A stable opinion is not automatically a justified probability

The original four prompts and two response tracks are restored, including the request to calculate a solution and its source diagram. The edited responses correct the swapped priors, invalid probability and inconsistent equations while retaining the curator’s question about recursive dependence.

Original WordPress conversation, April 7, 2024

Highlights · edited summary

  • The diagram gives Alex 75%, Ben 50% and Carl 30% initial confidence.
  • Reported trust does not directly measure actual accuracy.
  • Recursion can be calculated once a rule is specified; the supplied facts do not uniquely specify that rule.

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  1. Case #1 – Credence Complexity

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Prompt 1: How can this interdependent recursive probability problem be resolved to assign the claim a proper degree of credence after updating the priors with an assessment of the statements of the 3 friends on the reliability of the others? We won’t assume the availability of any other evidential input. I don’t have an answer. Does the recursion prevent an answer?

What the trust loop does and does not specify

Claim: I have 15 brothers. Alex starts at 75% confidence, Ben at 50%, Carl at 30%. Alex believes 40% of what Ben says; Ben believes 70% of what Carl says; Carl believes 20% of what Alex says.

ChatGPT response · editorial edition

The diagram gives Alex 75%, Ben 50% and Carl 30% initial confidence in “I have 15 brothers.” Alex believes 40% of what Ben says, Ben 70% of what Carl says, and Carl 20% of what Alex says. These are reported attitudes. They do not establish anyone’s actual accuracy or tell us how much new information each report contains.

Recursion alone does not prevent a mathematical answer. The obstacle is that no rule connects these attitudes to a uniquely justified probability of the claim. We can calculate what happens under an explicitly chosen rule without adding observations, but choosing that rule adds assumptions. Iterating the same testimony must not silently count it as fresh evidence each time.

Here’s a step-by-step approach:

  1. Assign initial beliefs: Use (0.75, 0.50, 0.30) in Alex–Ben–Carl order. Keep these distinct from the three trust reports.
  2. Establish relationships: Draw Alex → Ben → Carl → Alex, with reported trust 0.40, 0.70 and 0.20. Each arrow means “listens to,” not “has independently verified.”
  3. Create equations: Specify what a trust percentage does. Treating it as an averaging weight is one possible convention, not a consequence of probability theory or of the diagram.
  4. Iterate: If a rule is chosen, update all three values from the same previous round. Record whether each person retains the original prior or instead retains part of the previous opinion; these are different models.
  5. Check convergence: Test whether successive values settle and remain between zero and one. Convergence establishes stability under the rule, not the truth or calibration of the resulting beliefs. Failure to converge can reflect a simple oscillating rule, not overwhelming complexity.

For this small example, a chosen linear rule can be solved directly or iterated on a spreadsheet. Neither technique supplies the missing connection between testimony and truth. Would you like to attempt an iterative computational approach to see if we can resolve these probabilities? The next calculation will therefore distinguish an illustrative opinion model from a uniquely warranted answer.

Gemini response · editorial edition

The recursion can be modeled, but the diagram does not determine a unique probability for the claim. In particular, a friend’s stated confidence in another person is not that person’s measured truthfulness. Before solving equations we must decide what their variables mean.

Let’s define the variables:

  • p: An assessor’s probability that “I have 15 brothers” is true, conditional on the supplied information and a specified evidential model.
  • a: Alex’s actual reliability in a defined class of reports; not established by Carl’s 20% trust report.
  • b: Ben’s actual reliability in a defined class of reports; not established by Alex’s 40% trust report.
  • c: Carl’s actual reliability in a defined class of reports; not established by Ben’s 70% trust report.

The original response proposed the following equations. They are retained here as the attempted model to be checked, not as justified consequences of the diagram:

1) a = 0.2
2) b = 0.4
3) c = 0.7
4) p = 0.75a + 0.5(1−a)
5) p = 0.3b + 0.5(1−b)
6) p = 0.5c + 0.5(1−c)
Equations 1–3 substitute reported trust for actual reliability. Equations 5–6 also swap Ben’s and Carl’s priors: the diagram gives Ben 0.50 and Carl 0.30. The fallback 0.5 is an additional, unsupported assumption; being unreliable does not mean reporting by a fair coin.

These six equations are linear, not nonlinear. Substituting a = 0.2, b = 0.4 and c = 0.7 gives p = 0.55, p = 0.42 and p = 0.50. A single p cannot equal all three.

No iterative solver can make those fixed constraints simultaneously true. An approximation could minimize a chosen measure of disagreement, but that would introduce a new objective and would not turn the output into the probability requested.

Correcting the swapped priors alone does not repair the model: the three expressions would then give 0.55, 0.50 and 0.36. We still need a justified account of how the reports depend on the claim and on one another.

Thus we can diagnose the attempted equations exactly, even though the probability of the claim remains undetermined by the supplied facts. The missing ingredient is a defensible model, not merely more computing power.

Prompt 2: Please attempt to calculate a solution.

Calculating with explicit assumptions

ChatGPT response · editorial edition

An illustrative calculation is possible if we explicitly add a rule. Let A, B and C denote the three evolving opinions. Suppose each person repeatedly blends a fixed original prior with the current opinion of the next friend, using the stated trust as the blending weight. This convention is not entailed by “I believe 40% of what Ben says.” At a fixed point:

  • Original challenged result: Alex’s adjusted belief (pa) converges to approximately 109.53%(?). This is not a valid probability. Under the explicit illustrative rule instead: A = 0.60 × 0.75 + 0.40B = 0.45 + 0.40B.
  • Ben: B = 0.30 × 0.50 + 0.70C = 0.15 + 0.70C.
  • Carl: C = 0.80 × 0.30 + 0.20A = 0.24 + 0.20A.

Substitution gives A = 0.5772 + 0.056A, so A = 0.5772/0.944 ≈ 0.611441. Then C ≈ 0.362288 and B ≈ 0.403602. Starting from (0.75, 0.50, 0.30), simultaneous updates give (0.65, 0.36, 0.39), then (0.594, 0.423, 0.37), and converge to those values. Each step is a weighted average of valid probabilities. Differences between two starting states shrink by at least a factor of 0.70 per round, so this particular rule has a unique stable result.

These are three model-dependent opinions, not one established probability of the claim. The original response reported 109.53%, 86.33% and 51.91% without a reproducible rule. Its 109.53% cannot be a probability, and relabeling it “very confident” does not repair the calculation. The example above answers the request to attempt calculation while making the added convention visible; another defensible convention could produce a different result.

Gemini response · editorial edition

We can calculate whether the original proposed equations have a solution. This is a separate task from determining the truth probability. Keep the proposed symbols visible so the error can be located:

p: one claimed probability of the event; a, b, c: purported actual reliabilities of Alex, Ben and Carl. The original attempt assigned these from others’ opinions without justification.

Here is the original system, retained for diagnosis:

a = 0.2; b = 0.4; c = 0.7.
p = 0.75a + 0.5(1−a).
p = 0.3b + 0.5(1−b).
p = 0.5c + 0.5(1−c).

Because a, b and c are already fixed, no initial guesses or iterative updating are needed. Direct substitution settles whether the equations agree.

First constraint: p = 0.75(0.2) + 0.5(0.8) = 0.15 + 0.40 = 0.55.

Second constraint: p = 0.3(0.4) + 0.5(0.6) = 0.12 + 0.30 = 0.42.

Third constraint: p = 0.5(0.7) + 0.5(0.3) = 0.35 + 0.15 = 0.50.

The three required values differ. The original “Iteration 1” used a = b = 0.5 after declaring a = 0.2 and b = 0.4, so it was not evaluating its own stated constraints.

Its later iterations also evaluated 0.3(0.4) + 0.5(0.6) as 0.47. The correct result is 0.42.

Repeating an unchanged expression does not update the evidence or resolve the contradiction. The original 0.47, 0.47 and 0.50 were not within the stated tolerance of 0.01 either: their spread was 0.03.

Averaging inconsistent requirements is a different problem. For example, minimizing equally weighted squared deviations from the correctly computed values gives:

p = (0.55 + 0.42 + 0.50)/3 = 0.49. Its deviations from the constraints are −0.06, +0.07 and −0.01. This is an arithmetic compromise, not a simultaneous solution or a justified posterior probability.

The outcome of the requested calculation is therefore:

No exact solution exists for the original proposed system. The original reported p = 0.48 does not solve it. Moreover, Ben’s and Carl’s priors were swapped and reported trust was mistaken for actual reliability.

This failure belongs to the proposed equations; it does not prove that the curator’s scenario is impossible. With no new evidence, we can expose the inconsistency or explore an explicitly assumed opinion rule, as in the parallel response. We cannot honestly extract one uniquely warranted probability from the diagram alone.

Prompt 3: Please comment on how the complexity of the web of inductive dependencies is difficult for humans to calculate, and provide heuristics or solutions for this deficiency.

Managing the web of dependencies

ChatGPT response · editorial edition

The complexity of a web of inductive dependence, such as the one described in this scenario, poses significant challenges for human computation for several reasons:

  1. Interdependent relationships: A change can travel around a loop and return to its origin. These relationships need not be nonlinear; the illustrative model above is linear. The difficulty is tracking what depends on what.
  2. Iterative Nature: The adjustment of one belief potentially alters the basis on which another belief was adjusted, requiring multiple iterations to find a stable state—if one exists.
  3. Cognitive Load: Humans have limited working memory and can struggle to hold multiple, interconnected pieces of information in mind simultaneously, especially when the relationships between them are complex.
  4. Convergence: A simple rule may be checked by hand, but a larger network may need numerical or analytical tools. A program should report instability rather than conceal it behind a final decimal.
  5. Calibration: Confidence and accuracy differ. Where outcomes can later be checked, compare predictions with results; a stable collective opinion is not itself a calibration test.

To cope with these challenges, several heuristics and solutions can be adopted:

  1. Simplification: Break down the problem into simpler parts that can be understood individually before attempting to see how they interact as a whole.
  2. Visualization: Create diagrams or visual representations to map out the dependencies and relationships, which can make the structure of the problem clearer.
  3. Anchoring with care: Write down initial beliefs and their grounds. Retain them only as the chosen model specifies, and vary them to see how strongly they determine the result. An arbitrary starting number can create misleading certainty.
  4. Computational tools: Use a spreadsheet to check bounds, arithmetic, simultaneous updates and remaining equation errors. A faster solver cannot supply a missing evidential assumption.
  5. Algorithmic heuristics: Label every report with its source. If Alex’s report returns through Ben and Carl, do not automatically count the returning copy as independent confirmation.
  6. Educational Training: Develop better intuitions for complex probability through targeted education and practice with similar problems.
  7. Collaboration: Ask one person to check the diagram, another the equations and another the interpretation. Agreement is more informative when reviewers can trace independent grounds rather than merely repeat one another.
  8. Monte Carlo simulations: Random sampling can explore a specified probabilistic model or sensitivity to uncertain inputs. It does not manufacture missing evidence or guarantee convergence of an opinion loop; the three linear equations above need no simulation.

By combining these heuristics and solutions, humans can better cope with the complexities inherent in webs of inductive dependence.

Gemini response · editorial edition

This example illustrates two burdens: keeping track of interdependent reports and deciding what the reports justify. The first can often be delegated to arithmetic; the second requires explicit assumptions. Three people do not automatically create a nonlinear or computationally difficult system.

This difficulty stems from several factors:

  1. Cognitive limitations: Our ability to perform intricate probabilistic calculations, especially those involving recursive dependencies, is limited by the constraints of human cognitive architecture and working memory capacity.
  2. Combinatorial growth: A general model of many interacting uncertain variables can require a very large number of joint possibilities. Complexity depends on the representation and dependency structure; a simple linear averaging network is much easier than an unrestricted probability model.
  3. Opacity of inductive dependencies: In real-world situations, the inductive dependencies between beliefs and reliabilities are often opaque or implicit, making it challenging to explicitly represent them in a formal probabilistic framework.
  4. Uncertainty and incomplete information: The diagram gives precise reported beliefs, but not verified reliabilities, the evidence behind the priors, or the extent to which the friends share information.

To overcome these deficiencies and better handle complex inductive dependencies, several heuristics and potential solutions can be employed:

  1. Decomposition and simplification: Break down the problem into more manageable sub-components, make simplifying assumptions, or identify and focus on the most critical dependencies.
  2. Computational aids: Leverage computational tools, simulations, and numerical methods to offload the intricate calculations and explore different scenarios or parameter values.
  3. Graphical representations: Draw the communication loop first. A standard Bayesian network represents conditional dependencies with a directed graph without directed cycles; a cyclic conversation cannot simply be copied into it. If modeling successive rounds, distinguish each person’s state at each time.
  4. Bounded rationality: For a practical decision, compare plausible assumptions and ask whether they change the action. If they do, report that sensitivity. An unsupported precise number is not a useful approximation merely because it is easy to calculate.
  5. Heuristic reasoning: Trace claims to their earliest available source, flag shared sources, and separate “three people repeat it” from “three independent observations support it.”
  6. Expert elicitation: Outside this closed scenario, experts may help justify assumptions and assess sensitivity. Under the curator’s no-additional-evidence condition, expert input would change the problem and must not be slipped into the calculation.
  7. Iterative updating: Use iteration only after defining a coherent rule. The original failed calculation was not a valid demonstration. Repeatedly processing unchanged reports is computational iteration; learning from genuinely new evidence is an epistemic update.

Ultimately, while humans may struggle with intricate inductive dependency calculations, a combination of computational aids, graphical representations, heuristic reasoning, and bounded rationality approaches can help mitigate these deficiencies and enable more effective reasoning in complex probabilistic contexts.

Prompt 4: Provide a list of resources that might assess someone who wishes to explore this quandary further.

Resources for probability, consensus and judgment

ChatGPT response · editorial edition

The original list included loosely identified videos and blogs. These five specific alternatives provide a checkable route through the problem; a programming recursion lesson alone does not justify probabilistic updating.

  1. MIT: Probability Models and Axioms — a video introduction to specifying a probability model before calculating.
  2. MIT: Recursion and Dictionaries — lecture slides on programming recursion, useful background but distinct from probabilistic dependence.
  3. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Bayesian Epistemology — conceptual context for credence and updating; replaces the unspecified blog.
  4. Morris H. DeGroot: Reaching a Consensus (1974) — a mathematical opinion-pooling model; replaces the unidentified shortcut video. Read with Berger’s correction listed below.
  5. PyMC: Learn Bayesian Modeling — worked computational material for explicitly specified models; replaces the generic recursion tutorial.

Start with probability models, then compare the consensus paper with the philosophical discussion of justification. For practice, reproduce the three-person calculation above and change one assumption at a time. A numerical output should always travel with its assumptions.

Gemini response · editorial edition

The original five resource groups are retained. The three research-paper titles and three online-entry titles previously supplied were not established as reliable citations here; the entries below replace them with identifiable sources. Books and courses are retained with corrected descriptions and links.

Books:

  1. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases — edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky; background on intuitive probability judgment.
  2. Rational Choice in an Uncertain World — Reid Hastie and Robyn M. Dawes; rational standards and actual decision behavior.
  3. Judea Pearl, Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference (1988) — foundations of graphical probabilistic reasoning. This is background for constructing a model, not a solution determined by the three trust reports.

Online Courses:

  1. Probabilistic Graphical Models — Daphne Koller’s Stanford specialization on representing and reasoning with probability distributions.
  2. Bayesian Statistics: From Concept to Data Analysis — Herbert Lee’s course on Bayesian statistical reasoning.
  3. Probabilistic Systems Analysis and Applied Probability — MIT OpenCourseWare, including John Tsitsiklis’s lectures; probability models and inference.

Research Papers:

  1. Morris H. DeGroot, Reaching a Consensus (1974) — formalizes repeated opinion pooling; convergence is a property to establish, not assume.
  2. Roger L. Berger, A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Reaching a Consensus Using DeGroot’s Method (1981) — corrects a condition in the original consensus analysis.
  3. Peter M. DeMarzo, Dimitri Vayanos and Jeffrey Zwiebel, Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions (2003) — examines social influence when repeated information is not properly discounted.

Software Tools:

  1. HUGIN — tools for Bayesian network modeling; requires a specified model.
  2. GeNIe Modeler — graphical model construction and inference.
  3. PyMC — Bayesian modeling tutorials and examples; software cannot supply missing assumptions.

Online Resources:

  1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Bayesian Epistemology — credence, rational constraints and updating.
  2. MIT OpenCourseWare probability materials — lectures and exercises for checking calculations.
  3. PyMC learning documentation — examples for examining models and their predictions.

These resources address distinct tasks: calculating within a model, studying how opinions circulate, and assessing whether confidence is justified. No listed resource turns the diagram’s six reported percentages into a uniquely warranted probability without additional assumptions.

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Nearby pages in the same branch include Case #1 – Credence Complexity, Case #2 – The Telephone Game, Case #3 – Core Rationality, and Case #5 – Vanishing Probabilities; those links are not decorative, but suggested continuations where the pressure of this page becomes sharper, stranger, or more usefully contested.