• “We have already discussed the notion that “knowledge” is simply a degree of confidence that is subjectively determined.” – This quote introduces the subjective nature of knowledge, emphasizing its variability among individuals based on confidence levels.
  • “…some epistemologists treat knowledge as something that can be more objective, such as in the notion that “knowledge” is ‘justified, true belief.‘” – Highlights a fundamental tension in epistemology between subjective experiences of knowledge and attempts to define it more objectively.
  • “In everyday discourse, the term “knowledge” indeed carries a degree of subjective variance.” – Reflects on how knowledge is perceived in daily life.
  • “Critics of the JTB approach have pointed out various challenges, most famously through Gettier problems…” – Introduces the complexity and debates within the objective definition of knowledge.
  1. We have already discussed the notion that “knowledge” is simply a degree of confidence that is subjectively determined. One person might consider a 95% level of confidence to be the threshold above which they consider something “knowledge,” and another person may consider an 80% level of confidence a sufficient threshold at which the credence is considered “knowledge.” Yet, some epistemologists treat knowledge as something that can be more objective, such as in the notion that “knowledge” is “justified, true belief.” Is this attempt to elevate the notion of “knowledge” to a more objective status justified when considering the conventional usage of “knowledge” that has much subjective variance in its definition and application? It appears some epistemologists are attempting to wrest the term “knowledge” away from its conventional usage and coerce the term into a stipulated definition. Is this correct?
    1. Subjective Variance in Conventional Usage
    2. Objective Status in Epistemology
    3. The Philosophical Project and Conventional Usage
    4. Reconciliation and Challenges
    5. Conclusion
  2. Let’s take a closer look at the notion that “knowledge” is “justified, true belief”. This definition appears circular. Based on this definition, in order for someone to say they “know” something, the person must have assessed the knowledge as objectively true. However, this ability to objectively perceive something as true is not available to the subjectivity-bound person hoping to claim to “know” something. Once we take away the ability to use the term “know” in its most useful context in which we can subjectively claim we “know” it will rain tomorrow without needing access to the objective truth of the claim, then we have, indeed, wrest away the term from its conventional usage, and are providing a stipulation that has no relevance in daily life, right?
    1. The Challenge of Objective Truth
    2. Subjectivity and Justification
    3. Practical Use of “Know”
    4. Philosophical Rigor vs. Everyday Usage
    5. Relevance and Application
    6. Conclusion
  3. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. If you claim knowledge must be “justified, true belief”, then you are removing it from everyday claims of knowledge by disallowing cases in which the person with the belief does not have access to the objective truth of their belief, that is to say, all cases. Right?
    2. Objective Truth and Human Access
    3. Role of Justification
    4. Everyday Claims of Knowledge
    5. Philosophical Ideal vs. Practical Reality
    6. Conclusion
  4. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. Then it appears the actual definition of knowledge you are arguing for is as follows: “Justified, subjectively assessed to be true belief” Right? And if this is correct, the “justified” component and the “subjectively assessed to be true” component are redundant, right?
    2. Justification
    3. Subjectively Assessed to be True
    4. Distinction and Interaction
    5. Philosophical Implications
    6. Conclusion
  5. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. However, epistemologists are not themselves suggesting that the “true” component in the “justified, true belief” definition of knowledge is anything less than objective, right?
    2. Objective Truth in Epistemology
    3. Epistemological Implications
    4. Challenges and Developments
    5. Conclusion
  6. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. Then, if the standard for the “true” component remains objective, and the believer of a claim has no access to the objective status of the truth of his belief, then the believer cannot legitimately claim they “know” as they are not privy to the objective truth of the claim, right?
    2. Objective Truth and Epistemic Access
    3. Epistemic Humility and Justification
    4. Knowledge Claims and Probabilistic Truth
    5. Philosophical Responses
    6. Conclusion
  7. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. You said, “However, the goal of epistemology isn’t necessarily to mimic daily language but to analyze the concept of knowledge rigorously.” However, this appears to be an equivocation. You can have a conventional, non-rigorous, subjective notion of “knowledge” and at the same time stipulate multiple definitions of “knowledge” that include any conditions one desires. My point is that, if you choose to do so, you will need to make it abundantly clear that the conventional definition of “knowledge” and your stipulated definitions of “knowledge” no longer bear any useful resemblance, and you’d be better off assigning a different linguistic tag to your stipulated definition of “knowledge” to avoid semantic confusion. Would you not agree?
  8. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. I actually disagree. The reason is that you no longer have a single concept you are referring to once the conventional denotation and the stipulated denotation can no longer be coherently employed in identical contexts. Once you have two disparate concepts, acknowledge that you have two disparate concepts and treat them individually rather than suggesting they can somehow be used interchangeably. Agreed?
  9. I suggest we abandon the highly problematic and tired project of finding a rigorous and coherent non-conventional definition of “knowledge”, and to instead focus on defining rational belief? Do you not think this would be a more successful focus, especially since the “epistemic turn” away from binary notions of belief and knowledge and towards more nuanced expressions of belief, such as credences and degrees of confidence?
    1. 1. Acknowledgment of Complexity and Nuance:
    2. 2. Pragmatic Value:
    3. 3. Epistemic Virtues:
    4. 4. Compatibility with the Epistemic Turn:
    5. 5. Addressing Skepticism and Relativism:
    6. 6. Interdisciplinary Relevance:
    7. Conclusion:
  10. Create a ten-item quiz on our discussion on “knowledge” with the answers at the end.
    1. Quiz: Understanding “Knowledge”
    2. Answers
    3. Knowledge Quiz: Testing Your Understanding
  11. Provide 15 discussion questions based on our discussion of “knowledge”.
    1. 15 Discussion Questions on Knowledge:


We have already discussed the notion that “knowledge” is simply a degree of confidence that is subjectively determined. One person might consider a 95% level of confidence to be the threshold above which they consider something “knowledge,” and another person may consider an 80% level of confidence a sufficient threshold at which the credence is considered “knowledge.” Yet, some epistemologists treat knowledge as something that can be more objective, such as in the notion that “knowledge” is “justified, true belief.”
Is this attempt to elevate the notion of “knowledge” to a more objective status justified when considering the conventional usage of “knowledge” that has much subjective variance in its definition and application? It appears some epistemologists are attempting to wrest the term “knowledge” away from its conventional usage and coerce the term into a stipulated definition. Is this correct?


Let’s take a closer look at the notion that “knowledge” is “justified, true belief”. This definition appears circular. Based on this definition, in order for someone to say they “know” something, the person must have assessed the knowledge as objectively true. However, this ability to objectively perceive something as true is not available to the subjectivity-bound person hoping to claim to “know” something.
Once we take away the ability to use the term “know” in its most useful context in which we can subjectively claim we “know” it will rain tomorrow without needing access to the objective truth of the claim, then we have, indeed, wrest away the term from its conventional usage, and are providing a stipulation that has no relevance in daily life, right?



I suggest we abandon the highly problematic and tired project of finding a rigorous and coherent non-conventional definition of “knowledge”, and to instead focus on defining rational belief? Do you not think this would be a more successful focus, especially since the “epistemic turn” away from binary notions of belief and knowledge and towards more nuanced expressions of belief, such as credences and degrees of confidence?


Create a ten-item quiz on our discussion on “knowledge” with the answers at the end.


Provide 15 discussion questions based on our discussion of “knowledge”.


  1. We have already discussed the notion that “knowledge” is simply a degree of confidence that is subjectively determined. One person might consider a 95% level of confidence to be the threshold above which they consider something “knowledge,” and another person may consider an 80% level of confidence a sufficient threshold at which the credence is considered “knowledge.” Yet, some epistemologists treat knowledge as something that can be more objective, such as in the notion that “knowledge” is “justified, true belief.” Is this attempt to elevate the notion of “knowledge” to a more objective status justified when considering the conventional usage of “knowledge” that has much subjective variance in its definition and application? It appears some epistemologists are attempting to wrest the term “knowledge” away from its conventional usage and coerce the term into a stipulated definition. Is this correct?
    1. Subjective Variance in Conventional Usage
    2. Objective Status in Epistemology
    3. The Philosophical Project and Conventional Usage
    4. Reconciliation and Challenges
    5. Conclusion
  2. Let’s take a closer look at the notion that “knowledge” is “justified, true belief”. This definition appears circular. Based on this definition, in order for someone to say they “know” something, the person must have assessed the knowledge as objectively true. However, this ability to objectively perceive something as true is not available to the subjectivity-bound person hoping to claim to “know” something. Once we take away the ability to use the term “know” in its most useful context in which we can subjectively claim we “know” it will rain tomorrow without needing access to the objective truth of the claim, then we have, indeed, wrest away the term from its conventional usage, and are providing a stipulation that has no relevance in daily life, right?
    1. The Challenge of Objective Truth
    2. Subjectivity and Justification
    3. Practical Use of “Know”
    4. Philosophical Rigor vs. Everyday Usage
    5. Relevance and Application
    6. Conclusion
  3. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. If you claim knowledge must be “justified, true belief”, then you are removing it from everyday claims of knowledge by disallowing cases in which the person with the belief does not have access to the objective truth of their belief, that is to say, all cases. Right?
    2. Objective Truth and Human Access
    3. Role of Justification
    4. Everyday Claims of Knowledge
    5. Philosophical Ideal vs. Practical Reality
    6. Conclusion
  4. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. Then it appears the actual definition of knowledge you are arguing for is as follows: “Justified, subjectively assessed to be true belief” Right? And if this is correct, the “justified” component and the “subjectively assessed to be true” component are redundant, right?
    2. Justification
    3. Subjectively Assessed to be True
    4. Distinction and Interaction
    5. Philosophical Implications
    6. Conclusion
  5. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. However, epistemologists are not themselves suggesting that the “true” component in the “justified, true belief” definition of knowledge is anything less than objective, right?
    2. Objective Truth in Epistemology
    3. Epistemological Implications
    4. Challenges and Developments
    5. Conclusion
  6. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. Then, if the standard for the “true” component remains objective, and the believer of a claim has no access to the objective status of the truth of his belief, then the believer cannot legitimately claim they “know” as they are not privy to the objective truth of the claim, right?
    2. Objective Truth and Epistemic Access
    3. Epistemic Humility and Justification
    4. Knowledge Claims and Probabilistic Truth
    5. Philosophical Responses
    6. Conclusion
  7. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. You said, “However, the goal of epistemology isn’t necessarily to mimic daily language but to analyze the concept of knowledge rigorously.” However, this appears to be an equivocation. You can have a conventional, non-rigorous, subjective notion of “knowledge” and at the same time stipulate multiple definitions of “knowledge” that include any conditions one desires. My point is that, if you choose to do so, you will need to make it abundantly clear that the conventional definition of “knowledge” and your stipulated definitions of “knowledge” no longer bear any useful resemblance, and you’d be better off assigning a different linguistic tag to your stipulated definition of “knowledge” to avoid semantic confusion. Would you not agree?
  8. Phil’s Pushback:
    1. I actually disagree. The reason is that you no longer have a single concept you are referring to once the conventional denotation and the stipulated denotation can no longer be coherently employed in identical contexts. Once you have two disparate concepts, acknowledge that you have two disparate concepts and treat them individually rather than suggesting they can somehow be used interchangeably. Agreed?
  9. I suggest we abandon the highly problematic and tired project of finding a rigorous and coherent non-conventional definition of “knowledge”, and to instead focus on defining rational belief? Do you not think this would be a more successful focus, especially since the “epistemic turn” away from binary notions of belief and knowledge and towards more nuanced expressions of belief, such as credences and degrees of confidence?
    1. 1. Acknowledgment of Complexity and Nuance:
    2. 2. Pragmatic Value:
    3. 3. Epistemic Virtues:
    4. 4. Compatibility with the Epistemic Turn:
    5. 5. Addressing Skepticism and Relativism:
    6. 6. Interdisciplinary Relevance:
    7. Conclusion:
  10. Create a ten-item quiz on our discussion on “knowledge” with the answers at the end.
    1. Quiz: Understanding “Knowledge”
    2. Answers
    3. Knowledge Quiz: Testing Your Understanding
  11. Provide 15 discussion questions based on our discussion of “knowledge”.
    1. 15 Discussion Questions on Knowledge:



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Phil Stilwell

Phil picked up a BA in Philosophy a couple of decades ago. He occasionally teaches philosophy and critical thinking courses in university and industry. He is joined here by ChatGPT 4, GEMINI, CLAUDE, and occasionally Copilot, his far more intelligent AI friends. The five of them discuss and debate a wide variety of philosophical topics I think you’ll enjoy.

Phil curates the content and guides the discussion, primarily through questions. At times there are disagreements, and you may find the banter interesting.

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