• “Decisions to act are not evidence and should not retroactively affect the probabilistic assessment that led to the decision to act. The probabilities associated with different outcomes are based on the available information and understanding of the situation at the time the assessment is made.”
  • “…it is not traditionally rational to adjust the confidence in a claim based solely on the benefits of believing that claim. Rational belief formation is ideally guided by evidence and the likelihood of the claim being true, not by the potential outcomes of holding that belief.”
  • “In rational decision-making, probabilities are assessed based on available information and do not change simply because a decision has been made.”
  • “…from a pragmatic viewpoint, where outcomes play a crucial role in decision-making, one might argue for a different kind of rationality—pragmatic rationality—where the benefits of a belief justify increasing confidence in it.”
  1. Should I increase my confidence in a claim if a higher confidence in the claim increases my chance of acquiring the benefits behind the claim? For example, many religions suggest I should increase my belief in God, not based on the arrival of greater evidence for God, but based on the notion I won’t be able to otherwise acquire the “salvation” of that God. Is this rational? Should the act of making a decision change the probability assessments on which the decision was made? In other words, if I assess I have a 10% chance of surviving a fight with the bear chasing me and a 15% chance of surviving an attempted jump over a gorge to escape the bear, should my decision to jump over the gorge increase my initial 15% confidence I’ll survive the gorge jump?
    1. Decision-Making and Probability Assessments
    2. Conclusion
  2. To confirm, decisions to act are not evidence. Therefore, any decision to act should not affect the probabilistic assessment that led to the decision to act. Correct?
  3. How can we describe in psychological terms the drive to increase the assessed probabilities in the direction of a decision based on those probabilities?
    1. 1. Confirmation Bias
    2. 2. Post-Decision Rationalization or Choice-Supportive Bias
    3. 3. Cognitive Dissonance
    4. 4. Self-Justification
    5. 5. Optimism Bias
    6. Conclusion
  4. Is this notion of a decision illegitimately moving a credence independent of evidence relevant to Kierkegaard’s epistemology?
    1. Leap of Faith
    2. Subjectivity is Truth
    3. Against Objective Certainty
    4. Relevance to the Notion of Decision and Credence
  5. Do Kierkegaard and other Christian philosophers include in their epistemological models a way to measure the success or predictability of their “leaps of faith” disjointed from the degree of relevant evidence?
    1. Kierkegaard’s Leap of Faith
    2. Subjective Truth and Authentic Existence
    3. Other Christian Philosophers
    4. Faith as Trust and Relationship
    5. Conclusion
  6. You said, “However, even within this more rational framework, the predictability of faith’s outcomes remains a matter of divine mystery rather than empirical evidence.” What is the predictive strength in Kierkegaard’s faith?
    1. Existential Transformation
    2. Subjective Certainty
    3. Ethical and Spiritual Predictions
    4. Faith as a Response to the Absurd
    5. Conclusion
  7. Your response is equivalent to saying there is no observable predictive strength in faith, right?
  8. Does Kierkegaard offer us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments?
  9. My question was whether Kierkegaard offers us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments. Based on your last response above, the answer is not actually “no”, right?
  10. Create a 5-item quiz based on the discussion above with answers at the end.
    1. Quiz on Faith and Existential Commitment
      1. Questions
      2. Answers
    2. Quiz: Balancing Reason and Faith
  11. Provide 10 discussion questions on the content above.


Should I increase my confidence in a claim if a higher confidence in the claim increases my chance of acquiring the benefits behind the claim? For example, many religions suggest I should increase my belief in God, not based on the arrival of greater evidence for God, but based on the notion I won’t be able to otherwise acquire the “salvation” of that God. Is this rational?
Should the act of making a decision change the probability assessments on which the decision was made? In other words, if I assess I have a 10% chance of surviving a fight with the bear chasing me and a 15% chance of surviving an attempted jump over a gorge to escape the bear, should my decision to jump over the gorge increase my initial 15% confidence I’ll survive the gorge jump?


To confirm, decisions to act are not evidence. Therefore, any decision to act should not affect the probabilistic assessment that led to the decision to act. Correct?


How can we describe in psychological terms the drive to increase the assessed probabilities in the direction of a decision based on those probabilities?


Is this notion of a decision illegitimately moving a credence independent of evidence relevant to Kierkegaard’s epistemology?


Do Kierkegaard and other Christian philosophers include in their epistemological models a way to measure the success or predictability of their “leaps of faith” disjointed from the degree of relevant evidence?


Create a 5-item quiz based on the discussion above with answers at the end.


Provide 10 discussion questions on the content above.


  1. Should I increase my confidence in a claim if a higher confidence in the claim increases my chance of acquiring the benefits behind the claim? For example, many religions suggest I should increase my belief in God, not based on the arrival of greater evidence for God, but based on the notion I won’t be able to otherwise acquire the “salvation” of that God. Is this rational? Should the act of making a decision change the probability assessments on which the decision was made? In other words, if I assess I have a 10% chance of surviving a fight with the bear chasing me and a 15% chance of surviving an attempted jump over a gorge to escape the bear, should my decision to jump over the gorge increase my initial 15% confidence I’ll survive the gorge jump?
    1. Decision-Making and Probability Assessments
    2. Conclusion
  2. To confirm, decisions to act are not evidence. Therefore, any decision to act should not affect the probabilistic assessment that led to the decision to act. Correct?
  3. How can we describe in psychological terms the drive to increase the assessed probabilities in the direction of a decision based on those probabilities?
    1. 1. Confirmation Bias
    2. 2. Post-Decision Rationalization or Choice-Supportive Bias
    3. 3. Cognitive Dissonance
    4. 4. Self-Justification
    5. 5. Optimism Bias
    6. Conclusion
  4. Is this notion of a decision illegitimately moving a credence independent of evidence relevant to Kierkegaard’s epistemology?
    1. Leap of Faith
    2. Subjectivity is Truth
    3. Against Objective Certainty
    4. Relevance to the Notion of Decision and Credence
  5. Do Kierkegaard and other Christian philosophers include in their epistemological models a way to measure the success or predictability of their “leaps of faith” disjointed from the degree of relevant evidence?
    1. Kierkegaard’s Leap of Faith
    2. Subjective Truth and Authentic Existence
    3. Other Christian Philosophers
    4. Faith as Trust and Relationship
    5. Conclusion
  6. You said, “However, even within this more rational framework, the predictability of faith’s outcomes remains a matter of divine mystery rather than empirical evidence.” What is the predictive strength in Kierkegaard’s faith?
    1. Existential Transformation
    2. Subjective Certainty
    3. Ethical and Spiritual Predictions
    4. Faith as a Response to the Absurd
    5. Conclusion
  7. Your response is equivalent to saying there is no observable predictive strength in faith, right?
  8. Does Kierkegaard offer us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments?
  9. My question was whether Kierkegaard offers us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments. Based on your last response above, the answer is not actually “no”, right?
  10. Create a 5-item quiz based on the discussion above with answers at the end.
    1. Quiz on Faith and Existential Commitment
      1. Questions
      2. Answers
    2. Quiz: Balancing Reason and Faith
  11. Provide 10 discussion questions on the content above.



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Phil Stilwell

Phil picked up a BA in Philosophy a couple of decades ago. He occasionally teaches philosophy and critical thinking courses in university and industry. He is joined here by ChatGPT 4, GEMINI, CLAUDE, and occasionally Copilot, his far more intelligent AI friends. The five of them discuss and debate a wide variety of philosophical topics I think you’ll enjoy.

Phil curates the content and guides the discussion, primarily through questions. At times there are disagreements, and you may find the banter interesting.

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