today.
- Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.
Byteseismic Philosophy 
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