Moral Realism & Intuition

“Moral realism is the philosophical doctrine that there are objective moral facts, which are independent of human beliefs or perceptions.”
“This viewpoint is appealing because it corresponds with the intuitive judgments most people make about moral issues.”
“The assertion that moral realism can fairly claim to have common sense and initial appearances on its side suggests that this doctrine is not only theoretically robust but also resonant with everyday moral reasoning.”
“Moral realism posits that these intuitive assessments are actually tapping into a real and structured moral universe, suggesting that our instinctual moral responses are grounded in objective truths.”
“The inclination to treat moral realism’s ‘intuitive’ correctness with skepticism stems from a well-established caution in philosophy against relying too heavily on intuitions, which can be swayed by various psychological and cultural factors.”
“The diversity of moral norms and values across different societies challenges the idea that our intuitions universally reflect objective moral truths.”

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Restate the following from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy in clear and rigorous terms, then elaborate on the notion:

“By all accounts, moral realism can fairly claim to have common sense and initial appearances on its side.”

Restatement:
According to widespread views, moral realism holds a position that aligns with common sense and the immediate perceptions of most people.

Elaboration:
Moral realism is the philosophical doctrine that there are objective moral facts, which are independent of human beliefs or perceptions. That is, certain actions are right or wrong independently of what anyone thinks about them. This viewpoint is appealing because it corresponds with the intuitive judgments most people make about moral issues. For example, when people declare that acts such as murder or theft are wrong, they typically mean this in an absolute sense, not just in relation to a particular culture or individual preferences.

The assertion that moral realism “can fairly claim to have common sense and initial appearances on its side” suggests that this doctrine is not only theoretically robust but also resonant with everyday moral reasoning. Common sense, in this context, refers to the basic level of practical insight that ordinary people naturally possess. Initial appearances are the immediate perceptions or gut feelings that people have about the rightness or wrongness of certain behaviors before engaging in deep philosophical analysis.

In simpler terms, most people, when faced with clear cases of compassion or cruelty, recognize an inherent moral quality in these actions without needing sophisticated philosophical arguments. Moral realism posits that these intuitive assessments are actually tapping into a real and structured moral universe, suggesting that our instinctual moral responses are grounded in objective truths. This alignment with common sense and initial appearances provides moral realism with a persuasive edge in debates about the nature of morality.

The quoted statement suggests that the perspective of moral realism – the view that moral facts and truths exist objectively, independent of what any individual or culture believes – aligns with common intuitions and first impressions about the nature of morality. In other words, when we first consider moral questions and judgments, it seems natural to view them as reflecting objective realities about right and wrong, good and bad, rather than as merely subjective preferences or social constructs.

To elaborate, the notion that moral realism has “common sense and initial appearances on its side” stems from how we commonly experience moral judgments and convictions. When we feel that an action is truly wrong or right, or that a state of affairs is unjust or virtuous, these seem to be more than just personal opinions – they feel like apprehensions of objective moral truth. The strong intuitive force behind many of our moral beliefs makes it seem that we are tracking real moral facts, just as our perceptions of the physical world seem to track real facts about material reality.

Additionally, we tend to treat moral disagreements as more than just clashes of personal preference, but as potential errors about objective moral reality that call for rational debate, appeal to moral principles, and a sincere attempt to correct misapprehensions. The way we approach and grapple with moral issues suggests an underlying commitment to moral realism on some level.

However, despite these initial appearances, moral realism remains a philosophically contentious position. Skeptics argue that our moral intuitions and experienced moral convictions cannot be simply taken for granted as tracking objective reality, as they may arise from other forces like biological evolution, cultural inculcation, or psychological projection. The common sense view could be an illusion. Defending moral realism requires rigorous philosophical arguments beyond just pointing to its intuitive starting point. But the claim that moral realism meshes with common sense and first impressions remains an important consideration in the debate.

It would seem, based on the strong emotional draw of moral realism, that its “intuitive” correctness should be treated with the utmost skepticism. Weigh in on this.

The inclination to treat moral realism’s “intuitive” correctness with skepticism stems from a well-established caution in philosophy against relying too heavily on intuitions, which can be swayed by various psychological and cultural factors. This skepticism is not just prudent but necessary for a rigorous examination of any philosophical doctrine. Here are several reasons to approach the intuitive appeal of moral realism critically:

Fallibility of Intuition:
Intuitions are immediate beliefs or judgments not based on conscious reasoning, and they can often be mistaken. They are influenced by an individual’s upbringing, culture, personal experiences, and even biological predispositions. In the realm of morality, where there is significant disagreement between cultures and individuals about what constitutes right and wrong, relying on intuition alone appears problematic. This suggests a need to interrogate the sources and veracity of our moral intuitions critically.
Evolutionary Psychology Perspective:
Some theorists argue that our moral intuitions have been shaped more by evolutionary pressures than by access to moral truths. From this viewpoint, moral reactions might be more about survival and social cohesion rather than about tapping into an objective moral order. This evolutionary perspective casts doubt on the reliability of moral intuitions as guides to moral reality, suggesting that they serve more pragmatic than truth-tracking purposes.
Philosophical Disagreements:
The landscape of moral philosophy is fraught with deep and persistent disagreements that extend even to fundamental issues. If moral realism were intuitively obvious in a way that tracked truth, one might expect less profound and widespread disagreement among both laypeople and philosophers about moral issues. The fact that such disagreements exist might indicate that what feels intuitively right can vary dramatically, thereby questioning the universal truth-claiming nature of moral realism.
Cognitive Biases and Heuristics:
Psychological research has shown that humans are prone to various cognitive biases and heuristics that can distort our thinking and decision-making processes, including in the moral domain. For instance, the availability heuristic might lead someone to judge moral situations based on what examples are most readily brought to mind rather than on all relevant facts. Such biases suggest caution in uncritically accepting moral intuitions as foundations for moral realism.
Cultural Relativism and Moral Diversity:
The diversity of moral norms and values across different societies challenges the idea that our intuitions universally reflect objective moral truths. Proponents of cultural relativism argue that morality is constructed socially and varies with cultural contexts. This view raises questions about whether moral intuitions, which often vary by culture, can be reliable indicators of objective moral truths.

In conclusion, while moral realism may align with common sense and initial appearances, these foundations themselves warrant scrutiny. The intuitive appeal of moral realism, though psychologically compelling, needs to be weighed against the potential for bias, error, and cultural influence that characterize human intuitions. A thorough philosophical investigation of moral realism would require looking beyond intuitive correctness, employing logical rigor and empirical investigation to assess the validity of its claims.

You raise an excellent point. The fact that moral realism has such a strong intuitive and emotional appeal to us should actually make us more skeptical of accepting it at face value. There are several reasons why we ought to be wary of treating the intuitive correctness of moral realism as sufficient grounds for endorsing it:

1. Our moral intuitions and gut feelings likely evolved not to track abstract moral truths, but to facilitate cooperation and social cohesion within our ancestral hunter-gatherer groups. The powerful emotional draw of moral realism may simply be a byproduct of these evolutionary processes shaping our psyches, not evidence of moral facts.

2. We know from studies in psychology and cognitive biases that our intuitions across many domains can lead us profoundly astray from truth and rationality. Moral questions seem particularly rife for baldkin intuitions, emotional reasoning, and other distortions.

3. Throughout history, moral intuitions have clashed violently across cultures in ways that make them seem contingent on circumstances rather than tracking objective reality. The existence of such radical moral disagreements should make us doubtful that intuition alone can be trusted.

4. Moral realism is an ontologically weighty claim – that there exists a realm of objective moral facts and properties. Such a substantial metaphysical commitment requires tremendous philosophical justification beyond just intuitive appeal.

So while the intuitive force of moral realism should be taken seriously as a philosophical data point to potentially explain, you are absolutely right that it cannot be treated as sufficient evidence all by itself. The emotional resonance may simply be a psychological artifact unrelated to moral truth. Extraordinary claims like moral realism require rigorously marshaled arguments and circumspect scrutiny, not just deference to common intuition. Subjecting our moral intuitions to critical reason is crucial for avoiding the trap of codifying our gut feelings into moral dogma. Skepticism toward intuitive moral realism is well-warranted.

Enumerate and comment on the emotions that may contribute to the “intuition” that moral realism is correct.

The intuition that moral realism is correct—that is, the belief that there are objective moral truths—can be significantly influenced by various emotional responses. These emotions play a critical role in shaping our immediate moral judgments, often before rational deliberation takes place. Below, I enumerate and discuss several key emotions that contribute to this intuition:

Empathy:
Empathy involves understanding and sharing the feelings of others. It can lead individuals to make strong moral judgments based on the perceived suffering or happiness of others. For example, empathetic responses to someone in pain might intuitively affirm the moral wrongness of causing harm. This emotional response can bolster the belief in moral realism by suggesting that some actions are inherently wrong, regardless of cultural or personal standards.
Disgust:
Moral disgust is an emotional reaction to actions deemed morally reprehensible. This emotion can extend beyond physical disgust (e.g., to spoiled food) to moral contexts (e.g., to acts of betrayal or cruelty). The visceral nature of disgust can lend a sense of objectivity to the wrongness of certain actions, reinforcing the intuition that such actions are universally condemnable, a key tenant of moral realism.
Anger:
Anger often arises from perceptions of injustice or wrongdoing. When people feel anger in response to an action, it can reinforce their belief that the action is not just undesirable but morally wrong. Anger might therefore support moral realism by making it seem self-evident that some behaviors (e.g., unfair treatment) are objectively immoral.
Guilt:
Guilt occurs when one believes they have violated a moral norm. This emotion presupposes the existence of right and wrong ways to act, aligning well with moral realism. The experience of guilt can strengthen the conviction that there are objective moral truths, as it involves internal sanctions for failing to adhere to these perceived truths.
Compassion:
Compassion, like empathy, involves concern for the suffering of others, but with a motivational component towards alleviating that suffering. This emotion can prompt intuitive judgments about the rightness of helping behaviors, suggesting to the individual that certain moral imperatives (like aiding those in need) are universally valid.
Fear:
Fear, especially of social reprisal or punishment, can influence moral intuitions. It may lead to compliance with perceived moral laws, not necessarily because they are believed to be intrinsically valid, but because violating them is seen as hazardous. While fear might complicate the picture, it can also support the intuition of moral realism insofar as it presupposes the existence of moral rules that ought to be followed to avoid negative outcomes.
Relief:
Relief can be felt when an anticipated negative moral outcome does not occur or when a moral conflict is resolved. This emotion might support moral realism by reinforcing the sense that certain resolutions are ‘right’ or ‘just’—aligning outcomes with a moral order that appears objective.

Each of these emotions can significantly impact the intuition that moral realism is correct by providing immediate, emotionally charged reasons to believe in the existence of objective moral truths. However, it’s important to critically assess whether these emotions are revealing these truths or simply reflecting evolutionary, psychological, or social pressures that shape human response mechanisms. This distinction is crucial for understanding the validity and limits of moral realism from a philosophical standpoint.

There are several powerful emotions that likely contribute to the widespread intuition that moral realism is correct:

1. A sense of moral certainty and conviction – When we have a strong moral belief about something being right or wrong, there is an associated feeling of certainty that this belief tracks an objective moral truth. This sense of conviction can make moral realism feel self-evident.

2. Moral indignation/outrage – When confronted with acts that violate our moral code, we often experience visceral feelings of indignation and outrage. These intense emotional reactions can make it seem inconceivable that we are not responding to objective moral violations.

3. Feelings of guilt and shame – The experience of guilt over moral transgressions and shame at moral failings creates a feeling that we have breached real moral standards, not just subjective preferences.

4. Desire for moral authority – There is a deep human craving for moral objectivity and authority to ground our ethical beliefs and practices. Moral realism satisfies this desire, whereas moral anti-realism can feel unsettling.

5. Emotions around justice and fairness – Our notions of justice and rights seem to require moral facts to be truly coherent. The passion around injustice suggests an intuition about objective moral realities being violated.

While these emotional phenomena are data points to potentially explain, we must be cautious about treating them as reliable guides to moral reality. Emotions can powerfully shape intuitions across all domains in ways that frequently mislead us. The fact that moral realism resonates so strongly with our moral emotions and intuitions may say more about the evolutionary effects that shaped those intuitions than about the actual truth of moral realism.

We must critically examine whether these moral emotions truly track objective moral facts, or whether they arose as evolutionary adaptations for social cohesion and cooperation, divorced from any deeper metaphysical grounding. Extraordinary philosophical care is required to not let our powerful moral intuitions and emotions unduly sway our metaphysical conclusions.

Create a 10-item quiz on the entire thread above.

Moral Realism Quiz

What philosophical doctrine posits that there are objective moral facts that are independent of human beliefs or perceptions?
What is meant by “common sense” in the context of moral realism’s alignment with common sense and initial appearances?
Which psychological perspective suggests that our moral intuitions may be more about evolutionary pressures than about accessing moral truths?
Why should the intuitive correctness of moral realism be treated with skepticism, according to philosophical caution?
What kind of heuristic might lead someone to judge moral situations based on the most readily available examples rather than all relevant facts?
Which emotion involves understanding and sharing the feelings of others and contributes to moral judgments about the suffering or happiness of others?
How does the emotion of anger relate to the intuitive support for moral realism?
What role does guilt play in reinforcing the belief in moral realism?
Cultural relativism challenges moral realism by suggesting that moral norms: A. Are based on objective truths that transcend cultural differences. B. Vary with social constructs and are culturally dependent. C. Are universally accepted regardless of individual or cultural beliefs. D. None of the above.
Which emotion might complicate the intuitive support for moral realism by presupposing the existence of moral rules to avoid negative outcomes, rather than their intrinsic validity?

Answers:

Moral realism.
The basic level of practical insight that ordinary people naturally possess.
Evolutionary psychology.
Intuitions can be influenced by personal, cultural, and psychological factors and may not accurately reflect objective truths.
Availability heuristic.
Empathy.
Anger arises from perceptions of injustice or wrongdoing and can reinforce the belief that certain actions are objectively wrong.
Guilt occurs when one believes they have violated a moral norm, presupposing the existence of right and wrong ways to act.
B. Vary with social constructs and are culturally dependent.
Fear.

1. According to the passage, which of the following views does moral realism claim?

2. What does the passage suggest is a reason why moral realism seems intuitive to many people?

3. The passage states that our moral intuitions likely evolved for what purpose?

4. According to the passage, what should the existence of radical moral disagreements across cultures make us doubtful about?

5. Why does the passage argue that intuition alone cannot be treated as sufficient evidence for moral realism?

6. What does the passage suggest is required for moral realism to be justified, beyond just intuitive appeal?

7. The passage mentions several emotions that may contribute to the intuition of moral realism being correct. Which of the following is NOT one of those emotions?

8. According to the passage, what desire or craving does moral realism potentially satisfy?

9. The passage cautions about what potential mistake regarding our moral emotions and intuitions?

10. What philosophical care does the passage argue is required regarding moral intuitions?

Answers:

1. That moral facts and truths exist objectively, independent of beliefs.
2. Because when we consider moral judgments, it seems natural to view them as reflecting objective realities.
3. To facilitate cooperation and social cohesion within ancestral groups.
4. That intuition alone cannot be trusted to track moral truths.
5. Because moral realism is an extraordinary metaphysical claim requiring tremendous justification.
6. Rigorously marshaled arguments and circumspect scrutiny.
7. Anger
8. The desire for moral objectivity and authority.
9. Treating them as reliable guides to moral reality.
10. Extraordinary philosophical care is required to not let moral intuitions unduly sway metaphysical conclusions.

Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.

What is moral realism, and how does it propose that moral facts exist independently of human beliefs and perceptions?
How does the alignment of moral realism with “common sense” and “initial appearances” support its validity as a philosophical doctrine?
Discuss the implications of evolutionary psychology on the belief in objective moral truths. How might evolutionary pressures influence our moral intuitions?
Explore the philosophical reasons for treating the intuitive correctness of moral realism with skepticism. What potential pitfalls exist in relying too heavily on intuition in moral philosophy?
Explain the impact of the availability heuristic on moral judgments. How might this cognitive bias affect our perception of moral issues?
Discuss how empathy contributes to the intuition that certain actions are morally right or wrong. What limitations might this emotion have in determining moral truth?
Analyze the role of anger in supporting moral realism. Can anger be considered a reliable indicator of moral truth?
How does guilt reinforce the belief in objective moral truths according to moral realism? Discuss whether guilt could be misleading in understanding morality.
Evaluate the argument posed by cultural relativism against moral realism, which suggests that moral norms are culturally dependent. What strengths and weaknesses does this argument have?
Fear is often linked to moral compliance due to social or punitive repercussions. Discuss how fear might complicate the support for moral realism.
Compassion and relief are emotions that can endorse certain moral resolutions as ‘right’ or ‘just.’ Discuss how these emotions might align with moral realism’s claims.
How does the disagreement among philosophers regarding fundamental moral issues challenge the idea that moral realism is intuitively correct?
Compare and contrast moral realism with moral relativism, particularly in how each views the nature of moral truths.
Discuss the role of education and cultural exposure in shaping one’s moral intuitions. How might these factors influence the acceptance or rejection of moral realism?
Evaluate whether moral realism can be defended solely on the basis of being intuitive, considering the psychological and social factors that influence human emotions and beliefs.

These discussion questions are designed to foster a deeper understanding and critical analysis of moral realism and related philosophical, psychological, and cultural considerations.

Here are 15 discussion questions relevant to the content on moral realism and the role of intuitions:

1. Do you find the notion of objective moral truths intuitive? Why or why not?

2. Can you think of examples where your moral intuitions clashed with those of others from different cultures or backgrounds?

3. How might evolutionary forces have shaped our moral intuitions in ways disconnected from moral truth?

4. What are some potential non-moral sources of the powerful emotional experiences associated with moral convictions?

5. Is there a difference between the intuition of moral realism being correct, and it actually being correct? How can we separate these?

6. Should we be more or less skeptical of moral intuitions compared to intuitions in other domains? Why?

7. How might cognitive biases and psychological projection lead us astray in trusting moral intuitions?

8. Are there particular moral issues where your intuitions feel especially unshakable? What might explain this?

9. Can you think of historical examples where societies institutionalized moral intuitions that we now reject as wrong?

10. Is the fact that moral realism would satisfy desires for objectivity a reason to be more or less confident in it?

11. How might one try to rigorously justify moral realism beyond just intuitive appeal?

12. Are there instances where we should override strong moral intuitions with reason and argument? When?

13. Could there be evolutionary advantages to having mistaken realist moral intuitions?

14. Is skepticism of moral intuitions a threat to moral motivation and keeping society stable?

15. How can we cultivate the proper care and circumspection regarding moral intuitions going forward?

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