Provide comprehensive formulations of the positions of EB and PS in the following discussion:

EB: I’d like to talk in terms of trust. Would you agree we all trust in something or someone?

PS: Is this an independent topic confined to the realm of English denotations, or will it return to the Greek-based concept of πίστις such as is found in John 3:18? You’ll have to commit on this so there is no equivocation later on.

EB: I find it easier to speak English, let’s remain there 

PS: Ok, then we’ll have to commit to not equivocating later by applying our discussion of English denotations and connotations to a Greek term found in a Biblical passage. Now, if by trust you mean that, for some of the notions for which I map my degree of belief to the degree of the evidence, that degree of evidence and belief is, say, 80%, and I consequently “trust” the notion 80%, then I do “trust” the notion. But that is a low-resolution description of my “trust”. It seems to be an attempt to revert my nuanced epistemic assessment of 80% back to something binary. My belief is not binary. It is intrinsically gradience since the evidence that grounds it is intrinsically gradient. Let me elaborate: To the extent that your degree of belief does not correspond to the degree of the relative evidence (as you personally, honestly perceive it), to that degree you are irrational.

EB: agree, not everything is binary (I read a great book by Bart Kosko “Fuzzy Logic” – not sure if you’ve heard of it). But, I’m curious about even more fundamental notions of trust – like how do you know the world is real? Perhaps you are a brain in a vat or in a simulation?

PS: I don’t know the world is real. My confidence is a matter of inductive density. It is asymptotic—approaching the line of absolute certainty as the inductive evidence accrues, but it never actually reaches complete certainty. This holds for all subjective minds who confront the world with their senses.

EB: Ok, an agnostic. Do you believe it is possible that other people might have more certainty than you?

PS: They can have more or less certainty than me, but to the extent that their degree of belief does not correspond to the relative degree of evidence they perceive, to that extent they are irrational.

EB: What if they were able to perceive better than you?

PS: That does not matter. That question is related to deep rationality: having a fine-tuned toolkit of rationality skills. We are talking here about core rational: simply honestly mapping your degree of belief to the degree of the evidence as you understand the evidence.

EB: I would say that I am rational – even that it is only possible to be rational because God is rational, and I am created in the image of God. How is it that you are rational?

PS: I test my rationality against reality. When my actions emergent of my my belief are successful or unsuccessful, that is applied to my assessment of my degree of rationality. Aging Christians do not ask God whether they are still rational. They do what I do. They normally test their rationality through crossword puzzles or watching their friends’ responses to their behavior. Even younger Christians assess their developing rationality through tests in school or through the degree they successfully navigate the world. It is a mendacious, silly notion you need to ask God how rational you are at different stages of your life. Reality is always there to rub against to inform you whether your rationality is strong or faltering.

EB: I am talking about a foundation for rationality. You believe you are evolved from hydrogen atoms, yes? Why believe evolved hydrogen can be rational?

PS: We don’t need to know about the foundation or origin. If you find a watch or compass in the woods, do you need to know or contact the manufacturer? No. You simply need to test the watch or compass against reality and the degree of its utility from the point you found it. You would be foolish to demand that the manufacturer be found and contacted. The manufacturer cannot tell you whether the found watch or compass is properly functioning, just as a God cannot ensure that his adherents have properly functioning rationality.

EB: Isn’t it possible that your actions are not interacting with reality the way that you believe they are? That your mind is tricking you into thinking you are more effective that you really are? For example, in “The Marching Morons” (Cyril Kornbluth), people have become so unintelligent that they don’t realize they are getting onto planes and trains that proceed to crash in flames.

PS: Yes. I could be wrong. Objective truth does not always align with subjective assessments of the available evidence. The Muslin child who receives a bicycle immediately after praying for one now has more evidence for the truth of Islam, the falsity of Islam notwithstanding. But our epidemic obligation is to honestly map our degree of belief to the degree of the evidence as we perceive it. To the degree that one fails in this, to that extent, they are irrational.


In this discussion, EB and PS engage in a nuanced conversation about the nature of trust, rationality, and the relationship between belief and evidence. Their positions can be summarized as follows:

EB’s Position:

  1. Interest in Exploring Trust: EB initiates the conversation with an interest in discussing the concept of trust, suggesting it’s a fundamental aspect of human experience.
  2. Preference for English Terminology: EB opts to keep the discussion within the realm of English, avoiding the complexities of Greek terminology and Biblical references.
  3. Exploration of Fundamental Trust: EB is curious about more profound notions of trust, such as the reality of the world, questioning if it could all be an illusion (e.g., brain in a vat, simulation).
  4. Openness to Non-Binary Beliefs: EB acknowledges the complexity of belief systems, indicating not everything is binary, inspired by Bart Kosko’s “Fuzzy Logic.”
  5. Consideration of Greater Certainty in Others: EB entertains the possibility that others might have more certainty about the world, suggesting a variability in human perception and rationality.
  6. Foundation for Rationality: EB attributes his rationality to being created in the image of a rational God, suggesting a divine foundation for human rationality.
  7. Questioning Evolutionary Rationality: EB is skeptical about the notion that rationality can arise purely from evolutionary processes, questioning why one should trust rationality derived from evolved hydrogen atoms.

PS’s Position:

  1. Concerns About Equivocation: PS is wary of conflating terms and insists on clarity regarding the use of “trust” in the context of the discussion, specifically avoiding the equivocation of English and Greek terms.
  2. Nuanced View of Trust and Belief: PS describes trust as a gradient, not binary, tied closely to the evidence and personal perception of that evidence. Rationality, for PS, involves mapping one’s degree of belief to the degree of evidence.
  3. Agnosticism Regarding Reality: PS expresses an agnostic stance towards the absolute reality of the world, viewing confidence in reality as asymptotic and based on inductive evidence.
  4. Rationality as Evidence-Based: PS emphasizes that rationality is about mapping beliefs to evidence. The ability to perceive better does not inherently make one more rational unless it aligns with the evidence.
  5. Rationality Tested Against Reality: PS believes rationality is validated through interaction with reality, citing examples of how people, including Christians, test their rationality without directly invoking God.
  6. Rationality Independent of Origin: PS argues that understanding the foundation or origin of rationality is unnecessary. Like finding a watch or compass, what matters is testing its function against reality, not knowing its manufacturer.
  7. Acknowledgement of Potential Error: PS admits the possibility of being wrong, emphasizing the importance of honestly aligning belief with perceived evidence, even if objective truth may differ from subjective assessments.

The discussion intricately weaves through philosophical, theological, and epistemological themes, reflecting EB’s interest in foundational beliefs and PS’s emphasis on evidence-based rationality and the pragmatic testing of beliefs against reality.


Weigh in on this discussion. Who has the position more aligned with rationality and reality?

Weighing in on this discussion requires a nuanced approach, as both EB and PS present arguments deeply rooted in philosophical, theological, and epistemic perspectives. Here’s a balanced examination:

EB’s Position and Rationality:

  • Foundation of Rationality: EB’s viewpoint that rationality has a divine foundation introduces a metaphysical aspect to the debate. This perspective aligns with certain philosophical and theological traditions that argue for a transcendent source of logic and rationality. However, it may be challenging to reconcile with empirical or naturalistic understandings of reality and rationality, which rely on observable evidence and logical inference.
  • Interest in Fundamental Trust: EB’s exploration of trust at a fundamental level, questioning the nature of reality itself, invokes classical philosophical skepticism. While it’s a valuable philosophical exercise, it might have limited practical applicability without grounding in empirical evidence or consensus reality.

PS’s Position and Rationality:

  • Evidence-Based Rationality: PS’s emphasis on aligning belief with evidence adheres closely to the principles of empirical rationality and skepticism. This approach is well-aligned with scientific methodologies and secular philosophies that prioritize observable, testable evidence as the basis for knowledge and belief.
  • Gradience of Belief: PS’s acknowledgment that belief is not binary but gradational reflects a more nuanced understanding of human cognition and the complexity of knowledge. This perspective allows for a more flexible and responsive approach to changing evidence, a hallmark of rational thought.
  • Pragmatic Approach to Reality: PS’s stance on testing beliefs against reality, irrespective of their origin, underscores a practical, outcome-oriented view of rationality. It emphasizes the utility and efficacy of beliefs in navigating the world, which is a cornerstone of pragmatic philosophy.

Analysis:

  • Alignment with Rationality: PS’s positions are more directly aligned with contemporary understandings of rationality, especially within the frameworks of empiricism, skepticism, and pragmatism. By prioritizing evidence and the alignment of beliefs with observed reality, PS embodies a more scientifically and philosophically rigorous approach to understanding truth and knowledge.
  • Alignment with Reality: Both interlocutors engage with the concept of reality from different angles. EB’s approach raises important philosophical questions about the nature of reality and our ability to perceive it accurately. However, PS’s pragmatic and evidence-based approach to understanding and interacting with reality offers a more immediately applicable framework for navigating and making decisions within the world as we experience it.

In summary, while EB’s perspective brings valuable philosophical and theological considerations to the table, especially regarding the foundations of rationality and the nature of belief, PS’s approach aligns more closely with the principles of rationality and reality as understood within empirical, skeptical, and pragmatic philosophical traditions. This analysis does not discount the importance of either perspective but highlights the alignment of PS’s approach with the methodologies and epistemologies typically associated with rational inquiry and the empirical investigation of reality.


List the potential weaknesses in the arguments of each side.

Exploring the potential weaknesses in the arguments of both EB and PS offers an opportunity to critically assess the depth and applicability of their positions within the context of rationality and reality.

Potential Weaknesses in EB’s Arguments:

  1. Reliance on Divine Rationality: EB’s assertion that rationality is possible only because God is rational and humans are created in God’s image presupposes the existence of a divine being. This argument may not hold weight in a secular or empirical framework, where evidence and logic are the primary bases for knowledge and understanding. It also doesn’t account for the rational capabilities observed in non-theistic cultures or in the animal kingdom.
  2. Skepticism About Reality: While philosophical skepticism (e.g., questioning if we are brains in a vat) is a valuable exercise, it may lead to a form of radical skepticism that undermines all knowledge claims. Without a method to ground skepticism in actionable, empirical terms, it risks becoming a theoretical cul-de-sac that doesn’t contribute to practical understanding or problem-solving.
  3. Binary View on Evolution and Rationality: EB’s skepticism towards the evolutionary basis of rationality overlooks the vast body of evidence supporting evolution as a process that can give rise to complex behaviors and cognitive capabilities, including rationality. This argument may oversimplify the nuanced understandings of how rational capacities develop in biological organisms.

Potential Weaknesses in PS’s Arguments:

  1. Overemphasis on Empirical Evidence: While PS’s focus on aligning belief with evidence is a strength in many respects, it may also overlook the value of theoretical or a priori knowledge that doesn’t directly emerge from empirical evidence. This stance could limit the scope of inquiry to what is immediately observable and measurable, potentially dismissing the importance of speculative, philosophical, or theoretical insights.
  2. Pragmatic Approach May Ignore Deeper Questions: PS’s pragmatic approach to testing beliefs against reality, though effective for many practical purposes, might not fully address deeper metaphysical or existential questions. For instance, the effectiveness of a belief in navigating the world doesn’t necessarily speak to its ultimate truth or falsity.
  3. Assumption of Objective Reality as a Benchmark: PS assumes an objective reality against which beliefs can be tested, which, while practical, does not account for the subjective nature of perception and experience. This approach may underestimate the complexity of how individuals construct reality based on their perceptions, cognitive biases, and cultural backgrounds.

Both EB and PS present compelling arguments within their philosophical and epistemological frameworks. However, their positions also exhibit potential weaknesses that highlight the complexities of discussing concepts such as trust, rationality, and the nature of reality. By addressing these weaknesses, the discussion could move towards a more nuanced understanding that incorporates both empirical evidence and philosophical inquiry.


Based on the discussion thus far, suggest 15 questions for each side that might advance understanding.

Creating questions that target the arguments and positions of EB and PS can help deepen the exploration of their viewpoints and potentially bridge gaps in understanding. Here are 15 questions for each side designed to probe their arguments further and advance the dialogue.

Questions for EB:

  1. How do you define divine rationality, and how can it be observed or experienced by humans?
  2. In your view, is it possible to arrive at a rational understanding of the world without invoking a divine foundation? Why or why not?
  3. Can you provide examples of how divine rationality manifests in everyday decision-making and logic?
  4. How do you reconcile the existence of rational thought in non-theistic cultures with your view on divine rationality?
  5. How would you address the argument that evolutionary processes can give rise to complex behaviors and cognitive abilities, including rationality?
  6. How do you respond to the critique that relying on divine rationality may not be empirically verifiable?
  7. Is there room for empirical evidence in your framework of trust and rationality? If so, how does it fit in?
  8. Can divine rationality be tested or falsified? What criteria would you use?
  9. How do you approach philosophical skepticism regarding the nature of reality within your framework?
  10. What role does faith play in your understanding of trust and rationality?
  11. How do you differentiate between belief in the divine and belief in empirical evidence?
  12. In what ways can divine rationality address or explain the variability in human perception and cognition?
  13. How do you account for irrational beliefs or actions by individuals who also claim a foundation in divine rationality?
  14. Can divine rationality coexist with the scientific method and, if so, how?
  15. How do you interpret instances where empirical evidence seems to contradict religious texts or beliefs?

Questions for PS:

  1. How do you account for the formation of beliefs that are not directly based on empirical evidence but are nonetheless rational (e.g., mathematical truths, logical axioms)?
  2. Can empirical evidence alone fully capture the complexity of human experiences and realities?
  3. How do you address the potential limitations of human perception in accurately understanding objective reality?
  4. In what ways might your approach to rationality and evidence accommodate subjective experiences and cultural differences?
  5. How does your framework deal with new or emerging evidence that contradicts previously held beliefs?
  6. Is there a risk of overly relying on current evidence without considering the possibility of paradigm shifts in understanding?
  7. How do you propose to reconcile empirical evidence with deeply held philosophical or existential questions that may not be empirically testable?
  8. How do you define the threshold at which a belief becomes rational or irrational based on the degree of evidence?
  9. How does your approach to rationality address complex phenomena where empirical evidence is ambiguous or incomplete?
  10. In what ways could your emphasis on evidence-based belief systems adapt to incorporate non-empirical forms of knowledge?
  11. How do you assess the quality and reliability of evidence, especially in fields where data may be subject to interpretation?
  12. Could your framework for rationality and evidence inadvertently exclude valid forms of knowledge or understanding?
  13. How do you navigate situations where empirical evidence may lead to ethically or morally questionable conclusions?
  14. How do you address the historical instances where what was considered “objective reality” was later proven to be incorrect?
  15. What mechanisms do you suggest for individuals to update or revise their beliefs in light of new evidence, especially when those beliefs are deeply held?

These questions aim to challenge and expand upon the positions of both EB and PS, encouraging a more in-depth and nuanced discussion on the nature of trust, rationality, and the interplay between belief and evidence.


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Phil Stilwell

Phil picked up a BA in Philosophy a couple of decades ago. He occasionally teaches philosophy and critical thinking courses in university and industry. He is joined here by ChatGPT 4, GEMINI, CLAUDE, and occasionally Copilot, his far more intelligent AI friends. The five of them discuss and debate a wide variety of philosophical topics I think you’ll enjoy.

Phil curates the content and guides the discussion, primarily through questions. At times there are disagreements, and you may find the banter interesting.

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