Moral Black Boxes

“This premise suggests that the ability to question and critically evaluate the moral goodness of a being is necessary to rationally affirm its role as a legitimate moral arbiter.” – Analysis of Premise 1
“If there is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X, you then cannot question the moral goodness of Deity X.” – Premise 2
“The conclusion follows logically from the premises. If P1 and P2 are accepted, and if P3 is true (as stipulated), then it logically follows that one cannot rationally claim that Deity X is the legitimate arbiter of morality.” – Conclusion assessment
“If we accept the premises that: Questioning the moral goodness of a deity is necessary to rationally claim that the deity is a legitimate arbiter of morality… Then the conclusion that no one can claim to have access to the moral status of Deity X logically follows.” – Discussion on the implications of the premises and conclusion

Note: A blackbox is a source of output for which the inner processes are unseen and unknown.

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Rigorously assess the following argument.

P1: If you cannot question the moral goodness of a deity, you cannot rationally claim that deity is the legitimate arbiter of morality.
P2: If there is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X, you then cannot question the moral goodness of Deity X.
P3: There is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X.
Conclusion: You cannot rational claim that Deity X is the legitimate arbiter of morality.

The argument presented follows a logical structure, specifically a form of deductive reasoning called a syllogism, where it attempts to establish a conclusion based on the logical relationship between premises. Here’s a step-by-step analysis of each premise and the conclusion:

Premise 1 (P1): If you cannot question the moral goodness of a deity, you cannot rationally claim that deity is the legitimate arbiter of morality.

Assessment: This premise suggests that the ability to question and critically evaluate the moral goodness of a being is necessary to rationally affirm its role as a legitimate moral arbiter. The underlying assumption here is that rational affirmation requires the possibility of doubt and critique. This seems reasonable because it aligns with principles of open inquiry and rational scrutiny.

Premise 2 (P2): If there is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X, you then cannot question the moral goodness of Deity X.

Assessment: This premise asserts that the ability to question the moral goodness of Deity X is contingent upon the possibility of imagining actions that could count as evidence against their moral goodness. If every possible action by Deity X is compatible with Deity X being morally good, then there is no basis for questioning Deity X’s moral goodness. This premise logically follows the criteria for questioning set forth in P1.

Premise 3 (P3): There is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X.

Assessment: This premise states a condition about Deity X—that no action can be conceived that would challenge the deity’s moral goodness. The truth of this statement depends heavily on the characteristics attributed to Deity X and how broadly or narrowly “imaginable action” is defined. It requires accepting that Deity X is such that all actions are inherently good, which might not be universally agreed upon but is internally consistent within the framework of the argument.

Conclusion: You cannot rationally claim that Deity X is the legitimate arbiter of morality.

Assessment: The conclusion follows logically from the premises. If P1 and P2 are accepted, and if P3 is true (as stipulated), then it logically follows that one cannot rationally claim that Deity X is the legitimate arbiter of morality. This conclusion is dependent on accepting the truth and validity of all preceding premises.

Logical Structure:

P1 establishes a general principle about questioning and rational claims regarding moral arbiters.
P2 and P3 set up a specific scenario involving Deity X, applying the principle from P1 to this specific case.
The conclusion derives naturally from the premises, assuming the premises are true.

Conclusion of Assessment:
The argument is logically valid, meaning that if the premises are true, the conclusion necessarily follows. However, the soundness (truth of the premises) is subject to debate, particularly concerning P3, which assumes a particular theological or philosophical view of Deity X that not all might share. If one rejects P3, the argument’s persuasive power diminishes significantly.

The argument presented appears to be logically valid. Let’s break it down:

P1: If you cannot question the moral goodness of a deity, you cannot rationally claim that deity is the legitimate arbiter of morality.

This premise seems reasonable. If we are not allowed to critically examine a deity’s moral standing, then we cannot rationally accept that deity as the ultimate authority on morality.

P2: If there is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X, you then cannot question the moral goodness of Deity X.

This premise is also logically sound. If there is no hypothetical action that could undermine the deity’s moral goodness, then it becomes impossible to question or scrutinize that moral goodness.

P3: There is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X.

This premise is a factual claim, and its truth or falsity would depend on the specific characteristics and beliefs surrounding Deity X.

Conclusion: You cannot rationally claim that Deity X is the legitimate arbiter of morality.

If premises P1, P2, and P3 are true, then the conclusion logically follows. If we cannot question the moral goodness of Deity X (P2 and P3), then by P1, we cannot rationally claim that Deity X is the legitimate arbiter of morality.

Overall, the argument is logically valid. The strength of the argument ultimately rests on the truth of premise P3, which is a factual claim about Deity X. If there is indeed no conceivable action that could undermine Deity X’s moral goodness, then the conclusion holds true. However, if counterexamples can be found that would constitute evidence against Deity X’s moral goodness, then premise P3 would be false, and the argument would be unsound.

Additionally, one could potentially challenge premise P1 by arguing that there could be other criteria (besides the ability to question moral goodness) that would allow a deity to be considered the legitimate arbiter of morality.

In summary, the argument is logically valid, but its soundness depends on the truth of premise P3 and the acceptance of premise P1.

Therefore, anyone claiming that there can be no evidence submitted against the moral goodness of Deity X must also conclude they have no access to the moral status of Deity X. Correct?

Yes, that is a reasonable interpretation and extension of the argument analyzed. If we accept the premises that:

Questioning the moral goodness of a deity is necessary to rationally claim that the deity is a legitimate arbiter of morality (as suggested in P1).
The ability to question the moral goodness of a deity is contingent upon the possibility of imagining actions that would count as evidence against their moral goodness (as suggested in P2).
No imaginable action of Deity X can be considered as evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X (as stated in P3).

Then the conclusion that no one can claim to have access to the moral status of Deity X logically follows. If all actions by Deity X are compatible with Deity X being morally good, and thus immune to questioning or critique, then by the premises laid out, it follows that it is not possible to have a rational basis to affirm or understand Deity X’s moral status in a meaningful way. This line of reasoning argues that without the potential for critical evaluation, there can be no genuine understanding or affirmation of moral goodness, rendering the concept of Deity X’s moral status inaccessible for rational discussion or determination.

Yes, that is correct. If someone claims that there is no imaginable action or evidence that could count against the moral goodness of Deity X (as stated in premise P3), then by the logic of this argument, they must also conclude that they cannot rationally claim Deity X as the legitimate arbiter of morality.

The crux of the argument rests on premises P2 and P3:

P2: If there is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X, you then cannot question the moral goodness of Deity X.

P3: There is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X.

If someone accepts P3 as true, that there is truly no conceivable evidence or action that could undermine Deity X’s moral goodness, then by P2, they cannot question or scrutinize Deity X’s moral status at all.

And by P1: If you cannot question the moral goodness of a deity, you cannot rationally claim that deity is the legitimate arbiter of morality.

Therefore, anyone who dogmatically holds that there can be absolutely no evidence brought against Deity X’s moral goodness (P3) is logically forced to conclude that they have no rational basis to claim Deity X as the ultimate moral authority, per the reasoning of this argument.

In essence, insisting on the unquestionable moral perfection of Deity X necessitates giving up the ability to evaluate or justify Deity X’s status as the arbiter of morality. The argument demonstrates the tension between such an unfalsifiable premise and rational moral reasoning.

I have seen theists of different sorts attempt to make their God off-limits to questions of moral goodness by claiming their God cannot be morally judged by humans. Comment on any logical flaws in this in light of our discussion above.

The stance that a deity, such as God, cannot be morally judged by humans presents an interesting philosophical and theological claim, and there are several points to consider in light of the discussion above:

Implications for Rational Inquiry: If it is claimed that God is beyond human moral judgment, this aligns with Premise 3 (P3) from the original argument, which states that there is no imaginable action by the deity that would constitute evidence against their moral goodness. In such a scenario, if humans cannot imagine or assess actions that could count as morally good or bad, this limits their ability to rationally evaluate the deity’s moral nature. This essentially places the deity’s morality outside the realm of human understanding and scrutiny.
Contradiction with Premise 1 (P1): The original argument’s Premise 1 suggests that the ability to question the moral goodness of a deity is necessary for rationally affirming that the deity is a legitimate moral arbiter. If a theistic claim posits that God cannot be judged morally by humans, it implicitly suggests that humans cannot question God’s moral goodness. According to P1, this would imply that humans cannot rationally affirm God as a legitimate arbiter of morality.
Issue of Moral Relevance: If God’s actions and motives are completely incomprehensible or beyond human moral judgment, then on what basis can humans understand or accept moral commands purportedly issued by God? The relevance and applicability of a moral system depend significantly on the ability to understand the moral authority from which the commands derive. If God’s morality is inscrutable, it may challenge the coherence or relevance of His moral directives to human life and ethics.
Autonomy and Moral Agency: A claim that God cannot be morally judged by humans might also undermine the notion of human moral agency and autonomy. It suggests a scenario where moral truth is dictated without the possibility of interrogation or understanding, which can conflict with views that see moral agency as involving understanding, questioning, and possibly even dissenting with proposed moral truths.
Logical Coherence: Philosophically, if God is posited as perfectly good and this goodness is beyond human questioning or understanding, it might raise issues about the logical coherence of asserting any knowledge about God’s moral nature. It could lead to a paradox where believers claim knowledge of God’s perfect goodness while simultaneously holding that this goodness cannot be questioned or understood.

The logical flaws or challenges presented by such theistic claims center around the tension between asserting a deity’s moral perfection and the necessary conditions for rational discourse and moral agency. If God’s moral goodness is beyond question, it challenges the ability to rationally engage with and affirm the deity’s moral authority, as highlighted by the premises of the original argument discussed.

The claim by some theists that their God cannot be morally judged or questioned by humans is logically flawed in light of the argument we discussed, and it highlights an inherent tension in their position.

By asserting that their God is off-limits to moral scrutiny or questioning by humans, these theists are effectively embracing premise P3 of the argument: “There is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X.”

However, as we established through the logical reasoning of the argument, if one accepts P3 as true, then one must also accept the conclusion: “You cannot rationally claim that Deity X is the legitimate arbiter of morality.”

In other words, by making their God immune to any moral questioning or evidence against its goodness, these theists are undermining their own ability to rationally justify or defend their God as the legitimate source of morality.

The flaw in their position is the attempt to have it both ways – to declare their God as the ultimate moral authority while simultaneously placing it beyond the realm of moral evaluation or criticism. This is logically incoherent because, as premise P1 states, “If you cannot question the moral goodness of a deity, you cannot rationally claim that deity is the legitimate arbiter of morality.”

Any attempt to make a deity’s moral status unquestionable or unfalsifiable inevitably leads to the conclusion that one cannot rationally ground that deity’s status as the arbiter of morality. It becomes a matter of blind faith or dogma rather than a reasoned, defensible position.

For a deity to be rationally accepted as the legitimate source of morality, there must be some conceivable way to evaluate its moral standing, even if that evaluation ultimately affirms the deity’s goodness. Closing off all avenues of moral scrutiny, as these theists aim to do, is self-defeating from a rational and logical standpoint.

Create an interesting and clear hypothetical dialogue between a theist and a non-theist that saliently highlights the argument above.

Here’s a hypothetical dialogue that highlights the argument discussed above. The conversation occurs between Theo, a theist who believes that God’s actions and nature are beyond human moral judgment, and Alex, a non-theist who questions this view:

Alex: Theo, you’ve mentioned before that you believe God’s moral goodness can’t be judged by humans. Isn’t that a bit limiting for meaningful discussion about morality?

Theo: It might seem that way, but it’s actually very straightforward. God is perfect and His ways are beyond our understanding. We cannot apply our human standards of morality to the divine.

Alex: But doesn’t that make it impossible to question God’s moral goodness? How do we then affirm God as a legitimate moral arbiter if we cannot even question His actions?

Theo: We trust that God is good and His judgment is always right. His moral goodness is a given.

Alex: Let’s think this through. If we follow the logic that no imaginable action by God could be considered morally bad, then doesn’t it follow that we have no real access to evaluating His moral status?

Theo: I suppose, but His moral status isn’t something we evaluate. It’s something we accept on faith.

Alex: That’s an interesting point, but it raises a critical issue. If we accept on faith without the ability to question or evaluate, are we really engaging in a rational affirmation of God as the moral arbiter? If His actions are beyond critique, how do we meaningfully discuss or understand the morality behind His commands?

Theo: His commands are inherently good because they come from Him.

Alex: But there’s the problem. You’re using God’s identity to justify His commands, yet we’ve established we can’t assess His identity in moral terms because it’s off-limits to questioning. It seems circular to claim He’s good without the possibility of questioning His goodness.

Theo: It might appear circular from a human perspective, but divine logic is different from human logic.

Alex: I get that faith plays a big role here, but from a philosophical standpoint, claiming that God’s goodness is both unassailable and the basis for His authority without allowing for rational scrutiny, it seems we’re left accepting claims without the means to verify or even discuss them meaningfully. It’s like saying someone is a trustworthy leader without ever being able to discuss or critique their actions.

Theo: It’s challenging, but faith often requires us to accept things beyond our understanding.

Alex: And that’s precisely the issue for those who seek a rational basis for moral judgments. Without the ability to question, our engagement with morality becomes a passive acceptance rather than an active, reasoned understanding.

This dialogue illustrates the tension between the necessity for questioning in rational moral discourse and the concept of divine moral perfection that eludes human scrutiny.

Here is a hypothetical dialogue between a theist (Tara) and a non-theist (Nate) that highlights the argument we discussed:

Nate: So Tara, you believe your God is the ultimate source of morality, correct?

Tara: Absolutely. God is perfectly good and righteous, and God’s commands define what is ethical.

Nate: But how can you be sure God is truly good and the legitimate moral authority if God’s goodness cannot be questioned or evaluated?

Tara: God is beyond human judgment. We cannot apply our limited moral reasoning to an all-knowing, all-powerful deity.

Nate: But then doesn’t that undermine your ability to rationally claim God as the arbiter of morality? If there’s no possible evidence or action that could ever count against God’s moral goodness, then you can’t scrutinize or justify that goodness.

Tara: No, you’re mistaken. God’s moral perfection is an unquestionable fact. Any evil or suffering allowed by God must be for a greater good we cannot comprehend.

Nate: But by insisting God is beyond any moral questioning whatsoever, you’ve made God’s moral status unfalsifiable. And if God’s moral goodness is unfalsifiable, then logically, you cannot rationally defend God as the true moral authority.

Tara: That doesn’t follow. God’s nature as the source of morality is self-evident.

Nate: Let me lay out the argument: If you cannot question a deity’s moral goodness, you cannot rationally claim that deity as the arbiter of morality. And if there’s no conceivable evidence that could undermine your God’s moral goodness, then you cannot question that goodness. Therefore, by your own assertions, you cannot rationally claim your God as the legitimate source of ethics.

Tara: …I see the logic, but I still believe in God’s perfect goodness through faith.

Nate: But then you’ve departed from rational justification into blind belief. Insulating God from all moral scrutiny may preserve your faith, but it undermines any reasoned basis for God’s moral authority.

Create a 10-item quiz on the entire thread above.

Here is a 10-item quiz based on the entire thread above, focusing on the logical arguments and the dialogue:

Quiz Questions:

What does Premise 1 (P1) of the initial argument suggest about questioning a deity’s moral goodness?
According to Premise 2 (P2), what is necessary for questioning the moral goodness of a deity?
What does Premise 3 (P3) state about the actions of Deity X?
What conclusion is drawn if the premises in the argument are accepted as true?
How does the concept that God’s actions are beyond human moral judgment impact rational inquiry according to the analysis?
In the dialogue, what does Theo claim about the application of human standards to God?
What does Alex suggest is problematic about accepting God’s moral goodness without the ability to question it?
How does Theo justify God’s commands in the dialogue?
What logical flaw does Alex identify in Theo’s argument about God’s moral goodness?
What does Alex mean by saying engagement with morality becomes “a passive acceptance rather than an active, reasoned understanding”?

Answers:

The ability to question and critically evaluate the moral goodness of a being is necessary to rationally affirm its role as a legitimate moral arbiter.
The ability to imagine actions that could count as evidence against the deity’s moral goodness.
There is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X.
You cannot rationally claim that Deity X is the legitimate arbiter of morality.
It limits the ability to rationally evaluate the deity’s moral nature as it places the deity’s morality outside the realm of human understanding and scrutiny.
He states that God is perfect and His ways are beyond our understanding, suggesting that human standards of morality cannot be applied to the divine.
He suggests it seems circular to claim God is good without the possibility of questioning His goodness, thereby undermining a rational basis for affirming God as a moral arbiter.
He claims that God’s commands are inherently good because they come from Him.
He points out that Theo’s argument is circular because it uses God’s identity to justify His commands without allowing for the questioning of His moral goodness.
He implies that without the ability to question, individuals are merely accepting what they are told rather than understanding or reasoning through moral issues.

According to the argument presented, what is premise P1?
What is the significance of premise P2 in the context of the argument?
Which premise in the argument is a factual claim, and its truth or falsity depends on the specific characteristics and beliefs surrounding Deity X?
If someone claims that there is no conceivable action or evidence that could count against the moral goodness of Deity X, what must they logically conclude according to the argument?
What is the tension or flaw highlighted in the theist’s position of declaring their God as the ultimate moral authority while simultaneously placing it beyond the realm of moral evaluation or criticism?
In the hypothetical dialogue, what is Tara’s initial stance regarding her God’s moral status?
What logical argument does Nate present to Tara regarding her insistence on her God’s moral perfection being unquestionable?
How does Tara respond when Nate points out the logical conclusion of her position?
According to Nate, by insulating her God from all moral scrutiny, what has Tara departed from?
What does Nate suggest is the consequence of Tara’s position of preserving her faith in her God’s perfect goodness through blind belief?

Answers:

If you cannot question the moral goodness of a deity, you cannot rationally claim that deity is the legitimate arbiter of morality.
If there is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X, you then cannot question the moral goodness of Deity X.
P3: There is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X.
They must conclude that they cannot rationally claim Deity X as the legitimate arbiter of morality.
The flaw is the attempt to have it both ways – to declare their God as the ultimate moral authority while simultaneously placing it beyond the realm of moral evaluation or criticism, which is logically incoherent.
Tara’s initial stance is that her God is perfectly good and righteous, and God’s commands define what is ethical.
Nate presents the argument that by insisting God is beyond any moral questioning whatsoever, Tara has made God’s moral status unfalsifiable, and therefore, she cannot rationally defend God as the true moral authority.
Tara acknowledges the logic but falls back on her belief in God’s perfect goodness through faith.
Nate suggests that by insulating her God from all moral scrutiny, Tara has departed from rational justification into blind belief.
Nate suggests that by preserving her faith in her God’s perfect goodness through blind belief, Tara has undermined any reasoned basis for her God’s moral authority.

Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.

Here are 15 discussion questions relevant to the themes and concepts discussed above:

How important is the ability to question authority figures, including divine figures, in establishing moral norms?
Can a deity be considered morally good if their actions are beyond human comprehension?
Is it possible to have a rational understanding of morality that originates from a source considered infallible and unquestionable?
What are the implications for religious practices if followers cannot question the moral goodness of their deity?
How do the concepts of faith and rational inquiry intersect and possibly conflict when discussing the morality of a deity?
In what ways does claiming a deity’s actions are beyond human moral judgment affect theological and ethical debates?
How could one argue against the premise that no action by a deity could ever be considered morally bad?
What are the potential risks of accepting moral commands without the possibility of questioning the moral authority behind them?
How does the dialogue between Theo and Alex reflect broader societal debates about authority and morality?
Discuss the philosophical significance of the statement “divine logic is different from human logic” as mentioned by Theo.
What alternative views exist within theism that allow for questioning the moral goodness of a deity?
How do concepts from the dialogue and argument challenge or reinforce your own views on the relationship between morality and divinity?
Could a moral system based on unchallengeable commands be justified in a pluralistic society?
What are the philosophical challenges in defining what constitutes “imaginable action” against a deity’s moral goodness?
How does the principle that rational affirmation requires the possibility of doubt and critique apply to other areas of knowledge beyond theology?

These questions encourage deep thinking and discussion about the complex interplay between faith, morality, rational inquiry, and the role of divine authority in ethical discussions.

Here are 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above:

What criteria should be used to determine if a deity is the legitimate arbiter of morality?
Is it logically coherent to claim a deity as the source of morality while also asserting that deity’s moral goodness is beyond questioning?
Can faith alone be a sufficient basis for accepting a deity as the ultimate moral authority, or is some level of rational justification necessary?
How might the argument presented be countered or challenged by those who believe in the unquestionable moral perfection of their deity?
Are there any potential flaws or counterarguments to premise P1 (If you cannot question the moral goodness of a deity, you cannot rationally claim that deity is the legitimate arbiter of morality)?
Could there be alternative interpretations of premise P3 (There is no imaginable action of Deity X that would constitute evidence against the moral goodness of Deity X) that might weaken the argument?
How might the concept of moral goodness be defined or understood differently by theists and non-theists, and how could this impact the argument?
In the hypothetical dialogue, what alternative responses or counterarguments could Tara (the theist) have made to Nate’s points?
Are there any real-world examples or scenarios that exemplify the tension between unfalsifiable claims of a deity’s moral perfection and rational moral reasoning?
How might the argument be applied or extended to other belief systems or sources of moral authority beyond deities?
Could there be a way to reconcile the ability to question a deity’s moral goodness with still accepting that deity as the legitimate arbiter of morality?
What role, if any, should human reason and moral evaluation play in assessing the moral status of a deity claimed to be the source of ethics?
Are there potential dangers or risks in either dogmatically asserting a deity’s moral perfection or completely rejecting the possibility of a deity as a legitimate moral authority?
How might the argument be received or perceived by individuals with different religious or philosophical backgrounds?
Are there alternative formulations or framings of the argument that could make it more compelling or easier to understand?

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