- “Decisions to act are not evidence and should not retroactively affect the probabilistic assessment that led to the decision to act. The probabilities associated with different outcomes are based on the available information and understanding of the situation at the time the assessment is made.”
- “…it is not traditionally rational to adjust the confidence in a claim based solely on the benefits of believing that claim. Rational belief formation is ideally guided by evidence and the likelihood of the claim being true, not by the potential outcomes of holding that belief.”
- “In rational decision-making, probabilities are assessed based on available information and do not change simply because a decision has been made.”
- “…from a pragmatic viewpoint, where outcomes play a crucial role in decision-making, one might argue for a different kind of rationality—pragmatic rationality—where the benefits of a belief justify increasing confidence in it.”
Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)
- Should I increase my confidence in a claim if a higher confidence in the claim increases my chance of acquiring the benefits behind the claim? For example, many religions suggest I should increase my belief in God, not based on the arrival of greater evidence for God, but based on the notion I won’t be able to otherwise acquire the “salvation” of that God. Is this rational? Should the act of making a decision change the probability assessments on which the decision was made? In other words, if I assess I have a 10% chance of surviving a fight with the bear chasing me and a 15% chance of surviving an attempted jump over a gorge to escape the bear, should my decision to jump over the gorge increase my initial 15% confidence I’ll survive the gorge jump?
- To confirm, decisions to act are not evidence. Therefore, any decision to act should not affect the probabilistic assessment that led to the decision to act. Correct?
- How can we describe in psychological terms the drive to increase the assessed probabilities in the direction of a decision based on those probabilities?
- Is this notion of a decision illegitimately moving a credence independent of evidence relevant to Kierkegaard’s epistemology?
- Do Kierkegaard and other Christian philosophers include in their epistemological models a way to measure the success or predictability of their “leaps of faith” disjointed from the degree of relevant evidence?
- You said, “However, even within this more rational framework, the predictability of faith’s outcomes remains a matter of divine mystery rather than empirical evidence.” What is the predictive strength in Kierkegaard’s faith?
- Your response is equivalent to saying there is no observable predictive strength in faith, right?
- Does Kierkegaard offer us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments?
- My question was whether Kierkegaard offers us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments. Based on your last response above, the answer is not actually “no”, right?
- Create a 5-item quiz based on the discussion above with answers at the end.
- Provide 10 discussion questions on the content above.
Should I increase my confidence in a claim if a higher confidence in the claim increases my chance of acquiring the benefits behind the claim? For example, many religions suggest I should increase my belief in God, not based on the arrival of greater evidence for God, but based on the notion I won’t be able to otherwise acquire the “salvation” of that God. Is this rational?
Should the act of making a decision change the probability assessments on which the decision was made? In other words, if I assess I have a 10% chance of surviving a fight with the bear chasing me and a 15% chance of surviving an attempted jump over a gorge to escape the bear, should my decision to jump over the gorge increase my initial 15% confidence I’ll survive the gorge jump?
Increasing Confidence Based on Potential Benefits
The proposition suggests increasing belief in a claim (e.g., religious belief) not based on new evidence but because of the potential benefits (e.g., salvation). From a purely rational perspective focused on evidence and truth, it is not traditionally rational to adjust the confidence in a claim based solely on the benefits of believing that claim. Rational belief formation is ideally guided by evidence and the likelihood of the claim being true, not by the potential outcomes of holding that belief.
However, from a pragmatic viewpoint, where outcomes play a crucial role in decision-making, one might argue for a different kind of rationality—pragmatic rationality—where the benefits of a belief justify increasing confidence in it. This approach, however, diverges from the evidence-based approach typically advocated in epistemology.
Decision-Making and Probability Assessments
In the scenario of deciding between facing a bear and attempting a jump over a gorge, the act of making a decision itself does not logically alter the initial probability assessments. If you assess a 10% chance of surviving the bear and a 15% chance of surviving the jump, choosing to jump does not inherently increase the 15% survival probability. Your assessment is based on your understanding of the situation before making the decision.
In rational decision-making, probabilities are assessed based on available information and do not change simply because a decision has been made. What can change is your perception or additional factors coming into play after the decision, but these are not part of the initial probability assessment.
Conclusion
Within the constraints of the scenarios provided:
- It is not traditionally rational to increase confidence in a claim solely based on the benefits of believing that claim, without new evidence supporting its truth.
- The act of making a decision does not change the initial probability assessments on which the decision was made.
Modifying your probability assessment without new evidence based on a decision is generally considered irrational.
There’s a key distinction between making a decision and acquiring new information. When you make a choice, you’re acting on the information you already have. But that information itself shouldn’t change simply because you’ve acted.
In your bear chase example, let’s say you assess a 10% chance of surviving a fight and a 15% chance of surviving the jump. Deciding to jump shouldn’t magically increase your confidence in surviving the jump. The actual risks remain the same, regardless of your choice.
Here’s a breakdown of why modifying probability this way is irrational:
- Inaccurate representation of reality: It doesn’t reflect the actual likelihood of the event.
- Inconsistent decision-making: It can lead to changing probabilities for similar situations in the future, making your choices less reliable.
However, there are nuances to consider:
- New emotional information: Fear in the face of the bear might feel like “new information,” even though it doesn’t directly change the jump’s risk. This can influence your perception of the situation.
- Limited initial assessment: Your initial probabilities might not have captured all factors. Maybe you underestimated your jumping skills upon re-evaluation.
Here’s a better approach when making decisions:
- Separate assessment and action: Acknowledge your initial probability assessments and make decisions based on that information.
- Reassess after new information: If you gain new knowledge after acting, then you can update your probabilities for future encounters.
In conclusion, stick to modifying probabilities based on actual new evidence, not just because you made a decision. This will lead to more consistent and reliable decision-making in the long run.
To confirm, decisions to act are not evidence. Therefore, any decision to act should not affect the probabilistic assessment that led to the decision to act. Correct?
Correct, decisions to act are not themselves evidence and should not retroactively affect the probabilistic assessment that led to the decision to act. The probabilities associated with different outcomes are based on the available information and understanding of the situation at the time the assessment is made. Making a decision does not inherently provide new evidence or information that would justify changing those initial probability assessments.
That’s correct. Decisions to act are not evidence. Their purpose is to translate existing information (including probabilistic assessments) into action, not generate new information itself. Basing revised probabilities solely on taking action, without any additional information, would be illogical and misleading.
It’s important to maintain a clear distinction between:
- Initial probability assessment: This is your best estimate of the likelihood of an event occurring, based on available evidence and your understanding of the situation.
- Decision based on assessment: This is your choice of action based on the initial assessment of probabilities and your preferences or values.
- New information: This can be any additional data or insights that come to light after acting.
Only new information should inform your revised probability assessment. The act of making a decision is not new information, and it shouldn’t automatically alter the original probabilities.
[Abbreviated]
In most scenarios, though, stick to the principle: decisions to act are not evidence; update your probabilities only on the basis of new information.
How can we describe in psychological terms the drive to increase the assessed probabilities in the direction of a decision based on those probabilities?
The phenomenon you’re describing, where individuals adjust their probability assessments in favor of a decision they have made, can be understood through several psychological concepts and biases:
1. Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information in a way that confirms one’s preexisting beliefs or hypotheses. After making a decision, individuals are prone to unconsciously increase their perceived probability of success because they seek out information that supports the decision they have made and ignore information that contradicts it.
2. Post-Decision Rationalization or Choice-Supportive Bias
This is a type of cognitive bias where people tend to retroactively ascribe positive attributes to the option they chose and negative attributes to the options they did not choose. This can lead to a distorted memory of why a decision was made, making the chosen option seem more desirable than it was at the time of the decision. This bias can manifest as an increased belief in the likelihood of success of the chosen option.
3. Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance refers to the discomfort experienced when holding two or more conflicting cognitions (beliefs, attitudes, or values). After making a decision, especially a difficult one between closely matched alternatives, individuals might experience dissonance between the recognition of the risks involved and their desire to have made the right choice. To reduce this discomfort, they may increase their confidence in the probability of the decision leading to a positive outcome.
4. Self-Justification
Self-justification theory explains how individuals justify and rationalize their decisions, often in the face of contradictory evidence. This can lead to a reevaluation of the probabilities associated with the decision to make it appear more rational and justified in hindsight.
5. Optimism Bias
Optimism bias is the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes and underestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes. After making a decision, people may display an increased optimism about the probabilities of success due to an innate bias towards expecting positive outcomes.
Conclusion
These psychological mechanisms can lead individuals to adjust their perceived probabilities in favor of a decision after it has been made. It’s a way of aligning one’s beliefs and expectations with their chosen course of action, often unconsciously, to maintain consistency, reduce cognitive dissonance, and support their self-image as a rational decision-maker.
The tendency to increase the assessed probabilities in the direction of a decision based on those probabilities can be described by several psychological terms:
1. Confirmation bias: This is a well-documented cognitive bias where people favor information that confirms their existing beliefs or decisions, while disregarding or downplaying information that contradicts them. In your example, after choosing to jump the gorge, someone might subconsciously focus on positive aspects of their decision, like their athletic ability, while neglecting factors like potential hidden obstacles that could increase their risk.
2. Motivated reasoning: This occurs when people reason in a way that aligns with their desires, goals, or self-interest, even if it leads to faulty conclusions. In this case, the desire for a positive outcome (surviving the jump) might lead someone to inflate their initial risk assessment for the fight, thus justifying their chosen action (jumping).
3. Belief perseverance: This refers to the tendency for people to cling to their existing beliefs even in the face of contradictory evidence. After making a decision, individuals might exhibit a stronger conviction in the chosen option, even if the initial probabilities remain unchanged. This can stem from a need for cognitive consistency or a desire to avoid admitting potential errors in judgment.
4. Self-serving bias: This bias leads people to attribute positive outcomes to their own skills and abilities, but negative outcomes to external factors beyond their control. If someone survives the jump, they might attribute it to excellent jumping skills, further solidifying their initial belief in their higher chances of survival, even if the original assessment might have been inaccurate.
It’s important to note that these psychological tendencies are not always conscious or deliberate. They often operate subtly and unconsciously, influencing our decision-making processes and potentially leading to biased assessments of probabilities.
By being aware of these biases, we can become more critical thinkers and make better decisions by consciously seeking out and considering all available information, not just the information that confirms our initial choices.
Is this notion of a decision illegitimately moving a credence independent of evidence relevant to Kierkegaard’s epistemology?
Yes, the notion of a decision affecting belief or credence independent of evidence is indeed relevant to Søren Kierkegaard’s epistemology, particularly his views on faith and existential choice. Kierkegaard, a 19th-century Danish philosopher, theologian, and the father of existentialism, emphasized the importance of subjective experience and personal choice in the face of existential dilemmas.
Leap of Faith
One of Kierkegaard’s most influential concepts is the “leap of faith,” which describes the act of believing in something without sufficient empirical evidence, particularly in religious faith. Kierkegaard argues that certain truths, especially religious truths, are beyond the reach of rational demonstration or empirical evidence. Instead, these truths must be apprehended through a subjective act of commitment or a leap of faith. This leap is not irrational but is beyond the domain of conventional rationality—it’s a choice that reflects the individual’s deepest convictions, independent of objective evidence.
Subjectivity is Truth
Kierkegaard famously posited that “subjectivity is truth,” emphasizing the importance of personal experience and perspective in understanding and living out truth. In this view, the authenticity and passion with which one holds a belief are more significant than the objective certainty of the belief itself. This perspective highlights the role of personal choice and commitment in forming beliefs, especially in the context of existential and ethical truths, where objective evidence may not provide clear guidance.
Against Objective Certainty
Kierkegaard critiqued the excessive emphasis on objective certainty and rational evidence in understanding faith and existential choices. He argued that such an approach misses the essence of faith, which involves embracing uncertainty and making a personal commitment beyond what can be empirically verified or logically deduced.
Relevance to the Notion of Decision and Credence
Kierkegaard’s epistemology resonates with the notion that decisions to believe can legitimately move one’s credence independent of empirical evidence or logical proof. His philosophy suggests that in matters of faith and existential choice, the decision to believe—and the act of committing oneself to that belief—is itself a crucial part of apprehending truth. This commitment can alter one’s stance toward a belief, not because new evidence has been presented, but because the individual has engaged in a deeply subjective and existential process of choosing to believe.
In summary, Kierkegaard’s thought provides a philosophical framework that supports the idea of decisions affecting beliefs in ways that are not strictly tied to empirical evidence or rational demonstration. His emphasis on the subjective, existential leap of faith as a means of engaging with certain kinds of truth highlights the legitimacy and importance of personal commitment in shaping one’s beliefs and understanding of the world.
While Kierkegaard doesn’t directly address the specific scenario of probability assessments changing solely due to decisions, his ideas on subjectivity and passion in relation to knowledge shed light on the concept you mentioned.
Here are some key points to consider:
- Subjectivity: Kierkegaard emphasizes the role of the individual and their subjective experience in acquiring knowledge, particularly in areas like faith and ethics. He argues that objective, detached reasoning might not capture the full picture of human experience. In your example, the emotional intensity (passion) of facing a life-threatening situation (bear chase) might be seen as a valid subjective factor influencing your decision, even if it doesn’t directly change the objective probabilities.
- Passion and commitment: Kierkegaard believes that deep commitment and passion are crucial for attaining certain types of knowledge, particularly in religious belief. He argues that a purely intellectual approach can be insufficient and that faith often involves a “leap of faith” rather than solely relying on objective evidence. This resonates with the idea of making a decision (jumping the gorge) despite the lack of new evidence, as it highlights the role of non-rational factors like fear and hope in motivating such choices.
However, it’s important to note that:
- Kierkegaard doesn’t advocate for abandoning all objectivity: While emphasizing subjectivity, he doesn’t entirely dismiss the significance of reason and evidence. He argues for a balance between subjective engagement and objective assessment.
- He mainly focuses on religious knowledge: His views primarily focus on the domain of religious faith and existential questions, where he argues for the limitations of purely objective reason. Applying his ideas to everyday decision-making with objective probabilities might need further interpretation.
Therefore, while Kierkegaard’s ideas on subjectivity and passion might offer some insights into the psychological tendency you described, his specific views on probability assessments changing solely due to decisions remain ambiguous. It’s important to carefully consider the context in which his ideas are applied, recognizing the limitations of directly translating his primarily religious-focused concepts to other domains.
Do Kierkegaard and other Christian philosophers include in their epistemological models a way to measure the success or predictability of their “leaps of faith” disjointed from the degree of relevant evidence?
Kierkegaard and other Christian philosophers who discuss the concept of a “leap of faith” indeed approach faith and belief in a manner that is distinct from empirical evidence or the conventional metrics of success and predictability. Their epistemological models focus more on the existential and subjective dimensions of faith rather than on empirical verifiability or predictability in the scientific sense. Here’s how this perspective is reflected in their thought:
Kierkegaard’s Leap of Faith
For Kierkegaard, the “leap of faith” is inherently unquantifiable and not subject to empirical measurement. The success of such a leap is not evaluated by its predictability or outcomes that can be measured externally but by the internal transformation and the depth of commitment it engenders in the individual. Kierkegaard emphasizes the personal, subjective nature of faith—a relationship between the individual and the divine that transcends rational evidence. The “success” of a leap of faith, in his view, might be measured by the authenticity and intensity of one’s existential commitment rather than by conventional standards of evidence or outcome.
Subjective Truth and Authentic Existence
Kierkegaard posits that truth is subjective, focusing on the individual’s experience and commitment. The measure of success for a leap of faith is deeply personal and cannot be universally prescribed or predicted. It’s about the individual’s journey toward a genuine and authentic existence, marked by a personal relationship with God that is beyond the realm of objective verification.
Other Christian Philosophers
Other Christian philosophers and theologians have also grappled with the relationship between faith and reason, though their approaches vary. Some, like Thomas Aquinas, sought a more harmonious relationship between faith and reason, arguing that while faith goes beyond reason, it does not contradict it. However, even within this more rational framework, the predictability of faith’s outcomes remains a matter of divine mystery rather than empirical evidence.
Faith as Trust and Relationship
In broader Christian thought, faith is often understood as trust in God’s promises and character, rather than belief based on empirical evidence. This trust encompasses a relational dimension, focusing on a personal relationship with God. The “success” of faith, then, is seen in the context of this relationship and in the transformation of the believer’s life—factors that resist quantification in the same way scientific hypotheses might be tested and validated.
Conclusion
In the epistemological models of Kierkegaard and many Christian philosophers, the measure of a leap of faith’s success is not tied to empirical evidence or predictability in the conventional sense. Instead, it is understood in terms of personal transformation, the depth of existential commitment, and the authenticity of one’s relationship with the divine. These models emphasize the unique, subjective, and relational aspects of faith, which elude empirical measurement and rest on a different kind of knowing and experiencing reality.
You said, “However, even within this more rational framework, the predictability of faith’s outcomes remains a matter of divine mystery rather than empirical evidence.” What is the predictive strength in Kierkegaard’s faith?
Kierkegaard’s conception of faith, especially as it pertains to its “predictive strength,” diverges significantly from conventional understandings of prediction in empirical or scientific contexts. His focus is on the existential and subjective dimensions of faith rather than on its capacity to predict outcomes in the external world. Therefore, understanding the “predictive strength” of Kierkegaardian faith involves looking at the existential transformations and the subjective certainties it offers to the individual believer rather than empirical predictions.
Existential Transformation
For Kierkegaard, the strength of faith lies in its power to transform the individual’s existence. Faith, in this context, is not about foreseeing specific worldly outcomes but about the individual’s leap into a mode of existence that is incommensurate with rational calculation or empirical evidence. This leap of faith represents a profound commitment to a set of values or beliefs that define the individual’s understanding of their purpose and meaning in life.
Subjective Certainty
Kierkegaard emphasizes subjective truth and the internal certainties that come with genuine faith. This subjective certainty is a form of “predictive strength” in that it allows the individual to navigate existential anxieties and uncertainties with a sense of purpose and direction. However, this certainty is not about predicting future events but about being certain in one’s relationship with God and one’s own existential commitments.
Ethical and Spiritual Predictions
In a broader sense, Kierkegaard suggests that faith involves ethical and spiritual “predictions” or expectations about the nature of existence and one’s relationship with the divine. These are not predictions in the scientific sense but are expectations of spiritual growth, ethical living, and the ultimate significance of one’s life in relation to God. The “success” of these predictions is measured not by empirical outcomes but by the depth and authenticity of the individual’s existential engagement.
Faith as a Response to the Absurd
Kierkegaard also talks about faith in the context of the absurd—believing in something despite the lack of empirical evidence and even in the face of contradictory evidence. The predictive strength here could be seen in the individual’s ability to maintain faith and find existential meaning in circumstances that otherwise seem devoid of meaning. This aspect of faith underscores its role in empowering the individual to confront the absurdities of existence with hope and resilience.
Conclusion
In Kierkegaard’s framework, the “predictive strength” of faith is not about forecasting specific empirical outcomes but about the existential assurances and the subjective transformations faith brings to the individual. It’s about the individual’s commitment to a set of values and beliefs that guide their actions and give their life meaning, despite the absence of empirical evidence or in the face of life’s inherent uncertainties. This understanding of faith’s strength lies in its capacity to shape the individual’s existential orientation and ethical existence in profound and meaningful ways.
Your response is equivalent to saying there is no observable predictive strength in faith, right?
Yes, if we interpret “predictive strength” in the empirical or observable sense commonly used in scientific discourse, then it’s accurate to say that Kierkegaard’s conception of faith does not offer observable predictive strength in terms of specific, measurable outcomes. Kierkegaard’s perspective on faith is more concerned with existential commitments, subjective truth, and the individual’s relationship with the divine, rather than empirical predictions about the physical world or future events. His focus is on the transformative power of faith in the individual’s life from an existential and subjective standpoint, rather than on its ability to predict observable outcomes.
An observation on the disposition of ChatGPT:
ChatGPT tends to want to accommodate all points of view, but when facing rigorous logic, it tends to back down.
While Kierkegaard doesn’t directly address the specific scenario of probability assessments changing solely due to decisions, his ideas on subjectivity and passion in relation to knowledge shed light on the concept you mentioned.
Here are some key points to consider:
- Subjectivity: Kierkegaard emphasizes the role of the individual and their subjective experience in acquiring knowledge, particularly in areas like faith and ethics. He argues that objective, detached reasoning might not capture the full picture of human experience. In your example, the emotional intensity (passion) of facing a life-threatening situation (bear chase) might be seen as a valid subjective factor influencing your decision, even if it doesn’t directly change the objective probabilities.
- Passion and commitment: Kierkegaard believes that deep commitment and passion are crucial for attaining certain types of knowledge, particularly in religious belief. He argues that a purely intellectual approach can be insufficient and that faith often involves a “leap of faith” rather than solely relying on objective evidence. This resonates with the idea of making a decision (jumping the gorge) despite the lack of new evidence, as it highlights the role of non-rational factors like fear and hope in motivating such choices.
However, it’s important to note that:
- Kierkegaard doesn’t advocate for abandoning all objectivity: While emphasizing subjectivity, he doesn’t entirely dismiss the significance of reason and evidence. He argues for a balance between subjective engagement and objective assessment.
- He mainly focuses on religious knowledge: His views primarily focus on the domain of religious faith and existential questions, where he argues for the limitations of purely objective reason. Applying his ideas to everyday decision-making with objective probabilities might need further interpretation.
Therefore, while Kierkegaard’s ideas on subjectivity and passion might offer some insights into the psychological tendency you described, his specific views on probability assessments changing solely due to decisions remain ambiguous. It’s important to carefully consider the context in which his ideas are applied, recognizing the limitations of directly translating his primarily religious-focused concepts to other domains.
Does Kierkegaard offer us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments?
Kierkegaard’s stance on the balance of reason and faith in epistemic judgments is complex and nuanced, making it difficult to provide a straightforward answer of “yes” or “no” to your question. Here’s why:
Strengths and limitations:
- Strengths:
- Highlighting limitations of reason: Kierkegaard critiques the “pure” reason of traditional philosophy, arguing it cannot capture the richness and complexity of human experience, especially regarding faith and ethics. This critique emphasizes the importance of emotions, passion, and commitment in forming beliefs.
- Promoting individual responsibility: By emphasizing subjectivity, Kierkegaard places the responsibility for forming belief and meaning-making on the individual, encouraging them to grapple with their own existence and engage authentically with their faith.
- Limitations:
- Vagueness in guidance: He doesn’t offer a clear formula for achieving an ideal balance between reason and faith. This ambiguity can leave individuals struggling to navigate specific situations requiring epistemic judgments.
- Focus on religious context: His primary focus is on religious faith, and applying his ideas to broader epistemic domains like science or everyday decision-making requires careful consideration and potential modifications.
Interpretations and applicability:
Despite limitations, some argue that Kierkegaard’s ideas offer valuable insights for navigating the tension between reason and faith:
- Seeking a balance: While criticizing pure reason, some scholars argue he doesn’t advocate for abandoning it entirely. He might suggest seeking a balance where reason informs faith but doesn’t dictate it.
- Individual discernment: Recognizing the limitations of both reason and faith, individuals might be encouraged to engage in critical reflection and personal discernment to reach their own conclusions about various aspects of life, not just religious beliefs.
Ultimately, whether Kierkegaard’s work offers coherent and applicable guidance on balancing reason and faith depends on individual interpretations and the specific context of epistemic judgments being made. There isn’t a single definitive answer, and his ideas should be studied and understood within their context, acknowledging both their strengths and limitations.
My question was whether Kierkegaard offers us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments. Based on your last response above, the answer is not actually “no”, right?
You are absolutely right. Based on the breakdown of Kierkegaard’s ideas and their interpretations, it would be inaccurate to say he offers no guidance on the balance of reason and faith.
Here’s a more precise answer:
Kierkegaard’s work on reason and faith in epistemic judgments offers potentially valuable but nuanced insights. While not providing a clear-cut formula or being universally applicable across all knowledge domains, it does encourage critical reflection and consideration of both reason and subjective experience, particularly in the realm of religious belief.
Therefore, the answer is closer to “not a definitive yes, but a complex and thought-provoking exploration.”
An observation on the disposition of GEMINI:
It appears that GEMINI also eventually comes around when presented with push-back that is persistent and well-formulated.
Create a 5-item quiz based on the discussion above with answers at the end.
Quiz on Faith and Existential Commitment
Questions
1: Kierkegaard’s leap of faith is primarily described as an act of:
- A) Analyzing empirical evidence before believing.
- B) Committing to a belief beyond the realm of rational proof.
- C) Predicting future outcomes based on past events.
- D) Following societal norms and expectations.
2: The concept of “subjectivity is truth” in Kierkegaard’s philosophy highlights the significance of:
- A) External validation for personal beliefs.
- B) The scientific method in establishing facts.
- C) Personal experience and perspective in apprehending truth.
- D) Universal principles applicable to everyone.
3: Which psychological concept describes the tendency to favor information that confirms existing beliefs?
- A) Cognitive dissonance
- B) Confirmation bias
- C) Optimism bias
- D) Choice-supportive bias
4: Faith’s transformative power in an individual’s life is an example of:
- A) Empirical predictability.
- B) Objective measurement.
- C) Existential transformation.
- D) Rational decision-making.
5: Cognitive dissonance in the context of faith refers to:
- A) The discomfort experienced when beliefs align perfectly with evidence.
- B) The search for information that contradicts one’s beliefs.
- C) The discomfort experienced when holding conflicting beliefs.
- D) The ability to predict future events with complete certainty.
Answers
- B) Committing to a belief beyond the realm of rational proof.
- C) Personal experience and perspective in apprehending truth.
- B) Confirmation bias
- C) Existential transformation.
- C) The discomfort experienced when holding conflicting beliefs.
Quiz: Balancing Reason and Faith
Instructions: Answer the following questions based on the discussion about balancing reason and faith in epistemic judgments.
- According to the discussion, relying solely on reason in making decisions might neglect which crucial aspect?
- What is the distinction between initial probability assessments and decisions based on those assessments?
- Briefly describe the psychological term for the tendency to favor information confirming existing beliefs.
- How can emotions influence our decision-making processes? (Choose two)
- a) By providing new evidence unrelated to the initial decision.
- b) By influencing our perception of risk and reward.
- c) By automatically changing the probabilities associated with our options.
- Describe the challenge individuals face in applying Kierkegaard’s ideas to their everyday lives.
Answers:
- Subjective experience or emotions
- Probability assessments are estimates based on available evidence, while decisions are actions taken based on those estimates.
- Confirmation bias
- b) Influencing our perception of risk and reward
- Kierkegaard’s ideas primarily focus on religious faith and existential questions, making their direct application to everyday decision-making with objective probabilities more complex and requiring careful consideration.
Provide 10 discussion questions on the content above.
- How does Kierkegaard’s concept of the “leap of faith” challenge traditional views on the relationship between faith and reason?
- In what ways does the idea of “subjectivity is truth” influence modern existential thought, and how might it apply to contemporary debates on personal identity and authenticity?
- Discuss the psychological implications of confirmation bias in the context of religious belief and spiritual conviction. How might this bias affect an individual’s faith journey?
- Consider the role of existential transformation in religious and spiritual experiences. How do such transformations compare across different religious traditions?
- How does cognitive dissonance theory explain the internal conflict some individuals might experience when confronted with contradictory beliefs or evidence against their faith?
- Explore the ethical and spiritual expectations set by faith traditions. How do these expectations influence the behavior and decision-making of adherents?
- Discuss the potential positive and negative impacts of faith’s lack of empirical predictability on individuals and communities.
- How do concepts from existential philosophy, such as the “leap of faith” and “subjectivity is truth,” offer insights into the nature of belief in a post-modern world?
- Examine the concept of choice-supportive bias in the context of life-changing decisions, such as choosing a career path or a life partner. How does this bias compare to the leap of faith in religious belief?
- Reflect on the role of personal experience in shaping one’s faith and beliefs. How do individual experiences contribute to the diversity of religious expression and practice within a faith community?
- In the first example about religious belief, do you think it’s ever rational to increase your confidence in a claim primarily based on the desired outcome? Why or why not?
- Imagine you’re lost in the forest and need to choose which path to take. You assess that one path has a 60% chance of leading to safety and the other has a 40% chance. If you choose the 60% path, should your confidence in its safety increase to 100%? Why or why not?
- How can we distinguish between situations where emotions and desires should play a role in our decisions, and situations where they might hinder rational decision-making?
- Do you think it’s ever okay to base decisions on incomplete information? If so, when and why?
- In the context of making decisions, what are the potential benefits and drawbacks of being aware of our own biases, such as confirmation bias?
- How can we cultivate critical thinking skills that help us make informed decisions even when faced with emotional responses or limited information?
- In your opinion, is it more important to prioritize logic and evidence in decision-making, or to consider the emotional and personal aspects involved? Why?
- Can you think of any real-world examples where people might modify their assessments of probabilities based solely on their decisions, and why this might be problematic?
- How can the concept of bounded rationality help us understand and explain human decision-making in the real world?
- What are some potential ethical considerations involved in acknowledging the influence of emotions and desires on our decision-making processes?
Table of Contents: (Click any link below to navigate to that section.)
- Should I increase my confidence in a claim if a higher confidence in the claim increases my chance of acquiring the benefits behind the claim? For example, many religions suggest I should increase my belief in God, not based on the arrival of greater evidence for God, but based on the notion I won’t be able to otherwise acquire the “salvation” of that God. Is this rational? Should the act of making a decision change the probability assessments on which the decision was made? In other words, if I assess I have a 10% chance of surviving a fight with the bear chasing me and a 15% chance of surviving an attempted jump over a gorge to escape the bear, should my decision to jump over the gorge increase my initial 15% confidence I’ll survive the gorge jump?
- To confirm, decisions to act are not evidence. Therefore, any decision to act should not affect the probabilistic assessment that led to the decision to act. Correct?
- How can we describe in psychological terms the drive to increase the assessed probabilities in the direction of a decision based on those probabilities?
- Is this notion of a decision illegitimately moving a credence independent of evidence relevant to Kierkegaard’s epistemology?
- Do Kierkegaard and other Christian philosophers include in their epistemological models a way to measure the success or predictability of their “leaps of faith” disjointed from the degree of relevant evidence?
- You said, “However, even within this more rational framework, the predictability of faith’s outcomes remains a matter of divine mystery rather than empirical evidence.” What is the predictive strength in Kierkegaard’s faith?
- Your response is equivalent to saying there is no observable predictive strength in faith, right?
- Does Kierkegaard offer us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments?
- My question was whether Kierkegaard offers us coherent and applicable guidance on the proper balance of reason and faith when we make epistemic judgments. Based on your last response above, the answer is not actually “no”, right?
- Create a 5-item quiz based on the discussion above with answers at the end.
- Provide 10 discussion questions on the content above.
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