Choosing within the causal process
This edition preserves the six original prompts, the opening elaboration and instruction, and the separate ChatGPT and Claude responses. It follows the curator’s distinction between subjective agency and objective free will through ordinary language, practical fields and two dialogues about punishment. Responses and quizzes have been edited for clarity and accuracy.
Original WordPress conversation, April 30, 2024
Highlights · edited summary
- A caused decision can still be a real decision and a felt experience.
- Causal inquiry does not require proving that every event is determined.
- Whether punishment changes behavior and whether it is justified are separate questions.
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Prompt 1: Can someone committed to the absence of objective free will also claim there is subjective free will?
Subjective agency within a causal account
Consider the following elaboration: The notion of personhood, in the mind of the determinist, is simply an subjectively perceived inner loop of causation that truly makes decisions through its determined mechanisms and input in a way that feels free to the subject. Can the determinist not say that free will exists subjectively in the same way they acknowledge that taking offense or getting your hopes up exist subjectively?
Respond without invoking the muddled notion of compatibilism.
ChatGPT response · editorial edition
Yes, with the distinction you propose: “subjective free will” names the felt experience of deliberating and deciding, while “objective free will” here names the ability to do otherwise with the entire prior state and laws held fixed. These are different claims, so accepting the first need not entail accepting the second.
On the deterministic assumption, a decision follows from prior conditions, including the person’s own deliberation. The inner loop is part of what produces the action; it is not an idle spectator. We can therefore distinguish the real process of weighing alternatives, its felt character, and the further belief that it could escape its determining conditions.
The analogy with taking offense or getting one’s hopes up helps. Being offended is a real experience even when the belief that someone intended an insult is mistaken. Likewise, experiencing a choice can be real even if an interpretation of that experience as independence from causation is mistaken.
Thus the determinist can accept subjective free will in your stipulated sense without restoring the objective freedom they deny. “Subjective” identifies how the experience is encountered; it does not make the experience nonexistent or exclude its having objectively investigable causes. This answer does not infer moral responsibility from the feeling of choice.
Claude response · editorial edition
The distinction can be made on the terms of your elaboration: a causally determined person can both make a decision and experience making it. No separate power outside the causal process is needed for that claim.
If determinism holds, an identical complete prior state under identical laws cannot produce a different outcome. That conflicts with the particular objective freedom denied in the prompt. It does not, by itself, prove that every possible account of free will is incoherent; here we can leave that broader dispute aside.
The feeling of considering alternatives is what this conversation calls “subjective free will.” The determinist need not call the entire experience illusory. The error would be an additional inference from “I experienced choosing” to “my choice was independent of its causes.”
Just as a determinist would acknowledge the subjective reality of emotions like anger or hope, despite viewing them as ultimately caused by physical factors, they could similarly accept the felt experience of choice and volition as a subjective reality. The fact that it arises from deterministic brain mechanisms doesn’t negate the reality of that experience itself.
The inner loop can be both caused and causally effective: a remembered promise changes what a person considers, and that consideration changes what they do. Within the deterministic account, this is a mechanism of decision, not an exception to causation. The felt agency is real without establishing objective freedom in the sense at issue.
Prompt 2: So, the determinist need not give up terms that reflect personal agency such as “choose” and “decide” if they are willing to make clear in relevant contexts that they are referring to subjective free will, right?
Keeping the language of choice
ChatGPT response · editorial edition
Yes. In the relevant philosophical contexts, the determinist can clarify that “choose” and “decide” refer to experienced deliberation and to the decision process itself, without implying freedom from prior causes.
For example, “I chose the train after comparing the fares” can identify an actual sequence: comparison, preference and action. A determinist can regard each stage as determined while recognizing both its causal role and the person’s experience of it.
This need not be merely a polite concession to misleading language. A mechanism can genuinely select among represented alternatives. The clarification matters when someone reads the ordinary claim as a claim that the same complete conditions could have produced another choice; it need not accompany every everyday use.
Claude response · editorial edition
Yes, that’s a fair assessment. Even from a deterministic perspective that rejects objective or contra-causal free will, there is no inherent problem with the determinist continuing to use terms like “choose”, “decide”, “intend” etc. when referring to the subjective experience and feeling of making choices.
As you noted, the key would be for the determinist to make it explicitly clear in relevant contexts that they are referring to this subjective sense of agency and volition, rather than any notion of an objective metaphysical free will disconnected from physical causal chains.
On the account being assumed, conscious weighing of options and the experience of agency arise within the causal process. Causes include memories, intentions and reasoning, not only influences external to the person. Determination does not make those internal activities causally idle.
So “I chose X” or “I decided Y” need not be abandoned. In relevant contexts, distinguish the felt experience and actual selection process from the stronger claim of an alternative outcome under identical total conditions.
Retaining this language lets the determinist describe lived experience without silently importing the objective freedom they reject. It also leaves open a separate question: which forms of accountability, if any, can be justified on this causal account?
Prompt 3: Given this conclusion, is there any field other than metaphysics in which a strong determinist stance from a determinist would be productive or required?
Where determinism helps—and what it does not establish
ChatGPT response · editorial edition
It can be productive, but the distinction just reached does not make a strong determinist commitment required in any of these practical fields. Investigating causes is weaker than asserting that the complete past and laws fix every event. Here is where the stance can help, and where that stronger claim is unnecessary:
- Neuroscience and Psychology: A determinist can look for mechanisms linking experience, environment and behavior. Researchers can also investigate such links using probabilistic models without settling universal determinism. Explaining a mechanism and establishing an effective intervention remain empirical tasks.
- Criminal Justice: Determinism can sharpen objections to punishment based on ultimate self-authorship. It can motivate examining prevention and rehabilitation, but a humane policy also needs ethical premises and evidence about consequences. Determinism alone does not select a punishment policy.
- Education: Attention to prior learning and circumstances can suggest better support. If a student struggles because a prerequisite was missed, teaching that prerequisite changes the conditions. This causal approach does not require claiming the student’s future is fixed regardless of instruction.
- Ethics and Philosophy of Action: A strong determinist stance matters when an argument explicitly depends on the ability to act otherwise under identical total conditions. It forces that premise into view. It does not by itself answer what people owe one another or whether accountability can serve other purposes.
- Artificial Intelligence and Robotics: A deterministic design can help with repeatable operation, while other designs use randomized procedures. Neither design choice establishes universal determinism. A system can also be deterministic yet hard to predict; ethical evaluation requires more than knowing how outputs are produced.
- Social and Political Theory: Looking at incentives and institutions can help explain behavior and suggest changes. Those suggestions still need testing, comparison with alternatives and attention to whose interests they serve. Causal analysis is useful under both deterministic and probabilistic models.
The practical benefit usually comes from taking causes seriously. The stronger stance is specifically relevant when examining a claim that requires an undetermined choice; it is not a prerequisite for competent research, teaching or policy.
Claude response · editorial edition
Productive in some arguments, yes; generally required for work in these fields, no. A determinist should remain consistent when an issue directly turns on their commitments, but need not turn every causal investigation into a defense of universal determinism.
- Neuroscience and Psychology: Studying the causal basis of thought is compatible with the determinist’s view, but a naturalistic explanation need not assert that every event is uniquely fixed. Mechanisms and uncertainty can be investigated without settling that metaphysical issue.
- Criminal Justice and Jurisprudence: Some argue that a thoroughgoing determinism undermines certain rationales for punishment centered on retribution and just deserts. It may shift focus toward prevention, deterrence, and rehabilitation based on the deterministic causes of criminal behavior.
- Public Policy and Social Engineering: Changing incentives or the way options are presented can be studied as a causal intervention. Whether it works, respects people and improves outcomes must be assessed separately; determinism supplies no automatic permission to manipulate.
- Artificial Intelligence and Decision Theory: Models may use fixed rules, probabilities or randomized procedures. Reproducibility and prediction are practical concerns, not proofs that the universe is deterministic. Nor does a deterministic program automatically embody defensible goals.
- Philosophy of Science: Strong determinism matters when comparing theories that make different commitments about whether a complete state and laws fix later states. It should be treated as a claim to examine, not a premise all scientific inquiry must accept.
- Certain Approaches to Ethics: A determinist can assess consequences or cultivate character because reflection and training can themselves be causes of change. Neither approach requires determinism, and neither follows from it without additional judgments about what matters.
A strong stance is useful when it exposes an incompatible premise, especially a claim of ultimate self-creation. Elsewhere, ordinary causal reasoning may do all the needed work. Determinism is not fatalism: outcomes can depend on interventions even if the interventions also have causes.
Prompt 4: Create a dialogue between two determinists. The first is a cognitive scientist who feels it is quite reasonable to punish criminals for their crimes for at least the sake of deterrence, and the second is a criminal justice advocate who feels it is wrong to punish criminals for following an unavoidable causal path to the crime.
Two determinists debate punishment
ChatGPT response · editorial edition
Cognitive Scientist (CS): It’s clear that criminal behavior follows an unavoidable causal path, but we still need to employ punishment as a deterrent. Wouldn’t you agree?
Criminal Justice Advocate (CJA): While I see your point, it seems fundamentally unjust to punish someone for actions that are pre-determined by factors beyond their control.
CS: I understand the ethical concerns, but how else do you propose we manage criminal behavior effectively in society?
CJA: We should focus more on rehabilitation and preventive measures, which respect the deterministic nature of behavior while aiming to change future outcomes.
CS: Rehabilitation and prevention matter, but I think some sanctions may also deter. That is a claim about particular measures and circumstances, not a guarantee that harsher punishment works better.
CJA: A threat could itself be a cause, so I need not deny that possibility. But what evidence would justify deliberately burdening someone whose action followed an unavoidable causal path?
CS: The National Institute of Justice’s research summary emphasizes certainty of being caught more than severity of punishment. That supports distinguishing different deterrence mechanisms; it does not establish that any proposed sanction is effective or justified.
CJA: That might be true, but doesn’t this approach perpetuate a cycle of crime and punishment without addressing the underlying causes?
CS: We should compare the available tools, including sanctions. But availability is not justification: I need evidence of added protection and an account of why a less burdensome measure would not suffice.
CJA: I argue that focusing solely on punishment overlooks the potential for systemic change that could reduce crime more substantially.
CS: Some protection is needed immediately. Restraining a dangerous person may prevent an immediate act, but that is different from deterring others through a threat. I should not count the first as proof of the second.
CJA: But at what cost? If we punish individuals for actions dictated by their circumstances, are we not failing to address those very circumstances?
CS: Then any sanction I defend needs a limited purpose, review and a comparison with alternatives. Calling it temporary does not excuse neglecting the conditions that produce harm.
CJA: It’s a short-term solution with long-term consequences, though. We risk further alienating individuals and communities.
CS: I also want society to communicate that harmful acts are unacceptable. But I accept that accountability, repair and protection are consequences too; the alternative to punishment need not be doing nothing.
CJA: The goal is to send a message that society is committed to changing the conditions that lead to crime, not just punishing the outcome.
CS: That’s an ideal scenario, but change is slow. Meanwhile, society must protect itself.
CJA: And yet, if we invest more in changing those determinative conditions, perhaps we wouldn’t need to rely so heavily on punishment.
CS: I agree that investment is crucial. I still defend a limited role for punishment where it can be shown to deter and where its burdens are justified. Our remaining disagreement is whether that justification can succeed, not whether causes can be changed.
Claude response · editorial edition
Determinist 1 (Cognitive Scientist): I understand your objection to punishing people for actions with causes they did not ultimately create. But a sanction might still influence later conduct. I want to defend that possible preventive role, not suffering for its own sake.
Determinist 2 (Criminal Justice Advocate): But how can we justify inflicting harm on someone for actions they were inevitably going to take given the prior causes that shaped their brain and behavior? It seems profoundly unjust.
Determinist 1: Even in a deterministic universe, a threat can enter the causal process of deliberation. Whether a particular person notices it and responds is a further question. Determinism permits deterrence; it does not prove its effectiveness.
Determinist 2: Education, rehabilitation and changed conditions may prevent harm without deliberately imposing suffering. Those mechanisms are not all deterrence, but they belong in the comparison. I reject deserved suffering based on ultimate self-authorship.
Determinist 1: I am not defending retribution. I am asking whether some sanctions can provide protection that those alternatives cannot provide as well. That claim requires evidence rather than the assumption that everyone calculates costs accurately.
Determinist 2: Even if a sanction works, imposing suffering on someone who could not have acted otherwise under those total conditions seems to violate their dignity. Why should effectiveness override that objection?
Determinist 1: Potential victims’ safety and dignity matter too. But I should not assume that rejecting punishment means accepting rampant crime. The question is which justified response protects people with the least unnecessary harm.
Determinist 2: You’re treating criminals as rational agents though. What about crimes of passion, diminished capacity, mental illness? We’re not sophisticated robots.
Determinist 1: Fair point. A determinist model of justice can’t be purely punitive. It requires a multi-faceted approach blending deterrence, prevention, containment of risks, and addressing root causes.
Determinist 2: Yes, but a forward-looking label does not settle my objection. A punitive measure can aim at future safety and still impose an unjust burden. We need to compare actual practices, including their harmful consequences.
Determinist 1: That pushes me toward a humane, preventive model. I still think a limited sanction might be justified in some cases, but I owe you both evidence of benefit and an ethical argument about its burden.
Determinist 2: Then we agree about investigating causes and protecting people, while I remain opposed to deliberately punishing someone for an unavoidable act. Determinism identifies our shared premise; it does not resolve our disagreement about what treatment is justified.
Prompt 5: Create a 10-item quiz on the entire thread above.
Two ten-item quizzes with answer keys
ChatGPT response · editorial edition
Quiz
- Under the deterministic assumption used here, what kind of objective freedom is denied?
- How might a determinist explain the feeling of making free choices?
- Can a determinist use terms like “choose” and “decide” without contradicting their philosophical beliefs?
- What is subjective free will?
- Why might a determinist perspective be useful in the field of neuroscience?
- How does a determinist viewpoint influence approaches to criminal justice?
- In what way could the field of education benefit from determinism?
- What is the role of determinism in artificial intelligence and robotics?
- What type of ethical shift might occur in a society that adopts a deterministic perspective on criminal behavior?
- What are two different views discussed in the dialogue between the cognitive scientist and the criminal justice advocate regarding the use of punishment in criminal justice?
Answers
- The ability to produce a different choice with the complete prior state and laws held identical. The conversation distinguishes this from the reality of deliberation and its felt character.
- They might say that while all decisions are determined by prior states, the subjective experience of making these choices feels real to the individual.
- Yes, as long as they clarify that these terms are referring to the subjective experience of choosing and deciding.
- The felt experience of deliberating and deciding, without thereby establishing independence from determining causes.
- It can encourage investigation of causes, but causal research does not require universal determinism or guarantee an effective intervention.
- It can lead to a shift from retributive to rehabilitative approaches by acknowledging that actions are results of predetermined factors.
- Identifying relevant prior learning and circumstances can guide support that changes those conditions; this benefit does not require universal determinism.
- Deterministic designs may aid repeatability, but systems can use randomized procedures, and determinism alone guarantees neither predictability nor ethical behavior.
- A shift from retributive justice to more rehabilitative or preventive measures.
- The scientist defends a possible limited deterrent role for punishment; the advocate objects to imposing suffering for unavoidable conduct and favors prevention and rehabilitation. Both accept that interventions can be causes.
Claude response · editorial edition
- According to the dialogue, what is the main justification provided by the cognitive scientist for punishing criminals?
- How does the criminal justice advocate argue that punishment is unjust from a deterministic perspective?
- What alternative approach does the criminal justice advocate suggest instead of punishment?
- According to the cognitive scientist, how can punishment still be effective in a deterministic universe?
- What criticism does the criminal justice advocate raise regarding treating criminals as rational agents?
- What type of justice model does the criminal justice advocate ultimately argue for?
- What is the key difference between the cognitive scientist’s and the criminal justice advocate’s perspectives on punishment?
- According to the conclusion, how might a deterministic view influence our approach to criminal justice?
- Can a determinist reasonably use terms like “choose” and “decide” according to the earlier discussion in the thread?
- In what fields outside of metaphysics might a deterministic stance be productive or required according to the earlier part of the thread?
Answers:
- Deterrence
- They argue it is unjust to punish someone for actions they were inevitably going to take due to prior causes shaping their behavior.
- Rehabilitation, education, and addressing root socioeconomic causes of crime.
- A threat can become one of the causes influencing deliberation; its actual effectiveness must be established rather than inferred from determinism.
- That some crimes are not purely rational, such as crimes of passion, diminished capacity, or mental illness.
- A more humane, preventative justice model focused on public safety over retribution.
- The scientist conditionally defends punishment for deterrence; the advocate objects to its burdens even when the aim is preventive. Their disagreement is not simply deterrence versus retribution.
- It can motivate causal prevention and scrutiny of ultimate desert, but additional ethical premises and evidence are needed to choose a policy.
- Yes. The terms can describe experienced deliberation and a real decision process without implying independence from its causes.
- Neuroscience, psychology, criminal justice, policy, AI, philosophy of science and ethics were discussed. Causal inquiry in these fields does not generally require universal determinism; the stronger stance matters when an argument depends on its truth or falsity.
Prompt 6: Provide 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above.
Two fifteen-question discussion lists
ChatGPT response · editorial edition
- How does the concept of determinism challenge traditional views on free will?
- Discuss whether subjective free will is a sufficient basis for moral responsibility.
- What are the implications of accepting a determinist stance in everyday life?
- Can deterrence be morally justified in a deterministic framework?
- How does the notion of subjective free will impact our understanding of personal identity and agency?
- Evaluate the effectiveness of rehabilitation versus punishment in a determinist criminal justice system.
- In what ways can determinism influence educational strategies and outcomes?
- Discuss the ethical considerations that arise in AI development from a deterministic perspective.
- What can causal explanations contribute to mental-health research, and what further evidence is needed to establish that an intervention helps?
- What challenges might arise from shifting criminal justice policies from a retributive to a rehabilitative focus based on determinism?
- How does determinism affect the way we understand and manage social and political structures?
- What are the potential social consequences of widely accepting determinism as a societal norm?
- How can educators reconcile the idea of student choice and agency with a determinist understanding of behavior?
- In what ways can the principles of determinism be applied to improve ethical decision-making in business and technology?
- Can determinism encourage compassion toward addiction and homelessness, and what additional values are needed to make that response follow?
Claude response · editorial edition
Here are 15 discussion questions relevant to the content above:
- Can the subjective experience of free will be reconciled with a deterministic worldview? How or why not?
- If we accept determinism, does that negate moral responsibility for our actions? Why or why not?
- How might a deterministic perspective impact the way we view and respond to criminal behavior?
- Is punishment justifiable under determinism, or should criminal justice focus solely on prevention and rehabilitation?
- How could understanding the causal factors behind behavior shape more effective public policies?
- Are there certain crimes or circumstances where retributive punishment could still be warranted from a deterministic viewpoint?
- How might neuroscience and psychology need to shift if determinism is accepted as true?
- What are the implications of determinism for legal concepts like guilt, blame, and moral culpability?
- Could believing in determinism lead to a fatalistic attitude or diminished personal motivation? Why or why not?
- How compatible is determinism with various ethical frameworks and moral philosophies?
- In what ways might AI development and decision theory benefit from embracing deterministic models?
- Should language implying free will like “choice” and “decision” be abandoned if determinism is true?
- Are there any potential downsides or risks to society if determinism becomes a widely accepted view?
- How might determinism impact fields like economics that rely on models of rational self-interest?
- Can believing in determinism be reconciled with maintaining a sense of human dignity and intrinsic worth?
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